News Release

December 17, 2002

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Deterrence, Not Military Action Is Key to Dealing with Saddam Hussein
Attacking Iraq would likely further inflame Islamic extremists, lead to retaliation from terrorists

WASHINGTON -- Although the Bush administration is gearing up for possible military action against Iraq, there are less costly strategies for dealing with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein that will achieve better results, be less risky in terms of casualties, and diminish the threat of retaliatory attacks by terrorists, according to a new Cato Institute study.

In "Why the United States Should Not Attack Iraq," Ivan Eland, Cato's director of defense policy studies, and Bernard Gourley, an independent foreign policy analyst, argue that since Hussein's main concern is maintaining his political power, he can be deterred from using his supply of weapons of mass destruction because unleashing them could result in massive retaliation by the United States with its unmatched nuclear arsenal.

"Hussein must be made to know that if he uses his weapons of mass destruction against America," or our allies, "or if he assists others in doing so, he and his regime will be destroyed as the Taliban were," Eland and Gourley write.

Should the United States attack Iraq, the consequences could be disastrous. Eland and Gourley argue that an attack would play right into al Qaeda's hands and further inflame radical Islamists. Both authors believe that Hussein has weapons of mass destruction, but that deterrence is the best option. They add, however, if Hussein feels imminently threatened, he will have nothing to lose by using such weapons.

"Instead of being part of the war on the terrorist network that remains viable and is still attacking the United States, an unprovoked invasion of Iraq would detract from it and actually cause more retaliatory terrorism against U.S. targets," according to Eland and Gourley. "Instead of launching an excursion against Iraq, the Bush administration needs to put all of its resources and efforts into fighting the `enemy at the gates,' -- al Qaeda."

Eland's and Gourley's points are substantiated through prior experience with Hussein during the Gulf War. Although he faced inevitable military defeat, he did not want to risk his political survival and showed restraint in not using weapons of mass destruction against U.S. and coalition forces "because he knew using chemical weapons on the United States would be inviting disaster." Now that the United States is threatening his survival with an invasion, Hussein has nothing to lose by employing such weapons.

"Why the United States Should Not Attack Iraq"