Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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Page 6
vention, first known as the Demonstration Cities concept,
later as the Model Cities program, upon which HUD was creat-
ed and which justified its first years of existence.11
One cannot discount the role played in the development
of this policy and subsequent legislation not only by social
reformers but also by self-interested developers.12  Just as
the original public housing program was inspired, in part,
by Franklin Roosevelt's debt to construction unions and
hard-pressed Depression-era builders, so were HUD rehabili-
tation subsidy programs influenced by a range of financial
interests.  In Boston, for instance, the CEO of the parent
company to Boston Gas headed up a syndicate of investors to
renovate more than 2,000 apartments in the city's Roxbury
ghetto, all of which were, in that heavily subsidized proc-
ess, converted from oil heat to gas.13
The impulse to renovate was flawed in a number of key
ways.  First, the impulse to rehabilitate older housing in
poor neighborhoods incorrectly presumed that, despite the
lower incomes of inner-city residents, federal intervention
could permanently bring older apartment buildings back to
their original, middle-class standards.  Incentives, such as
low-interest mortgages, made renovating or constructing
buildings more attractive than maintaining them.  Thus, many
HUD-financed renovations turned out to be shoddy and short-
lived.  The agency quickly became the owner of many build-
ings left behind by owners who, though they had been lured
by up-front incentives, could not realize long-run profits
from operating the structures as rental properties.  For
example, by 1978, 10 years after HUD began a large-scale
subsidized renovation in older inner-city Boston, it had
been forced to foreclose on or assume ownership of 47 of 115
projects.14  As Irving Welfeld wrote, "Showcase projects had
become jungles."15  The fact that projects were privately
owned should not confuse us into thinking that they were
market driven. Profit-making owner-managers had simply
become the subsidized agents of government.
Second, HUD's approach ignored the historic dynamics of
what Wood had called "the tenement trail," which had been a
path of gradual upward mobility.  One of the great forces of
socialization of poor immigrants is the impulse toward self-
improvement, an impulse to improve one's physical surround-
ings and to move to a better neighborhood.  The plan to
rebuild the ghetto to middle-class standards reflected a
doubt that blacks could make that journey and offered,