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60 percent of all prescriptions written.68 Writing such
"off-label" prescriptions exposes doctors to the standards
of common-law negligence principles, by which they can be
found liable for their actions; yet they continue to pre-
scribe "off-label" rather than accept the truncated liabili-
ty offered by the FDA. There is no reason to believe that
breaking the FDA's approval monopoly would cause radical
changes in the common-law standards doctors already face.
Without the FDA's approval, a physician would be liable only
if the current medical consensus rejected the particular use
of a device or if the doctor prescribed a patently unsafe
device or a device that could not be made safe for the
prescribed usage. Doctors would then rely on the safety
mark of the certifier, and the usage guidelines from the
manufacturer's information and from medical journals in
writing prescriptions. Those guidelines and the safety seal
would then be the basis of a doctor's defense in a liability
suit.
Expanding third-party certification to medical devices
may increase the liability exposure of the certifying orga-
nizations. The potential that certifying organizations may
be held liable for the manufacturer's products may cause
potential certifiers to stay out of the medical device
market. However, certifying organizations are not sellers,
advertisers, distributors, or manufacturers of products.
They do not offer testimonials or underwrite risk. Third-
party certification simply states the professional opinion
of the certifiers as to the safety and, perhaps, the effec-
tiveness of the good. They can still be sued, but the law
does not assign many of the principles of liability to such
certification organizations, and there is no principle to
hold a certifier liable for an unforeseeable error, provided
the certifier was not negligent.
The laws governing fraud and liability protect consum-
ers. An injured consumer still retains all powers of legal
redress. Breaking the FDA's legal monopoly on approval of
medical devices in no way implies a change in liability law
or practice. Currently, the FDA does not especially help or
hinder consumers bringing torts before the court, nor does
it protect the public by filing individual or class actions
on behalf of aggrieved consumers. If the FDA were no longer
to exercise monopoly authority, such suits would still be
brought, and the relative balance of power between consumers
and corporations or physicians would not have changed. The
notion that harmed consumers need the FDA to help them col-
lect damages from deep-pocketed medical establishments is
specious. Manufacturers of medical devices have never been
immune from torts, and removing the FDA blockade to market