Cato Institute
<<  <  >  >>
rial authority. Their success comes not from
to pay doctors according to the independent-
any inherent aspect of medical practice but
craftsman model. For example, Medicare's
from government protection.12 Licensing of
payment system generally does not reward
coordination. Instead, Medicare and other fee-
medical professionals, state health insurance
for-service payers tend to favor technologically
regulations, corporate-practice-of-medicine
intensive specialist services over those of gen-
laws, and policies that encourage fee-for-ser-
eral practitioners who might be best suited to
vice payment (i.e., Medicare, Medicaid, and
play the role of project manager. The mis-
the federal tax code) hold at bay the market
match between payment systems and patients'
forces that would improve coordination of
needs can be seen in the fact that the supply of
care by subjecting physicians to managerial
gerontologists is not increasing, in spite of the
authority.
obvious demographic basis for greater
Senior Management
demand and the value gerontologists can add
as project managers for those who are least
Coordinated health care teams in turn
able to coordinate their own care.10
would benefit from senior-level management
Physicians' resistance to managerial author-
that constantly examines how well their plans
ity is legendary. According to one colorful
are working, retains those that deliver positive
account:
outcomes, and discards those that do not.
When bottlenecks or errors arise, manage-
While many physicians fall prey to an
ment must brainstorm solutions, test them,
illusion of omnicompetence and believe
and implement those that work. In other
that their medical training endowed
words, senior management must be account-
them with superior management judg-
able for overseeing processes that lead to the
ment, most are incapable of submitting
best possible outcomes for patients.
to the authority of anyone, even a fellow
Such organizational advances are not
physician. Many physicians selected
entirely foreign to medicine. Some hospitals
their profession based upon their need
rely on "intensivists" to coordinate treatment
for autonomy and individual achieve-
in intensive care units, though this innovation
ment. As a consequence, many lack the
has yet to be widely adopted. Gerontologists
interpersonal skills or civility to func-
coordinate care for elderly patients, yet remain
tion as part of a larger enterprise . . . A
a relative anomaly, despite the obvious value
few less-temperate administrators actu-
they could provide to the growing number of
ally pop off in medical staff meetings
adults who struggle to care for their children
about how different things will be
and their aging parents at the same time.
"when all you bastards finally work for
Intensivists employ checklists of standard pro-
me."11
cedures to reduce errors in intensive-care
units.13 These advances illustrate how man-
In the home-building analogy, it is as if the
agement techniques borrowed from industrial
concrete contractor, the drywall contractor,
settings can be used to improve health care.
the electrician, and the plumber all refuse to
Yet prevailing payment and workforce policies
Government
work under a general contractor. Instead,
have inhibited these and similar innovations.
interference holds
they each try to do their jobs independently,
regardless of the impact on the rest of the
at bay the market
A Role for Corporations
project. No one craftsman is in a position to
forces that would
take responsibility for delivering the overall
finished product, and quality suffers as a
The challenge of developing organization-
otherwise improve
result.
al competence is the chief focus of the mod-
coordination
ern corporation.14 The very purpose of cor-
Physicians have been more successful
of care.
than other professionals in resisting manage-
porations is to reduce transaction costs
4