Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
<<  <  >  >>
Page 10
Despite Tokyo's strongest efforts, 53.8 percent of
voters rejected the proposal, most of them unequivocally;
37.9 percent supported the initiative only because they
believed the economic benefits would be substantial.  Just
8.3 percent backed the project without qualification.
Although satisfied by the result, Miyagi complains, "The
saddest part of the referendum is that the government suc-
ceeded in splitting the city.  People feel stress over the
referendum itself, not just the results."34
Nago's mayor nevertheless announced his support for
the proposal--because of the central government's promises
of substantial economic aid--and then effectively fell on
his sword by resigning.  He was succeeded by a candidate
who offered ambiguous backing for the base but vowed to
abide by Governor Ota's decision.35   Then Ota, whose ap-
proval is necessary for the use of Okinawan waters,
announced that he would not approve the heliport, greatly
angering Hashimoto.  Ota explained, "We must respect the
will of the people because it is the fundamental rule of
democracy."36   Says editor Ken Miki, "Hashimoto thought
Okinawa would accept [the heliport] proposal."  The prime
minister had "great expectations, but the result was the
opposite, so he was really disappointed."37   The central
government hasn't given up, observes one Ota staffer, but
the project seems stalled.
Indeed, some outside observers warn Tokyo against
attempting to impose this or any other strategy without
local consent.  Columnist Frank Ching contends, "If Tokyo
decides on strong-arm tactics and rides roughshod over the
Okinawans again, the resulting outcry may put in jeopardy
not just the heliport but all U.S. bases on Okinawa."38
But even Ota's agreement would not necessarily make
the plan feasible.  According to the General Accounting
Office, the United States and Japan face "(1) significant
costs to acquire and maintain the facility; (2) major
technological challenges, as no sea-based facility of the
type and scale envisioned has ever been built; and (3)
operational complications because the sea-based facility
envisioned would be insufficient to support all U.S. oper-
ating requirements and maintain maximum safety margins."39
U.S. military commanders privately doubt it will ever be
built.40
Threadbare Justifications for Keeping the Bases
In any case, SACO does not reach the more fundamental
issue: why should the United States continue to dominate