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relations with the South.  South Korea, with twice the

population and 24 times the economic output of the North,

should be fully able to defend itself.  Pyongyang poses no

credible threat to Japan.  Washington should be phasing

out its commitment to South Korea, which would eliminate

the most obvious contingency for the Marines on Okinawa.52

Instead, Secretary of Defense William Cohen says that

"as far as Japan and Okinawa is concerned, we intend to

remain with the same essential presence there that we cur-

rently have," even if the two Koreas reunite.53   That is

assuming the Japanese leaders allow Washington to stay.

Senior Marine Corps officers worry that "if Korea reuni-

fies they will kick the U.S. out" of the island.54   Former

prime minister Hashimoto refused to commit himself, saying

only that his government would discuss "troop levels in

accordance with changes in situations" in the region.55

But Governor Ota rightly worries about apparent U.S. plans

for a permanent occupation of the island: "It will be a

grave matter if Mr. Cohen means that U.S. bases in Okinawa

will be fixed as they are.  I cannot help but wonder about

our status as a sovereign nation if there is no reduction

in U.S. troop levels even after the threat of North Korea

is eliminated."56

In addition to invoking the specter of a Chinese or

North Korean menace, Marine Corps briefers also offer a

chart describing "critical oil shipping lanes."57   But no

naval force is threatening to close those lanes or has the

capability to do so.  Moreover, it is not clear what the

Marines could do if someone made such an attempt.  Presum-

ably naval and air forces would have to deal with that

problem.  And those are sea-lanes to Japan, not America.

Japan could easily develop the capability to protect those

lanes with enhanced naval and air forces.

The argument that Washington should continue to defend

Japan is especially bizarre since the Hashimoto government

intended to cut military outlays and newly elected Prime

Minister Keizo Obuchi is even more likely to do so.  And

while 69 percent of Japanese told the Daily Yomiuri in

November 1997 that North Korea could pose a military

threat to Japan, only 4 percent favored joining the United

States in combatting the North.58   If Tokyo doesn't per-

ceive its interests to be threatened, and if Japanese cit-

izens do not believe that their nation should defend its

security interests, the United States should not spend

billions of dollars to protect Japan.

Further, the argument that it is cheaper to station

U.S. forces in Japan, because of host-nation support, than