Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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Newly available technologies, however, allow greater control of power flows on
the grid and threaten to make monopoly regulation by FERC and state public utility
commissions anachronistic. High-voltage silicon switches, called thyristors, allow
engineers to "guide the flow of megawatts as rapidly and efficiently as integrated circuits
in personal computers handle microwatts."27 They allow the electrical grid to be con-
trolled electronically rather than electromechanically, as is typical today. As Richard
Balzhiser, president emeritus of the Electric Power Research Institute, notes, "Our ability
to switch at the speed of light will allow us to operate much closer to the system's thermal
limits, thus significantly enhancing the system's delivery capability without sacrificing
reliability."28
Mandatory open access is likely to reduce the incentive to adopt new grid control
technologies. If an independent system operator is used to manage power placed on the
grid, no one will profit from improvements in the precision control of power flows. In the
absence of mandatory access, entrepreneurs are more likely to adopt silicon switching
technology to attract customers who need "perfect" transmission reliability.
User-Owned Transmission Grids: Taming the Monopolist
The widespread fear of monopoly behavior by the sellers of transmission services
overlooks the fact that electricity buyers may organize to counter any market power
possessed by sellers. Demsetz argues,
If we are willing to consider the possibility that collusion or merger of all
potential bidding rivals [sellers of power] is a reasonable prospect, then we
must examine the other side of the coin. Why should collusion or merger
of buyers be prohibitively costly? If we allow buyers access to the same
technology of collusion, the market will be characterized by bilateral
negotiations between organized buyers and organized sellers.29
Houston offers compelling arguments about how user ownership could become an
important feature of the grid structure and eliminate harmful market power in transmis-
sion.30 The market solution to transmission monopoly power and the alternative to
regulatory management of the grid is what Houston envisions as the "user-ownership
solution." Houston notes that "ownership of transmission by its heaviest users is perhaps
the most effective means of reducing the possibility of hold-up problems related to these
co-specialized assets. That more measured market response can deter opportunism
because it causes owners to bear losses in their roles as customers."31 Houston argues that
"in the electricity marketplace, absent regulation, transmission's great value relative to
alternatives makes transmission control virtually an imperative to those who are using or
contemplating using the system frequently over a long time frame."32