Cato Institute
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Cato Policy Analysis No. 301
April 13, 1998
ELECTRIC AVENUES
Why "Open Access" Can't Compete
by Clyde Wayne Crews Jr.
Clyde Wayne Crews Jr. is a fellow in regulatory studies at the Competitive Enterprise
Institute in Washington, D.C.
Executive Summary
The regulation of electricity markets is changing rapidly. So far, the changes affect
only the generation of electricity. The deregulation of transmission and distribution is not
under serious consideration because conventional wisdom says that transmission and
distribution are natural monopolies that must be regulated. However, the source of
monopoly power in the utility industry is the local exclusive franchise currently held by
electric utilities rather than any natural characteristics of transmission and distribution.
The centerpiece of the regulatory changes is called mandatory open access, under
which electricity producers have the right to sell to whomever they choose at the retail level
across the wires of the incumbent utility. Although the requirement that utilities open their
lines is seemingly expedient, the true free-market alternative would eliminate today's exclu-
sive territorial franchises and allow competitors to develop parallel distribution, provide
on-site power, and negotiate voluntary agreements for access to the existing transmission
and distribution system. If legal entry barriers are eliminated and economic barriers to entry
are low, utilities' attempts to charge "unfair" prices will attract new competitors, including
smaller generators on customers' premises.
The principles that should guide the restructuring of the electricity industry are the
sanctity of the property rights of both producers and consumers and the integrity of the
market that emerges from those property rights. Producers should have an unfettered right
to sell to anyone, and consumers should have the right to buy from anyone, but neither has
the right to use the resources of others without consent.