Clinton Administration Policy to Overthrow Saddam Severely Flawed;
The Iraq Liberation Act is a failure; sanctions should be replaced with limited export controls

The U.S. policy of attempting to remove Saddam Hussein from power will be difficult, could be counterproductive and might throw Iraq into a civil war. Instead, the United States should replace general economic sanctions with a limited export control process that would restrict Iraq's ability to rearm itself, according to a study released today by the Cato Institute.

In "Imperial Overreach: Washington's Dubious Strategy to Overthrow Saddam Hussein," defense analyst David Isenberg argues that the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which states that the United States will aid efforts to overthrow Saddam to promote democracy, is flawed because it does not offer a realistic way of dealing with Saddam. Isenberg believes that the threat of Saddam is "overblown," based on the fact that Saddam's military has already been decimated by war and sanctions. "Saddam may be odious, but his regime does not pose a serious threat to America's security." Because Iraq lives in a "rough neighborhood," it has an incentive-like many nations in the region-to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, regardless of who is in power, Isenberg writes.

If Saddam Hussein were overthrown, Isenberg says, Iraq could break up as a result of civil war, or a more radical regime could arise. "Either outcome could cause instability in the entire region. . . . A post-Saddam regime could be even more virulently anti-United States than he is."

The United States has continued failed policies "on the premise that the appearance of doing something-no matter how foolish-is better than doing nothing at all." Economic sanctions, containment, no-fly zones, sporadic attempts to organize opposition groups and abortive attempts to foment coups have all failed to loosen Saddam's grip on power, the author notes, yet the ILA calls for the even more ambitious goal of attempting to overthrow Saddam. Instead, Isenberg argues that a more realistic policy would be to lift general economic sanctions in exchange for international weapons inspections and to continue a selective embargo on military weaponry. "Although this policy prescription is unlikely to please the zealots calling for Saddam's head, it does offer a realistic way to deal with an overblown threat and alleviate the sanctions-induced suffering of the Iraqi people."

"If the United States could patiently outwait a superpower adversary during the long years of the Cold War, it can certainly wait for the collapse of a petty tyrant in a small nation that poses little direct threat to the United States," he concludes.

"Imperial Overreach: Washington's Dubious Strategy to Overthrow Saddam Hussein"