Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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Page 4
It was certainly a difficult proposition for Americans.
Except perhaps for ghost towns and other small jurisdictions
that had outlived their economic reason for being, Americans
were more or less accustomed to the idea that cities should
become bigger and better.  Instead, Americans were seeing
the less-than-pleasant sight of neighborhoods in apparent
decline, at least compared with their middle-class origins.
Grand apartment buildings were being subdivided or, in some
cases, simply abandoned because of lack of demand.  Ironi-
cally, that could well have been viewed as a great and
fortuitous opportunity.  Cheap, often well built, used
housing was becoming available when significant numbers of
immigrants were arriving in town.  Housing economists have
termed that phenomenon "filtering"--that is, passing down
housing from the upwardly mobile to the next wave of aspi-
rants.
If there was no overall urban crisis and no sudden
collapse of the economies of our cities, why did Secretary
Weaver cast his role as broadly addressing such a crisis?
Perhaps he did so out of fear that casting the mission more
narrowly, as improving the black ghetto, would have had less
political appeal.  Indeed, it is striking that at a time of
robust economic growth, at a level for which we yearn today,
Weaver justified HUD as an agency that was necessary to
"contribute toward a better life for all income levels, all
age levels, and all racial characteristics or religious
beliefs."6  Other HUD officials, however, were often more
candid about the targeted nature of their mission.  Under
Secretary Robert Wood told the National Association of
Social Workers in 1966, "The impacted urban ghetto has, in a
comparatively short period of time, become the most explo-
sive social problem of our day."7  This was the essence of
HUD: a massive intervention in poor black neighborhoods to
fix up the buildings there, despite the fact that residents
themselves could not pay for such improvements.  Thus,
"ghetto" housing would remain inexpensive and would also be
"decent and sanitary," in the language of the National
Housing Act of 1937.  But why was that necessary?  What was
wrong with new urbanites' using older housing until they
could afford better?  To understand HUD's intervention, one
must look at the nation's essentially pessimistic and,
arguably, patronizing view of the prospects of the black
poor.
Was the "Black Ghetto" Permanent?