Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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Page 29
its extortion statute.  Other states include additional
requirements for the offense.  A handful of states require
malicious intent.96
Thus, whether due to lack of resources, lack of will,
or by statute, millions of citizens can expect no protec-
tion under anti-extortion laws from vandalism, harassment,
kidnapping, threats, and assaults if such offenses are
committed by union militants on strike for what they per-
ceive as better working conditions.  Indeed, the ineffec-
tiveness of state extortion laws as applied in cases of
union violence provides yet another basis upon which to
argue that FUVA is both constitutional and necessary.
Section 1 of the 14th Amendment bars states from
"depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law" or "deny[ing] to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Although that provision is enforceable through the courts,
the Supreme Court has abdicated its responsibility by con-
ferring on unions an exemption from the Hobbs Act.
Nonetheless, the Congress under Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment can "enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions" of Section 1.  And because Congress created
the statutory ambiguity that the Court has seized on, it
is imperative that Congress remove that ambiguity at once.
Absent a congressional remedy, one can anticipate that
the Court will continue to turn a blind eye to victims of
union violence.  Events at the AA Cross Construction Co.
are an unhappy reminder.
In 1974, Cross contracted with the U.S. Army to build
a pumping station near Port Arthur, Texas.  The company
began hiring both union and nonunion workers, which
aroused controversy in Port Arthur, where a large of num-
ber of union workers lived.  On January 15, 1975, a
protest was planned at a meeting of the Executive
Committee of the local Building and Construction Trades
Council.  Two days later, the "protest" commenced as "the
mob swarmed over the construction site, brutally beating
Cross and his employees with iron rods and wooden boards,
overturning and setting fire to the trailer that served as
the construction site office, smashing automobile and truck
windshields, and vandalizing company tools and equipment."97
The violence eventually forced Cross to default on its
contract with the Army.
Cross and  a number of nonunion employees led by Paul
Scott sued the unions under what is commonly known as the
"Ku Klux Klan Act" of 1871.  In language quite similar to