News Release

November 19, 2003

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Preemption and Mini-Nukes Could Make United States Less Secure

WASHINGTON -- Although preemption was a factor in the Bush administration's decision to attack Iraq earlier this year, such a strategy, combined with the possible development by the United States of low-yield, earth-penetrating nuclear weapons, i.e., mini-nukes, would actually undermine deterrence and could potentially make the United States less secure, a new Cato Institute study argues.

In "Mini-Nukes and Preemptive Policy: A Dangerous Combination," Director of Defense Policy Studies Charles V. Peņa writes: "If other countries know that the United States has no compunction about using nuclear weapons preemptively -- particularly with a stated objective of regime change -- leaders of those countries would have less incentive to be restrained in their actions. If those leaders believe regime change is a foregone conclusion, the incentive for them to see terrorism as perhaps the only way to retaliate against the United States increases, including the possibility of providing WMD to terrorists."

Mini-nukes advocates argue that the weapons are needed for possible attacks on underground storage areas that potential adversaries are building to hide WMD, as well as dissuade rogue states from developing WMD in the first place. Critics contend that even small-yield warheads detonated underground will produce significant blast damage and widespread nuclear fallout, as well as jeopardize international arms control and nonproliferation agreements.

"The reality is that mini-nukes won't deter countries from taking actions that they perceive to be in their self-interest, such as the acquisition of nuclear weapons thought to be the only way to deter the United States from engaging in preemptive regime change," Peņa writes. "And neither will arms control agreements and a nonproliferation regime."

In the end, developing mini-nukes could prove pointless as long as the United States pursues a policy of preemption, ultimately undermining the very security the United States hoped to have gained by developing mini-nukes, according to Peņa.

"As long as preemptive regime change is a core component of U.S. policy, rogue states will likely continue to pursue nuclear weapons development even if the United States develops and deploys mini-nukes," Peņa writes.