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the grounds that, in the context of a strike, the mili-

tants' actions were not illegal since they were pursuing

"legitimate" union objectives.  On direct appeal, a divid-

ed Supreme Court affirmed, 5-4.

The Court's misreading of the clear legislative histo-

ry of the Hobbs Act is incredible.  Congress in 1946 had

eliminated a clause barring prosecution of union violence

if such action would impair the "rights of legitimate

labor organizations in lawfully carrying out the legitimate

objects thereof."29   Nonetheless, Justice Potter Stewart,

writing for a majority of the Court, over a strongly word-

ed dissent by Justice William O. Douglas, decided that

Congress retained an ambiguity.

That ambiguity concerned the requirement for the

"wrongful" use of force, violence, or fear as an element

of the crime.  The majority argued that "wrongful" modi-

fied not only the use of violence, but also the property

gained through the use of force.  Thus, not only did the

union's means have to be "wrongful," so also did the

"property"--that is, the property to which the union had

"no lawful claim," according to the majority opinion.30

That semantic distinction is suspiciously close to the

holding in Local 807, in which the Court said that force

used to obtain payment for "bona fide" work was different

from force used to obtain payment for fictitious services.

Of course, Congress had enacted the Hobbs Act specif-

ically to eliminate the safe harbor for "legitimate" union

goals.  Nonetheless, the Court noted that the IBEW's

destruction of company property was part of a strike for

higher wages.  Since the demand for higher wages could not

be considered "wrongful," neither could the use of vio-

lence to gain higher wages.  The only seeming justifica-

tion for that interpretation was to be found in Rep.

Samuel Francis Hobbs's statement that the term wrongful

"qualifies the entire section" defining extortion,31 and his

claims during the debate that the Hobbs Act was not meant

to hamper "any legitimate activity on the part of . . .

labor unions."32

Relying on those assertions, the majority chose to

focus on a few trees to the exclusion of the forest.  In

particular, the Court ignored a proposed amendment by Rep.

Emanuel Celler (D-NY), which would have exempted any

"activities which are lawful under" prevailing labor laws,

including the National Labor Relations Act.33   Hobbs vigor-

ously opposed that amendment because of its failure to

"require . . . that lawful acts, conduct or activities

must be done in a lawful and peaceful way."34   In short,