Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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Page 16
officers had been subverting the Fourth Amendment by issu-
ing search warrants to themselves.  Here is a telling
excerpt from the trial transcript:
The Court:  You mean that another police officer
issues these [search warrants]?
The Witness:  Yes.  Captain Couture and Captain
Shea and Captain Loveren are J.P.'s.
The Court:  Well, let me ask you, Chief, your
answer is to the effect that you never go out of
the department for the Justice of the Peace?
The Witness:  It hasn't been our--policy to go
out of the department.
Q.:  Right.  Your policy and experience, is to
have a fellow police officer take the warrant in
the capacity of Justice of the Peace?
That has been our practice.39
A.:
The Supreme Court declared the New Hampshire practice
unconstitutional precisely because search warrants were
being issued by executive branch agents.40
The judicial branch has a solemn duty to check the
legislature by invalidating laws that transfer the judicial
power to the executive branch--whether the transfer was
effectuated by purposeful design or negligence.41   That is
what the separation-of-powers doctrine is all about.  The
New Hampshire practice was a throwback to the colonial
days of multiple officeholding and executive warrants.
Thus, the Coolidge ruling was a sound application of the
doctrine.42
Some state courts have relied on the separation-of-
powers doctrine in their own state constitutions to
invalidate incursions into their warrant-issuing authority.
In People v. Payne (1985),43 for example, the Supreme Court
of Michigan relied explicitly on the Michigan Constitution
and its separation-of-powers doctrine to invalidate a
search warrant that had been issued by a district court
magistrate who was serving also as a deputy sheriff.
Echoing Lord Camden and other sages of the common law,
Justice James Ryan wrote that "the probable cause determi-
nation must be made by a person whose loyalty is to the
judiciary alone, unfettered by professional commitment, and
therefore loyalty, to the law enforcement arm of the exec-
utive branch."44