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53. See, for example, Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S.

41, 47 (1933).

54. Wallace at 661.

55. Ibid. at 660-61.  See also State v. Gleason, 4 P. 363

(1884); and Lippman v. People, 51 N.E. 872 (1898).

56. "The Warrant Clause says only when warrants may not

issue, not when they may, or must.  Even if all the mini-

mum prerequisites spelled out in the Warrant Clause are

met, a warrant is still unlawful, and may not issue, if

the underlying search or seizure it would authorize would

be unreasonable."  Amar, "Fourth Amendment First

Principles," p. 774.  It is also interesting to note that,

before the American Revolution, many colonial courts

refused to issue general warrants to Crown officials.  The

independent posture of the courts rankled British official-

dom no end.  See Charles A. Reynard, "Freedom from

Unreasonable Search and Seizure--A Second Class Constitu-

tional Right?" Indiana Law Journal 25 (1950): 271-74.

57. The modern administrative state is testing the resolve

of the judicial branch on a number of fronts.  Officials

at the Immigration and Naturalization Service, for example,

are trying to revive the idea of executive warrants.  See

8 C.F.R. §242.2(c) (1992).  The legislative and executive

branches are also using a new sentencing regime to get

around constitutional norms.  See Mistretta v. United

States, 488 U.S. 361, 413-27 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissent-

ing); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 70-72 (1991)

(Silberman, J., concurring); and Elizabeth Lear, "Is

Conviction Irrelevant?" UCLA Law Review 40 (1993): 1219-20.

Dozens of regulatory agencies are aggrandizing search pow-

ers under the rubric of "administrative inspections."  See

Timothy Lynch, "Polluting Our Principles: Environmental

Prosecutions and the Bill of Rights," Temple Environmental

Law and Technology Journal 15 (1996): 171-77.  Those prob-

lems are beyond the scope of this study, but for a general

overview of the Supreme Court's failure to defend the

judicial branch from legislative incursions, see Amy D.

Ronner, "Judicial Self-Demise: The Test of When Congress

Impermissibly Intrudes on Judicial Power after Robertson v.

Seattle Audubon Society and the Federal Appellate Courts'

Rejection of the Separation of Powers Challenges to the

New Section of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,"

Arizona Law Review 35 (1993): 1037.

58. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

59. Ibid. at 393-94.