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would be an obligation due when the individ-
that they would receive the means-tested
ual would have been eligible to receive benefits
amount."
under the current system. And the maturity
The paternalism of the first reason and the
value would equal the present value of the ben-
reliance on the extreme cases of the second are
efits the person would have been entitled to,
equally unattractive. More important, Prof-
less the present value of the person's future tax
essor Feldstein does not even refer to the clear
liability, both adjusted for mortality.
injustice of a mandatory plan.
The result would be a complete transition
The most obvious example is a person with
to a strictly private system, with every partici-
AIDS who has a short life expectancy and lim-
pant receiving what current law promises. Yet,
ited financial means, yet would be required to
aside from the cost of distributing the new
use a significant fraction of his or her earnings
obligations, the total funded and unfunded
to accumulate what is almost certain to prove
debt of the United States would not change by
a worthless asset.
a dollar. There are no "costs of transition." The
More generally, the fraction of a person's
unfunded liability would simply have become
income that it is reasonable for him or her to
funded. The compact between the generations
set aside for retirement depends on that per-
would have left as a legacy the newly funded
son's circumstances and values. It makes no
There are no
debt.
more sense to specify a minimum fraction for
"costs of transi-
How would that funded debt be paid when
all people than to mandate a minimum frac-
it came due? By taxing, borrowing, creating
tion of income that must be spent on housing
tion." The
money, or reducing other government spend-
or transportation. Our general presumption is
unfunded liability
ing. There are no other ways. There is no more
that individuals can best judge for themselves
would simply have
reason to finance the repayment of this part of
how to use their resources. Mr. Feldstein sim-
the funded debt by a payroll tax than any other
ply asserts that in this particular case the gov-
become funded.
part. Yet that is the implicit assumption of
ernment knows better.
those who argue that the "costs of transition"
In 1964, Barry Goldwater was much reviled
mean there can be only partial privatization.
for suggesting that participation in Social
The payroll tax is a bad tax: a regressive tax
Security be voluntary. I thought that was a
on productive activity. It should long since
good idea then; I still think it is.
have been repealed. Privatizing Social Security
I find it hard to justify requiring 100 per-
would be a good occasion to do so.
cent of the people to adopt a government-pre-
scribed straitjacket to avoid encouraging a few
"lower-income individuals to make no provi-
Should Social Security Be
sion for their old age deliberately, knowing
Mandatory?
that they would receive the means-tested
amount." I suspect that, in a voluntary system,
many fewer elderly people would qualify for
Should a privatized system be mandatory?
the means-tested amount from imprudence
The present system is; it is therefore generally
or deliberation than from misfortune.
taken for granted that a privatized system
I have no illusions about the political feasi-
must or should be as well.
bility of moving to a strictly voluntary system.
The economist Martin Feldstein, in a 1995
The tyranny of the status quo, and the vested
article in the Public Interest, argued that contri-
interests that have been created, are too strong.
butions must be mandatory for two reasons.
However, I believe that the ongoing discussion
"First, some individuals are too shortsighted
about privatizing Social Security would bene-
to provide for their own retirement," he wrote.
fit from paying more attention to fundamen-
"Second, the alternative of a means-tested pro-
tals, rather than dwelling simply on nuts and
gram for the aged might encourage some
bolts of privatization.
lower-income individuals to make no provi-
sion for their old age deliberately, knowing
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