Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 37 October 27, 1995

Foreign Policy Briefing

Holbrooke Horror:
The U.S. Peace Plan for Bosnia

by Ted Galen Carpenter

Ted Galen Carpenter is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.

Executive Summary

The terms of the emerging peace accord to end the war in Bosnia are a blueprint for disaster. Washington foolishly insists on maintaining the fiction of a united Bosnian state while accepting a de facto partition. Renewed fighting is highly probable when the Serb self-governing "entity" attempts to secede and merge with Serbia and the Muslim-dominated government tries to assert Bosnia's sovereignty. Indeed, a clash between Muslim and Croat forces is also possible, since any Muslim-Croat cooperation has been a matter of expediency. To enforce such an inherently unworkable settlement would be to recklessly put American treasure and lives at risk.

Since Bosnia is little more than a battleground for contending ethno-religious factions, and the United States has no vital interests there, Washington should let those factions work out their own destiny, however long it takes. Only a settlement forged by the parties to the conflict--an agreement that reflects battlefield realities and the balance of political and military forces--has any chance of achieving a durable peace.


There is a growing likelihood that the United States and its NATO allies will be sending a peacekeeping force to implement an agreement ending the long and bloody war in Bosnia. True, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, the official in charge of Washington's diplomatic effort, repeatedly cautions that the belligerents are still a considerable distance from a final settlement. It is possible that the latest round of negotiations may fail, as have previous attempts. The difference, however, is that this time the NATO powers have demonstrated that they are willing to back their diplomatic initiatives with military force. Washington's determination to orchestrate a peace settlement is also much greater than ever before. At the very least, we have reached the point where a peace accord in Bosnia is no longer just a remote possibility. Consequently, it is imperative that we scrutinize the probable provisions of such a settlement.

It is especially important to do so because the United States will be involved militarily in any peacekeeping venture. The exact size of the Peace Implementation Force is still being heatedly debated by U.S. and European officials. Military leaders are pressing for the deployment of at least 50,000 troops to discourage any challenge by the Bosnian belligerents, even though some political leaders hope to hold the commitment down to 20,000 or 25,000 to minimize domestic opposition.(1) Whatever the size of the force that is ultimately created, President Clinton and Secretary of Defense William Perry have stated on numerous occasions that the United States will provide approximately half of the troops.

That would be an unwise commitment in any case, since the United States has no interests at stake in the Balkans that warrant risking the lives of American military personnel. It would be especially unwise, however, to put U.S. troops in harm's way to enforce a settlement that, instead of bringing lasting peace to Bosnia, creates new conditions for instability and conflict that could go on for decades. The American-inspired peace plan is one of those convoluted enterprises that habitually enchant diplomats but have no connection to reality.

Stage One: The Geneva "Breakthrough"

Adopting a strategy of coercive diplomacy, NATO launched a series of punishing air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets in September. That effort to bomb the Serbs to the conference table and convince them to accept the U.S.-sponsored peace plan seemed to pay off. Even as the attacks were taking place, Holbrooke announced from Geneva on September 8 that the belligerents had made significant progress toward a settlement.

The core assumption of the "agreement on basic principles" outlined in Geneva is that Bosnia would continue to enjoy international recognition of the borders it claimed when it declared independence in 1992. At the same time, there would be two self-governing "entities" within Bosnia. One entity, the Muslim-Croat federation that the United States helped to create in early 1994, would control approximately 51 percent of the country's territory, while the Bosnian Serb entity, the Republika Srpska, would control the other 49 percent. Both entities would have the right to establish "parallel special relationships" with neighboring countries.(2) In other words, the Muslim-Croat federation would have political ties to Croatia, and the Serb entity would be able to develop such links to Serbia.

In praising the breakthrough, Secretary of State Warren Christopher stressed what has become a veritable obsession on the part of U.S. negotiators: "Each of the parties has accepted the continuation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state, within its current internationally recognized bor- ders."(3) Cynics might be tempted to regard such statements as little more than diplomatic window-dressing, and several high-level U.S. officials have reportedly stated privately that, although Bosnia would continue to exist as a country in theory, there would be a de facto ethnic partition. Nevertheless, the emphasis that President Clinton and Secretary Christopher have repeatedly placed on the importance of maintaining Bosnia's sovereignty and territorial integrity suggests that they may be serious about that objective. Even if they are not, there is always the danger that one or more of the parties in Bosnia--particularly the Muslim faction--may take such rhetoric seriously and act accordingly. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman aptly described the danger.

You always get in trouble when you don't call something by its real name. By denying that this is partition, and by suggesting that the U.S. is still ready to put its military and diplomatic weight behind knitting Bosnia into a single state, Washington is only raising unrealistic expectations among the Muslims.(4)

Countries do not exist in theory; they exist in reality or not at all. A Bosnia with two political heads may be theoretically innovative, but it is utterly impractical. Among its many defects, Washington's scheme ignores the problem of the belligerents' sharply conflicting long-term agendas. The Bosnian Serbs have made it clear that they ultimately want to become part of a Greater Serbia. Although the Serbs, reeling from the damage inflicted by NATO bombing and the loss of territory at the hands of increasingly well-armed Croatian and Bosnian government forces, may be willing to capitulate and sign a peace agreement that reflects Washington's demands, it is unlikely that they will truly abandon that objective. Shortly after the Geneva agreement, Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadzic reiterated, "Our final goal is a unified state of all Serbs," whether that occurs "in one, two, or three steps."(5)

Conversely, the goal of the Muslim-dominated regime in Sarajevo appears to be to regain control of all Bosnia, and its recent combined military offensive with its Croat allies may be the first step. A high-level Bosnian official has stated privately that his government views a peace agreement "as a way to buy a few years to recover Serb-held areas, either by peaceful means or by force."(6) There is little evidence that the Sarajevo regime is reconciled to meaningful Serb political autonomy, much less any move by the Republika Srpska to merge with Serbia. That point became emphatically clear in the second stage of negotiations that led to the signing of a more detailed agreement in New York on September 26.

Stage Two: The New York Agreement

Bosnian prime minister Haris Silajdzic vigorously pressed for provisions authorizing the creation of political institutions for the entire country.(7) That position was hardly consistent with a willingness to accept the Republika Srpska's independence, de facto or otherwise. But Silajdzic's demands were reflected in the accord, which the Serbs had little choice but to accept or face renewed NATO air strikes. The New York agreement included a commitment to hold free elections in both of the "entities" for all-Bosnia governmental institutions. The passages of the agreement pertaining to the parliament and presidency provide a flavor of the jury-rigged nature of the proposed structure.

Following the elections, the affairs and prerogatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be vested in the following institutions. . . .

* A parliament or assembly, two-thirds of which will be elected from the territory of the Federation, and one-third from the territory of the Republika Srpska. All parliamentary actions will be by majority vote provided the majority includes at least one-third of votes from each entity.

* A Presidency, two-thirds of which will be elected from the territory of the Federation, and one- third from the territory of the Republika Srpska. All Presidency decisions will taken by the majority vote, provided, however, that if one-third or more of the members disagree with a decision taken by the other members and declare that decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the entity or entities from which the dissenting members were elected, the matter will be referred immediately to the appropriate entity's/entities' parliament. If any such parliament confirms the dissenting position by a two-thirds vote, then the challenged decision will not take effect.(8)

The institutions would have responsibility for Bosnia's foreign policy, but the parties were to negotiate further to determine the extent to which those institutions would have responsibility for "other matters."(9)

The provisions are a blueprint for political impasse and, ultimately, renewed civil war. In the parliament, the Serb delegates could legally thwart any action--perhaps even using their veto power to blackmail their adversaries into granting the Republika Srpska independence. The same potential exists with the presidency. Indeed, perhaps the most peculiar part of the accord is the adoption of a collective presidency. Plural executives have had a long and inglorious history. The scheme produced disastrous results during the waning decades of the Roman Republic as members of the ruling triumvirates constantly engaged in power plays and double dealing. A plural executive emerged briefly during the French Revolution, with an equally unimpressive performance. More recently, Marshal Josef Broz Tito's dictatorship was succeeded by a collective presidency in Yugoslavia, and it is all too apparent how that system worked out.

The convoluted nature of the all-Bosnia institutions, combined with the supposed autonomy of the self-governing entities, does not represent an experiment in enlightened democratic federalism. Rather, it has all the earmarks of an arrangement drafted by State Department functionaries who specialize in abstract political theories. To work at all, such a complex scheme would require an extraordinary degree of goodwill on the part of all the parties and a willingness to compromise--qualities that have not been abundant in Bosnia and are not likely to be in the foreseeable future.

Washington's Obsession with Bosnian Unity

The Clinton administration's insistence that any peace settlement must maintain at least the appearance that Bosnia will be a unified state is puzzling. It is not as though the country had a lengthy history of independence and a sense of nationhood. Before its secession from Yugoslavia in 1992, Bosnia had not been an independent political entity in modern times. During the past 500 years it was, in turn, part of the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a monarchist Yugoslavia, and a communist Yugoslavia. Even though the Sarajevo regime declared independence in 1992, it has never actually controlled all (or even a decisive majority) of the territory it claimed--not even for a single day.

Moreover, the "international boundaries" of the Bosnian state have flimsy legitimacy, at best. Those boundaries were purely artificial creations, imposed by Tito shortly after he consolidated his power at the end of World War II. They were meant to be internal (virtually the equivalent of "provincial") lines of political and administrative demarcation within Yugoslavia, not the boundaries of an independent, sovereign state. Furthermore, Tito's creation of "republics" such as Bosnia and Croatia was a deliberate exercise in political gerrymandering to dilute Serb political influence by minimizing Serbia's size and placing large Serb minorities in other political jurisdictions. Howard University professor Nikolaos Stavrou points out that the premature decision by the United States and its European allies to recognize the independence of Croatia and Bosnia without any rectification of boundaries exacerbated an already dangerous situation. "With amazing haste, administrative and geographic borders had been converted to international ones without much concern for the ethnic makeup of these new entities."(10)

Washington's refusal to accept an official partition of Bosnia may simply reflect an unwillingness to admit that the United States and the West European powers blundered in recognizing Bosnia's independence when the new state had obvious problems of viability from the outset. If so, that is a sad comment on the wisdom of the Clinton administration's foreign policy team. In essence, the administration would be saying that the United States must persist in a hopelessly flawed policy merely to save face--even if that means prolonging the agony in the former Yugoslavia.

A more charitable explanation is that U.S. leaders fear that accepting a de jure partition would set a dangerous precedent in the international system. Other "aggressors" might then conclude that it is acceptable to change international frontiers or shatter duly recognized states by force. But there are two problems with that reasoning. First, the war in Bosnia is only one of more than 30 conflicts already raging throughout the world. A nearly universal feature of those struggles is that they involve local quarrels and grievances and often have deep, tangled historical roots. Just as the origins of those wars had nothing to do with Bosnia, the belligerents are not likely to alter their objectives in response to what happens in Bosnia. The notion that the Ossetian and Abkhazian separatists in Georgia will abandon their quest for independent states, or that Armenia will give up its claim to Nagorno-Karabakh, because the United States refuses to countenance the breakup of Bosnia is the worst sort of naivete.

Second, by insisting on the unity of Bosnia, U.S. policymakers implicitly adopt the position that every ethnic group in the former Yugoslavia, save one, has an inherent right of secession. Thus, the Slovenes, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Macedonians all had the right to secede from Yugoslavia. But for some inexplicable reason, the Serb population of Bosnia has no similar right to withdraw from that newly minted country, even though most Serbs have no desire to live under a political system that would inevitably be dominated by their ethnic adversaries. The administration's position is difficult to justify either logically or morally.

Washington's Ominous Prototype: The Muslim-Croat Federation

The tendency of U.S. policymakers to build elaborate, gossamer political structures for Bosnia did not begin with the latest diplomatic offensive. Nearly two years ago Washington exerted tremendous effort to help create a Muslim-Croat federation. The remarks of a "senior official" shortly after the parties signed the agreement in March 1994 illustrate the continuity of U.S. thinking. "What we have in mind is that the central government of [Bosnia] would be weak, but the Muslim-Croat part would be stronger. The links to Croatia on the outside could be stronger than those to the Serbs within the country of Bosnia. You'd end up with an asymmetrical federation in Bosnia."(11)

Although U.S. diplomats deserved high marks for creativity, the Muslim-Croat federation has proved to be dysfunctional. The notion of a country in which the constituent population groups have stronger political ties to outside powers than they do to each other is, to put it charitably, peculiar. Indeed, despite the official trappings, the "federation" is largely a fiction. As Misha Glenny, a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center and a leading expert on the Balkans, notes,

In the Croat-held areas of Bosnia, there is no trace of the [Sarajevo] Government. The currency used is Croatian, and the symbols flying over every building are exclusively Croatian. Muslim refugees have not returned in significant numbers to areas from which they were ethnically cleansed by the Croats. Nor does there seem to be the remotest prospect of this happening soon.(12)

The administration's peace plan for Bosnia incorporates many of the features of the agreement that set up the Muslim-Croat federation. Given the problems with the operation of that federation, there is little reason to assume that the new plan will work.

Multiple Sources of Danger

The potential for conflict between a Sarajevo government committed to establishing Bosnia's sovereignty in fact as well as in name and Bosnian Serbs wanting to secede and join Serbia is obvious. A more subtle but equally lethal danger is that the NATO peacekeeping force could be blindsided by a conflict between Muslims and Croats. Although those two factions are currently allied, some of the worst fighting in the Bosnian war was the Muslim-Croat bloodletting in 1993.

Washington apparently harbors the illusion that the Muslims and Croats, because they sometimes cooperate against the Serbs, have similar objectives. They do not. Although both groups supported Bosnia's secession from an increasingly Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, they did so for very different reasons. The Muslims, as the most numerous faction in Bosnia, wanted an independent state that they could dominate. The Croats, as the least numerous group, regarded Bosnia's independence as merely an interim step toward a merger of the predominantly Croat portion of the country with Croatia. Two factions with such incompatible goals are unlikely to coexist indefinitely in the same country. What does NATO propose to do if fighting erupts again between the two factions?

A related question is what the alliance plans to do if President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, who has made no secret of his territorial designs on western Bosnia, undermines Washington's carefully crafted peace settlement.(13) Glenny notes that because Croatia controls all access to Bosnia from the West, "the Government in Sarajevo will be utterly dependent on Croatia economically."(14) The Wall Street Journal fears that the West "is about to turn Bosnia into another Lebanon, with [Serbia's president Slobodan] Milosevic in the role of Syria's Assad."(15) The Journal's analogy may have some merit, but it is Tudjman, not Milosevic, who will be in a position to attempt to make the Muslim-Croat federation a Croatian protectorate--if he allows it to continue to exist at all. Bosnia's Muslims, however, may resist such domination even more than did Lebanon's fractious Christian community.

Dilemmas for the United States

Americans have reason to be concerned about the strange diplomatic machinations in Geneva and New York, given the Clinton administration's promise to provide U.S. troops as part of a NATO peacekeeping force. That commitment could prove costly in more ways than one. Administration spokes- people have conceded that the deployment would cost at least $1 billion in the first year.(16) Other estimates, most notably by former deputy undersecretary of defense Dov Zakheim, place the figure at more than $2 billion.(17) Moreover, although Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Gen. John Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry have stated that the U.S. force would remain in Bosnia for only nine months to a year, that seems unduly optimistic--a best-case scenario that assumes that all the belligerents abide by the provisions of the settlement.(18)

Even worse than the prospective cost is the danger that the peacekeeping troops may be caught up in renewed fighting. Sooner or later the Bosnian Serbs (and probably the Bosnian Croats as well) will attempt to politically meld with their ethnic brethren across the border. U.S. and NATO leaders will then face an unpalatable choice. They can either watch their Potemkin Bosnian state disintegrate, or they can use military force to try to preserve a diplomatic fiction.(19)

If the settlement shows signs of unraveling, the administration may also have to contend with a vocal U.S. faction that already wants Washington to use military power to fully restore Bosnia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Such critics regard the formula being pushed by Holbrooke as a dangerous capitulation to Serb aggression. The Wall Street Journal fumes, "While the world's cartographers can still label a piece of Balkan territory Bosnia-Herzegovina, it appears Bosnia might end up as a sovereign country in name only. Bosnia-Herzegovina won't be the unified, multi-ethnic state many believe is crucial to its survival."(20) Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, similarly contends that, instead of acquiescing in Bosnia's partition, the United States "should focus now on the reintegration of people and territory into a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina."(21) Former deputy assistant secretary of defense Frank Gaffney is characteristically blunt about how that can be accomplished, arguing that "U.S. air power (operating unilaterally or with allied participation) can enable Bosnian government and Croatian forces to reestablish a unified state in Bosnia-Herzegovina."(22)

If Washington failed to respond to the dismemberment of Bosnia in violation of the peace agreement, there would be howls of protest and a concerted lobbying campaign by such politically connected partisans of the Sarajevo regime. Whether the Clinton administration or a successor would be prepared to resist the calls for U.S. military action to preserve Bosnia's territorial integrity is a troubling question.

Requirements of a Viable Settlement

A more realistic policy now would avoid such unpalatable choices in the future. The notion of a united Bosnia was a utopian fantasy from the outset. There is no Bosnian nation; Bosnia is little more than a battleground for contending ethno-religious factions. An official partition, negotiated by the belligerents and reflecting their respective battlefield fortunes, would merely confirm a reality that has existed for more than three years.

There are, of course, understandable moral objections to an ethnic partition. People should enjoy equal rights regardless of such extraneous factors as race, religion, or ethnic background, and it is an extraordinarily sad comment that the peoples of Bosnia have refused to honor that principle. But a multiethnic Bosnia in which toleration is practiced is not a realistic expectation; there is simply too much ingrained hatred on all sides. It is hardly an appealing option to legitimize the concept of "ethnically pure" states. The most likely alternative, however, would be recurring civil wars, and all the atrocities that accompany them, until one faction gained complete control of the country's political institutions and either subjugated or ethnically cleansed the other population groups. Sometimes even an ugly divorce is preferable to an attempt to preserve a violent, hopelessly defective marriage.

Some critics object to an ethnic partition on more pragmatic grounds. Christopher Hitchens contends that political partitions have rarely worked, pointing to Ireland, Palestine, Cyprus, Vietnam, and preindependence India as examples. Partition "always leads to another war," he warns, and it empowers the "most hectically nationalist and religious elements" in the newly divided societies.(23)

Those are criticisms that cannot be dismissed lightly, given the historical record. Nevertheless, Hitchens ignores some important factors. For instance, most of his examples of disastrous partitions involved divisions imposed by outside powers, not reached by the parties themselves (Ireland is the one partial exception). There are a number of counterexamples, including such recent peaceful or relatively peaceful divisions of larger states as the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ethiopia's hiving off of Eritrea, and Czechoslovakia's "velvet divorce." It should be noted, however, that in all of those cases the decision to separate was made by the parties directly involved, with minimal pressure from the outside. Hitchens also begs the question of what alternatives to partition were available to the countries he cites as examples. With the exception of Vietnam, attempting to hold those entities together probably would have resulted in even more bloodshed. Given the communal blood- letting in postpartition India, is it credible that forcing additional millions of Muslims and Hindus to live together in the same state would have worked better? The horrendous and repeated bloodshed in other states that were kept intact as a result of external intervention (e.g., Zaire and Sudan) is strong evidence of the bankruptcy of that option.

There is, of course, no guarantee that if the NATO intervenors withdrew from Bosnia the belligerents would agree on their own to partition the country. They might decide to wage a fight to the finish. But there would be significant incentives for them to cut their losses and accept a portion of the territorial spoils rather than seek total victory at the risk of total defeat. In any case, since the United States has no vital interests at stake in the conflict, Washington can and should afford them the opportunity to make their own decisions.

Washington's Elitist Arrogance

Washington's insistence on preventing an official partition will only prolong the suffering in the former Yugoslavia. The entire strategy is an example of elitist arrogance--the belief that U.S. policymakers can formulate the perfect plan to solve the many complicated problems of a region that Americans comprehend dimly, if at all.

There is, of course, nothing wrong with offering to mediate the Bosnia dispute and suggesting solutions. But the United States is not being an honest broker; since the beginning of the conflict, Washington has been a flagrant partisan of the Sarajevo government and--to an even greater extent--Croatia. Moreover, Holbrooke and his colleagues are offering, not helpful suggestions for a peace settlement, but implicit demands backed by the threat of further NATO air strikes. In that context, U.S. proposals are "suggestions" only in the sense that the Mafia uses the term.

The administration's would-be architects of peace should let Bosnia's feuding factions work out their own destiny, however long it takes. Only a settlement forged by the parties to the conflict--an agreement that reflects battlefield realities and the balance of political and military forces--has any chance of achieving a durable peace. The administration's overly creative peace architects should cease their labors, for Washington's gratuitous meddling threatens to make a bad situation even worse.


(1) Ann Devroy and Dana Priest, "Clinton Aides Debate Size of U.S. Peacekeeping Force for Bosnia," Washington Post, September 21, 1995, p. A24.

(2) Text of the accord, New York Times, September 9, 1995, p. A4. The 51 percent-49 percent territorial split is described as "the basis" for a settlement and "is open for adjustment by mutual agreement."

(3) Quoted in Martin Sieff, "Accord Offers 2 Bosnias in 1," Washington Times, September 9, 1995, p. A1.

(4) Thomas L. Friedman, "Holbrooke and the P-Word," New York Times, October 1, 1995, p. E13.

(5) Quoted in Balkan Watch, September 11, 1995, p. 1.

(6) Quoted in Amos Perlmutter, "Partitioned Bosnia: Will Peace Prevail?" Washington Times, September 20, 1995, p. A19.

(7) At one point Silajdzic even threatened to withdraw from the negotiations unless the peace agreement included a clear guarantee that the Serbs could not secede from Bosnia. Paul Wood and Harriet Martin, "Bosnian Government Pulls Out of New York Talks," Financial Times, September 25, 1995, p. 1.

(8) "A Framework for Bosnia: Excerpts from Accord by 3 Governments," New York Times, p. A10. The agreement also provided for a cabinet "of such ministers as may be neces sary" and a constitutional court with jurisdiction "to decide all questions" arising under the new constitution.

(9) Ibid.

(10) Nikolaos Stavrou, "The Balkan Quagmire and the West's Response," Mediterranean Quarterly 4 (Winter 1993): 36.

(11) Quoted in Roger Cohen, "Washington Might Recognize a Bosnian Serb State," New York Times, March 13, 1994, p. A10.

(12) Misha Glenny, "And the Winner Is . . . Croatia," New York Times, September 26, 1995, p. A23. Also see Roger Cohen, "Croatia Expands Its Power in Bosnia," New York Times, September 16, 1995, p. A4; and Michael Dobbs, "Defeat of the Bridge Builders," Washington Post, September 17, 1995, p. C1.

(13) There is some evidence that Tudjman and Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic concluded a secret agreement in 1991 to partition Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia. See Edward Mortimer, "Slicing Up the Bosnian Cake," Financial Times, August 8, 1995, p. 11. At a May 6, 1995, banquet in London to mark the anniversary of V-E Day, Tudjman reportedly scrawled a map of Bosnia showing the future border between Croatia and Serbia--with the Bosnian state completely erased. British Liberal party leader Paddy Ashdown was one of the people who saw the map. Peter Benesh, "Croat Lead er's Map Erases Bosnia," Washington Times, August 8, 1995, p. A1.

(14) Glenny.

(15) "A Pieces Agreement," editorial, Wall Street Journal, September 12, 1995, p. A26.

(16) Dana Priest and Ann Devroy, "White House to Ask $1 Billion for Bosnia Troop Deployment," Washington Post, September 28, 1995, p. A24.

(17) Dov S. Zakheim, "Adding Up the Taxpayers' Tab for Bosnia," New York Times, October 2, 1995, p. A17. Secretary of Defense Perry has now conceded that a year-long NATO peace keeping operation could cost between $1 billion and $2 billion, depending on the size of the force. Bill Gertz, "Perry Talks of Somalia Lessons," Washington Times, October 4, 1995, p. A9.

(18) Zakheim, for example, estimates that the mission would take five years, resulting in a "mind-boggling" cost of $12 billion. For Perry's comment that the deployment would last no longer than one year, see "Perry Limits Peacekeeping to 1 Year," Washington Times, September 27, 1995, p. A14.

(19) Patrick Buchanan notes another danger if fighting be tween two or more of the factions erupts. U.S. officials have suggested that Russia contribute a peacekeeping force to work in conjunction with the NATO force, although the Russian troops would not be under direct NATO command. "When U.S. and Russian troops are cheek-by-jowl and war breaks out again, whether initiated by Muslims, Croats, or Serbs," Buchanan warns, "Americans and Russians could be in the midst of the fighting--on opposite sides." Quoted in Paul Bedard, "Clinton Confident Hill Will Commit Troops to Bosnia," Washington Times, October 3, 1995, p. A8. For an account of the NATO-Russian discussion of Moscow's possible troop contribution, see Craig R. Whitney, "NATO Sees Progress on Formula to Let Russia Join Bosnia Force," New York Times, September 28, 1995, p. A13.

(20) "A Pieces Agreement."

(21) Jeane Kirkpatrick, "U.S. Should Not Protect Serb Rebels," Baltimore Sun, September 25, 1995, p. A7. Also see the similar views expressed by the Balkan Institute, an organization supported by a lengthy list of prominent members of the U.S. foreign policy and political establish- ments. Balkan Institute, "Partitioning Bosnia: Analysis of the U.S. Peace Initiative," September 1995; and Paul R. Williams, "Unprincipled Principles," Balkan Monitor, September 25, 1995.

(22) "Start the Bombing Now!" Center for Security Policy Decision Brief no. 95-D67, September 25, 1995, p. 3.

(23) Christopher Hitchens, "Minority Report," Nation, August 14-21, 1995, p. 155.

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