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has a similar view of the Nuremberg comparison.  He ex-

plains, "There is a frequently cited precedent for using a

legal tribunal and the notion of war crimes to bring 'jus-

tice' to a legal order that seems incapable of enforcing the

rules outsiders regard as vital: Nuremberg.  But the prece-

dent fails because the two situations are not analogous.

. . . Nuremberg was a victors' tribunal."6  Rubin adds that

Nuremberg was also in the middle of Germany and its greatest

success was in exposing to the German people themselves the

crimes committed by their government.  Furthermore, at

Nuremberg the Nazi archives were open to the defense as well

as to the prosecution, and the need for Allied secrecy did

not inhibit the ability of the defense to present evidence.

But the proposed ICC will not be a "victors' tribunal," and

it will encounter many of the same problems the Yugoslavia

tribunal does.  Rubin explains that

the documents and testimony needed for an effec-

tive defense are hard to expose and bring to the

tribunal; there is no reason to expect the Bosnian

Serbs to publish their internal records, and no

reason to think that the Serbian Serbs would want

those records, or their own Cabinet minutes that

might reflect those records, exposed.  Nor is

there any reason to expect the Bosnian Muslims or

Croatians to volunteer their own records, which

might exculpate some low-level defendants by in-

criminating higher-level officials.7

Nonetheless, many proponents of the ICC suggest that

the existence of the court will still have a deterrent

effect on potential war criminals.  Former president Jimmy

Carter, for example, says that "the most important thing in

knowing that the international criminal court is there, I

think would be a great deterrent among those who might be

inclined to perpetuate these kinds of crimes."8  Similarly,

Norman Dorsen of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and

Morton Halperin of the Twentieth Century Fund argue that the

ICC is needed "to deter those who would contemplate such

horrendous crimes."9  But according to Rubin, there is no

evidence that holding war crimes trials reduces the number

of threats to international peace and security.  If any-

thing, the opposite is true: making war less atrocious makes

it more likely.  The creation of war crimes courts, he con-

cludes, seems really "to have been aimed at making lawyers

the 'guardians' of a violent society, in which war is all

right as long as it is played by rules to which the con-