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62. Oral briefing at Camp Butler, Okinawa, March 26, 1998.

63. "Marines on Okinawa," p. 10.

64. See, for example, Doug Bandow, "UN Military Missions

as a Snare for America," in Delusions of Grandeur: The

United Nations and Global Intervention, ed. Ted Galen

Carpenter (Washington: Cato Institute, 1997), pp. 63-78.

65. Conversation in Naha, Okinawa, March 25, 1998.

66. "Marines on Okinawa," p. 9.

67. Third Marine Expeditionary Force, "Economic Impact:

U.S. Marine Corps on Okinawa," undated, p. 4.

68. For instance, the 18th Wing Public Affairs Office at

Kadena Air Base has published brochures titled "Good

Stewards of the Environment" (May 14, 1997) and "Being

Good Neighbors" (December 1997).

69. Koji Taira, "The Okinawan Charade: The United States,

Japan and Okinawa: Conflict and Compromise, 1995-96," Japan

Policy Research Institute Working Paper no. 28, January

1997, p. 2.

70. Ibid.

71. Quoted in "U.S.: Okinawa Troop Cutbacks Would Hurt,"

Daily Yomiuri, March 18, 1998.

72. Conversation in Naha, Okinawa, March 27, 1998.

73. Morihiro Hosokawa, "Time for US forces to Bow Out of

Japan," South China Morning Post, June 26, 1998.

74. "Marines on Okinawa," p. 7.  This seems to be a widely

shared fear.  The U.S.-Japan 21st Century Committee ex-

plained that "the risk" of Korean reunification "is not

that the United States will keep too many forces, but that

it may reduce its forces too much at a time when it is

necessary to work out with other nations a stable struc-

ture of peace."  U.S.-Japan 21st Century Committee, "Third

Plenary Conference," December 15, 1997, p. 13.  Yet the

most important factor in creating a stable structure of

peace would be the collapse of North Korea; how retaining

small numbers of unneeded ground units in Japan and Korea

would improve the construction of such a system is hard to

fathom.

75. Zich, p. 10.