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70. See Contract with America, ed. Ed Gillespie and Bob

Schellhas (Washington: Times Books, 1994), pp. 52-53.

71. S. 3, 104th Cong., 1st sess. §507(b) (1995) (emphasis

added).

72. See, for example, Orrin G. Hatch, Statement before the

Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on S. 3, Bill

to Control Crime, and for Other Purposes, p. 3; and Amar,

"First Principles," p. 759.

73. See Bradley C. Canon, "Is the Exclusionary Rule in

Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a

Precipitous Conclusion," Kentucky Law Journal 62 (1974):

709.  Cincinnati's experience vindicated a prescient opin-

ion filed by Judge Thomas A. Jones in 1936.  See State v.

Lindway, 2 N.E.2d 490 (1936) (Jones, J., concurring).

74. Canon, p. 709.  See also Sidney E. Zion, "Detectives

Get a Course in Law," New York Times, April 28, 1965,

p. 50.

75. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)

(opinion of Sutherland, J.).  In an 1819 letter, Thomas

Jefferson wrote, "My construction of the constitution

. . . is that each department is truly independent of the

others. . . . [The judicial department] cannot issue a

mandamus to the President or legislature, or to any of

their officers."  Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Judge

Spencer Roane, September 6, 1819, in Jefferson: Writings

(New York: Library of America, 1984), pp. 1426-27.  By

parity of reasoning, the legislature cannot issue commands

to judicial officers with respect to matters touching upon

their constitutionally assigned duties.

76. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).  See

also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 58-60 (1991)

(Scalia, J., dissenting); and Morrison at 710-11 (Scalia,

J., dissenting).

77. Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. 329, 337 (1841).

78. Since the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 constitu-

tionalized the judicial nature of the warrant-issuing pro-

cess and explicitly incorporated the separation-of-powers

doctrine, the court should have vigorously defended the

judicial province from executive encroachment.  Instead,

the court gave the executive branch a green light to

bypass the warrant clause of the state constitution.

79. See U.S. Department of Justice, pp. 617-20.