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extract American businessmen who have voluntarily ventured

into nations with volatile political environments, is far

less important.

Moreover, such tasks have little to do with Okinawa.

Observes Miki, "When we go to the U.S., people say, 'we

are trying to protect you, why do you complain?'65   But

today the 3rd MEF has virtually nothing to do with defend-

ing the Okinawans.  It is one thing to impose U.S. mili-

tary installations on a reluctant population when

Washington is actually protecting those people.  It is

quite another to perpetuate that burden to advance purely

American interests.  (Without embarrassment, the Marine

Corps says that "hosting the U.S. Marine Corps [in

Okinawa] is by no accident."66   That is true--Washington

simply placed the bases where it desired in an occupied

province of a defeated nation.)

Finally, the Marines cite the financial benefits re-

ceived by Okinawa.  Indeed, they have produced a slick

brochure touting the money that the Marine Corps infuses

into the community, including more than $4.5 million that

"local Okinawa moving companies will earn" moving service-

men and their families from Okinawan to base housing.67

(The Air Force has generated cheaper advertising for its

community service and environmental activities.)68   Although

some islanders obviously do benefit, more of them suffer

from the loss of alternative economic opportunities.  The

number of Okinawans employed on the bases has fallen from

40,000 to 8,200 since 1972; the share of the prefectural

product generated from the military bases has dropped from

16 percent to 5 percent over the same period.

There seems little doubt that Okinawans, who enjoy a

per capita income just 70 percent of that of other

Japanese, could put the portion of their island now occu-

pied by U.S. facilities to better use.  Koji Taira, a pro-

fessor at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign,

calls the 20 percent (base share of island land area)

minus the 5 percent (base share of island economy) a 15

percent "deadweight loss."69   But even that number, he

argues, understates the true social and environmental costs

borne by the residents of Okinawa because of the American

bases.

The 15 percent loss does not include the pres-

sure on land rents in the rest of Okinawa due to

the withdrawal of 20 percent of the area from

civilian use; inconveniences to civil air trans-

portation due to restrictions on the use of air

space; closures of port facilities and waters to