Cato Institute
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The real
Havrylyshyn, an International Monetary Fund
ness, and civil society, though stronger than
economist, shows that on virtually all the rele-
before, remains weak relative to Western coun-
problem with the
vant criteria ranging from economic growth
tries.
transition process
rates to corruption, the "big-bang" countries
It was under those difficult conditions,
in Central Europe
of Central Europe performed significantly bet-
therefore, that one of history's most dramatic
ter than most of their eastern neighbors who
social experiments--the political and economic
is not that it was
took the gradualist approach.78 His conclu-
transformation from communist repression to
too fast, but that
democratic capitalism--took place. The chal-
sions are overwhelmingly supported by the
academic literature.79
lenge was enormous. Moreover, there were no
it was not fast
detailed blueprints for the reforms that could
enough.
guide the region. The reformers knew where
Estonia: An Example Worth
they wanted to go but did not know how to get
Emulating
there. Not surprisingly, transformation was not
all clear sailing. For example, rigged privatiza-
tion deals channeled unearned wealth to
The success or failure of the transforma-
crooked government officials and their cronies.
tion process in Central Europe can only be
Today, those who partook in that privatization
judged in relation to other countries and
bonanza continue to enjoy their ill-gotten
regions. Central Europe has performed much
wealth, which generates much resentment
better than, say, Russia and Ukraine, whose
among the populace. Rigged privatization deals
approach to reform was haphazard at best.
have also undermined the values that form the
However, in comparison to Estonia, the most
moral underpinning of capitalism, including
fervent liberalizer in the post-communist
hard work and entrepreneurship.
world, Central Europe looks much less im-
Instead of auctioning them off to the
pressive.
highest bidder, Central European govern-
Estonia began to liberalize at the end of
ments often "sold" state assets at heavily dis-
1992. The government eliminated import tar-
counted prices to their political supporters,
iffs and instituted a flat income tax. Corporate
friends, and families. The forgone revenue
taxes on reinvested profits fell to zero. To
could have been used in a variety of ways
arrest inflation, the government established a
ranging from tax cuts to paying off the
currency board. State enterprises underwent
region's debt. Moreover, the early privatiza-
privatization. As was the case with all former
tion deals proved quite "sticky." Many of the
communist countries, initially the Estonian
new owners of the privatized enterprises did
economy went into a recession as many ineffi-
not try to resell them to more competent
cient firms folded. By 1995, however, the econ-
entrepreneurs. Instead, they either "tunneled
omy was growing again. Between 1995 and
them out" (a term for asset-stripping used in
2004, Estonian GDP per capita rose by 96 per-
cent.80 That rise was 47 percentage points
the Czech Republic and Slovakia) or drove
them to bankruptcy. Regrettably, the resale
higher than that of Hungary, the best per-
forming Central European country.81
of privatized enterprises in Central Europe
continues to be delayed by bureaucratic hin-
According to the Fraser Institute's Economic
drances, which forces the new buyers to
Freedom of the World: 2006 Annual Report,
resort to bribes.
Estonia was the 12th economically freest
Does that mean that Central European
country in the world and the freest country in
the post-communist world.82 The smaller role
countries should have waited before disman-
tling their socialist economies? The answer is
that the state plays in the lives of the Estonian
an emphatic no. The cost of postponing
people is reflected in the surveys of Estonian
reforms, in terms of subsidies to inefficient
public opinion. For example, only 38 percent
producers and foregone economic growth,
of Estonians felt that the state's role in their
would have been immense. Moreover, Oleh
lives was overbearing. The score in Poland, a
17