News Release

May 3, 2001

Study: Decaying Russian sensors increase risk of nuclear war
Holes in early-warning system make Russians more likely to launch on false alerts

WASHINGTON-The world has survived at least four false alerts for nuclear war in the past 20 years. But could it survive another? Maybe not, according to a new study from the Cato Institute. That's because many of the space-based sensors that Russian commanders use to track missile launches no longer work. That greatly increases the risks of accidental nuclear war, the study says.

In "Reducing a Common Danger: Improving Russia's Early-Warning System," Geoffrey Forden, a senior research fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, analyzes the previous false alerts-two in the United States, and two in Russia-and concludes that in three of the four cases, data from satellites averted catastrophe by providing information that contradicted false data from other sources.

Although the United States has sensors providing 24 hour, global coverage, Russia can no longer rely on its decaying fleet of early-warning satellites, Forden says. Satellites have drifted away from their optimal orbits, and many are no longer functioning. At best, he says, Russian coverage has dropped to 17 hours per day. Adding to Russia's woes is the loss of some of its most important ground-based radars, which ended up in different countries after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

"Almost inevitably, some future benign event will be misinterpreted by Russian military leaders as a possible nuclear attack-especially if the incident happens during a period of increased political tension with the United States," Forden says. "When that happens, early-warning systems can play a vital role in preventing escalation into a nuclear holocaust. Therefore, Russia's deteriorating early-warning system poses a real threat to U.S. security."

The solution, Forden argues, is to provide limited support for rebuilding Russia's early warning capacity. Russia already has some satellites ready for launch, he says, but it cannot afford to put them into orbit. The United States could launch five-the minimum needed to provide 24 hour coverage of U.S. missile fields-at a cost of roughly $160 million, he says. Using their own equipment would give the Russians more confidence that they were not under attack than would using shared information from U.S. early warning systems. "The advantage to the United States of improving Russia's access to early-warning information…outweighs any assistance it might give to Russia's war-fighting capabilities," Forden says.

"Reducing a Common Danger: Improving Russia's Early-Warning System"