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on American territory is simply incorrect.  The

Congressional Research Service reports that "only a rela-

tively small part of the Japanese contribution directly

offsets U.S. military operating costs.  Moreover, when

similar military units are compared, it does not appear

cheaper to base forces in Japan than in Europe or in the

continental United States."59   Basing some units on Guam or

Hawaii might be somewhat more expensive, but not dramati-

cally so.

More fundamentally, reliance on the host-nation sup-

port argument reinforces what former Marine Corps officer

Robert Hamilton calls "a widespread belief in Japan that

its partial financing of the U.S. military in Japan does

in fact constitute an alliance."60   A real alliance depends

on shared interest and effort, unlike the unbalanced

"mutual" defense treaty between Tokyo and Washington.  We

should send American soldiers abroad only if doing so

advances U.S. interests, not because a foreign country is

willing to pay to be protected.

Marine briefers rightly worry that East Asia today

has no cooperative defense system analogous to NATO.  But

America's dominant role makes such a system unlikely to

evolve.  Necessity is a powerful inducement; today, coun-

tries need not unite to deal with regional security prob-

lems.  Indeed, America's attempt to smother any independ-

ent action by its allies, particularly Japan, ensures that

they will never develop a collaborative system that could

respond to regional threats.  As Ted Galen Carpenter of

the Cato Institute points out, U.S. security guarantees

enable governments in the region "to adopt apathetic poli-

cies and engage in domestic political posturing rather

than forge ties of mutually beneficial military coopera-

tion."61

Marine Presence Is Strategically Irrelevant

Should Washington find itself at war with China (or

another aggressive power in East Asia), the Air Force and

Navy would do the heavy lifting.  The half-strength 3rd

MEF would have no meaningful role to perform.  Washing-

ton's participation in another ground war on the Asian

mainland is almost inconceivable, leaving the 3rd MEF no

useful function.  Moreover, a sizable American presence on

Okinawa, especially if it were directed against China,

would turn Japan into a military target--something likely

to make Tokyo hesitate to support Washington, just as

Japan lacked enthusiasm for U.S. saber rattling over

Taiwan in early 1996.