Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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the value of much of today's generation--and transmission--assets.39
Casten is not alone. Colin Besant of the Imperial College of London states,
We think power generation will go very much like computers. In the past
it was all mainframes, then the minis came along, and now we all have PCs
on our desks, on a network. We think the same thing will happen with
power generation. Everybody will have their own power generation
running off the gas.40
Although widespread microgeneration and heat recapture have not fully arrived, the trend
toward smaller scale appears to be irreversible.41
Access without Mandates
Much as free speech does not entail a right to a microphone, in a free market the
fact that one spins magnets to generate flows of electrons through copper wire does not
create a right to have someone transport that power against his will. Under full deregula-
tion, a utility may prevent access to its lines and poles but may not forbid competition.
Even if the prospect for parallel or bypass transmission is not good, wires, poles, plants,
and stations belong to the utility and cannot be taken without compensation. At most, one
could argue that the rights-of-way across which utility lines, poles, and other hardware run
do possess a public character because they were originally granted through the power of
eminent domain. They were, however, paid for, albeit at a discount. If competition
proves to be impossible, intransigent utilities should not be allowed to impede progress or
interfere with the rights of trade of others because of the accident of their role as gate-
keepers for the residue of a monopoly right-of-way--but they must be compensated fairly.
Still, universal access need not be imposed.
If incumbent utilities refuse transmission of electricity on their wires, competing
transmission entities, if feasible, might be allowed to erect hardware along the right-of-
way for a nominal access fee. Alternatively, should utilities fail to lower prices, competi-
tors might attach new transmission or distribution lines directly to existing utility lines
(with compensation perhaps based on the way utilities share their distribution capacity
with phone companies). In allowing such attachments, the government is using its
eminent domain power to promote public use and must compensate. Voluntary deals will
likely be reached, however, before government intervention is necessary.
Isolated use of the "attachment" method has the advantage of not imposing on the
utility any form of involuntary servitude, as open access would. The philosophical distinc-
tion between open access and occasional line attachment is clear. The first requires a
utility to do work, the second merely that it duck out of the way. The new competitor