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"Power Plan Has Juice," Chicago Tribune, October 31, 1997.
Virtually all states, however, are looking into restruc-
turing. See "Governor's Group Reports on State Restructur-
ing Progress," Electricity Daily, August 6, 1997, pp. 1-2.
6. "The rejection of both stranded cost recovery and manda-
tory access is the only rule consistent with the current
property rights of both [utilities and customers]--the only
fair rule." William Niskanen, "A Case against Both Stranded
Cost Recovery and Mandatory Access," Regulation, no. 1
(1996): 17.
7. Douglas Houston, "Schaefer Bill Insupportable," Regula-
tion, no. 4 (1996): 5.
8. The reduction in costs must occur at levels of output
that approximately equal the quantities demanded by consum-
ers.
9. Robert Bradley, "The Origins of Political Electricity:
Market Failure or Political Opportunism?" Energy Law Journal
17, no. 1 (1996): 59-102.
10. Cited in Harold Demsetz, "Why Regulate Utilities?" Jour-
nal of Law and Economics 11, no. 1 (April 1968): 59.
11. Ibid.
12. "Complaints were common that the streets were too fre-
quently in a state of disrepair for the purpose of accommo-
dating competing companies." Ibid.
13. See Gregg Jarrell, "The Demand for State Regulation of
the Electric Utility Industry," Journal of Law and Economics
21 (1978): 286-87. Emphasis in original.
14. Vernon Smith, "Regulatory Reform in the Electric Power
Industry," Issue Analysis Report no. 3, Goldwater Institute,
Phoenix, March 1995, p. 2.
15. Ibid. See also Marvin Olasky, Corporate Public Rela-
tions: A New Historical Perspective (Hillsdale, N.J.: Law-
rence Erlbaum Associates, 1987), pp. 33-43.
16. Peter Fox-Penner, Electric Utility Restructuring: A
Guide to the Competitive Era (Vienna, Va.: Public Utilities
Reports, 1997), p. 88.