Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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Page 26
that state and local laws were systematically enforced in
strike situations.  But with a conviction rate of less
than 3 percent, the failure of overwhelmed or politically
neutralized police and prosecutors to enforce the law
against union militants is clear.
FUVA, Gottesman complains, is unfair.  "When employees
are seeking higher wages, that's not extortion."87   His
rationalization of union violence is uncomfortably close to
the notion that the "legitimate" ends of unions justify
any and all means to achieve them.  Despite finding favor
with the highest court in the land, that logic is nonethe-
less toxic to a free society--defined by Hayek as a socie-
ty free from violence and coercion.88
There is only one principled objection to FUVA, to
which we now turn.  The U.S. Constitution creates a feder-
al government with enumerated powers, beyond which that
government may not extend its reach.  Given that each of
the 50 states has a law dealing with extortion, on what
constitutional basis can FUVA's supporters defend this
expansion of federal power?
Is FUVA Constitutional?
Nowhere in the Constitution is there a power con-
ferred upon Congress to interfere with the rights of indi-
viduals to voluntarily contract with one another.  But as
the country grew and some believed that labor-management
issues had to be addressed by the national government,
Congress sought to earmark a specified constitutional power
that would justify its ambitious regulatory agenda.  The
Commerce Clause became the vehicle of choice.89
The power of Congress to regulate commerce is not,
however, the power to regulate anything and everything.
As set out in Article I, Section 8, the Constitution
authorizes the federal government to "regulate Commerce
. . . among the several States."  Under the Articles of
Confederation, states had enacted tariffs and other protec-
tionist measures that crippled the free flow of trade.
"If there was any one object riding over every other in
the adoption of the constitution, it was to keep the com-
mercial intercourse among the States free from all invidi-
ous and partial restraints."90
Lamentably, Congress has expanded the Commerce Clause
to a general regulatory power.  And the Court--especially
after Franklin Roosevelt's notorious Court-packing scheme--
has facilitated federal overreaching by condoning legisla-