Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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leads to higher estimates of the population at
This is evidenced, for example, in the remark-
risk in the A1FI scenario relative to the B1
able declines--99 percent or greater--during the
scenario.
20th century in mortality and morbidity rates
Second, neither the FTA studies nor the
in the United States for various water-related
Stern Review deal very satisfactorily with
diseases, e.g., typhoid, paratyphoid, dysentery,
malaria and various gastrointestinal diseases.26
endogenous adaptation. Some FTA studies
(e.g., the ones for hunger and coastal flood-
This study highlights the tension between
ing) allow for some "spontaneous" adaptive
the public health and environmental improve-
responses because it should be expected that
ments associated with wealth creation and
even in the absence of new governmental
technological advance on one hand and the
policies, people would employ existing tech-
countervailing negative impacts on the same
nologies to protect themselves from econom-
from increased greenhouse gas emissions on
ic or bodily harm even in a "business-as-
the other hand. By and large, as I will show, the
usual" world. Yet the study for water stress
FTA and Stern Review confirm that richer and
doesn't allow for any adaptation. And even
warmer worlds will not necessarily have lower
where the FTA studies allow for some adap-
levels of human and environmental well-being
tation, they limit the range of available tech-
than poorer but cooler worlds.
The FTA and
nological options to currently available tech-
Stern Review
nologies.28 But we should expect that the
The Impact of Climate
menu of technological options would be
confirm that
Change­Four Scenarios
much broader, more cost-effective, and more
richer and
affordable in the future under any scenario
warmer worlds
because of the following:
In this section I present the FTA's scenario
estimates of the populations at risk in 2085
will not necessari-
· The world will be wealthier under any of
with and without climate change for four cli-
ly have lower
mate-sensitive threats to human well-being--
the scenarios (see Table 1) and, there-
hunger, water stress, coastal flooding, and
fore, better able to develop, afford, and
levels of human
malaria--and on a number of environmental
implement new as well as improved
and environmen-
indicators that are also sensitive to climate.
technologies;
tal well-being
·
When comparing the population at risk
Technology will, through the accretion
from these threats without climate change
of knowledge, advance, even if society
than poorer but
with the population at risk from these threats
doesn't get any wealthier; and
cooler worlds.
·
with climate change, a couple of issues should
Even in the absence of specific policy
be kept in mind.
changes, new and improved technologies
First, the A1FI and B1 scenarios are
will inevitably be developed to specifical-
assumed by the IPCC to have the same popu-
ly cope with the negative impacts of cli-
lation in 2085. That assumption, however, is
mate change.
dubious. In the real world, lower total fertili-
ty rates are generally associated with higher
Hence, limiting adaptation between now
levels of economic development.27 Hence, the
and 2085 to "current" technologies is tanta-
mount to estimating today's food produc-
A1FI world should have a lower population
tion based on the technology of 1920 (or ear-
in 2085 than the B1 world. Accordingly, the
lier). Any such estimate is bound to underes-
populations at risk in the A1FI scenario are
timate food production and overestimate
probably overestimated relative to the B1 sce-
hunger.29 In our case, doing so overestimates
nario. Likewise, relative to the B1 scenario,
greenhouse gas emissions and associated cli-
the population at risk in all scenarios, but the
mate changes are probably overestimated in
overestimates are greatest for the A1FI sce-
the A1FI scenario because emissions would
nario, followed by B1, B2 and A2, in that
be lower in a less-populated world. That, too,
order.
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