Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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Page 19
the police, the machinery of the state can be unleashed on
the accused citizen.  If a person is willing to assume the
risk that attends the making of a sworn statement, and a
judge finds the accuser's story coherent and credible
enough to establish probable cause, an arrest or search
warrant will issue.50   That was the procedure of the common
law, and that was the procedure that the Founders
constitutionalized.  Note, however, that if the legislative
body could change the rules in such a way as to make the
initiation of the state's legal process "cost free" by
lowering the threshold with a mere generalized belief
standard, it would undermine the Fourth Amendment's "Oath
or affirmation" safeguard by making perjury prosecutions
totally impracticable.51   Fortunately, the courts have rec-
ognized that danger and have invalidated affidavit stan-
dards that allow warrants to issue on flimsy or unsubstan-
tiated claims.52   Persons filing sworn complaints must sup-
ply a statement of supporting facts from which the accuser
concluded that a law was violated.53
Such threats to the oath requirement are tantamount
to a transfer of power from the judicial to the executive
branch.  When judges must issue warrants upon the mere
belief of police officers, they are reduced to rubber
stamps.  By inviting such flimsy or unsubstantiated search
warrant applications to be submitted, and then compelling
the issuance of the warrant, legislators have tried to
make judicial officers subservient to the police.  Such a
naked transfer of power was also found by the Supreme
Court of Indiana to violate the search and seizure provi-
sion of the Indiana Constitution:
The judicial officer before whom an application
for a search warrant is filed must exercise his
judicial power to determine whether or not a
warrant shall issue; such judicial function can
be moved only by the facts brought before him,
which are under oath or affirmation.  A warrant
to search and seize, which follows upon a state-
ment based solely upon the belief of the affi-
ant, based upon the secret facts of which he may
have knowledge, and the conclusion which results
from such reasoning is affiant's, not that of
the judicial officer.  The judicial process to
ascertain probable cause is then transferred from
the judicial officer to the affiant.  The
Constitution permits no such thing.54
Although the phrase "separation of powers" did not appear
in its ruling, the Supreme Court of Indiana did allude to
that concept when it analogized the warrant process to a