

CATO INSTITUTE

POLICY FORUM

SHOULD THE UNITED STATES GO TO WAR WITH IRAQ?

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Moderator:

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Featuring:

James Woolsey, Former Director,

Central Intelligence Agency;

and William Niskanen, Chairman,

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The Cato Institute

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. ELAND: Good morning. My name is Ivan Eland. I am the Director of Defense Policy Studies here at the Cato Institute. I would like to welcome you to the Policy Forum, entitled "Should the United States Go to War Against Iraq?"

Recently President Bush remarked, "I stand by these words: Afghanistan is just the beginning." And he stated that Saddam Hussein "needs to let inspectors back in his country." When asked about the consequences of letting the inspectors back into Iraq, President Bush replied "He'll find out."

Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor, also said something to the effect that we didn't need the September 11th attacks to tell us that Iraq was a threat to our U.S. security.

All of these remarks could be interpreted as similar to the ultimatum that Bush gave to the Taliban to turn over bin Laden or share his fate. But should the U.S. go to war against Iraq? That is the question we are going to be taking up today.

Before introducing our two distinguished speakers I would like to take a minute to throw out some issues, in the form of questions, that should be prominent in the debate on this issue. We will hopefully get the answers to them, or at least a

better understanding of the issues, from our speakers today or in the question-and-answer period.

I was at a small lunch roundtable yesterday on this very subject, and one of the participants said: Saddam is a bad man and I'm not sure why a lot of people in the Washington policy community don't understand that. And I thought to myself, I wonder what planet he is from; I don't think anybody in the Washington policy community doesn't think that Saddam is a bad man.

But I think the question is: Should we not just attack but take out Saddam? Another question is: Do we need hard evidence that he had direct involvement in the September 11th or anthrax attacks to do so?

According to a former Congressman at this lunch yesterday, the fact that Mohamed Atta met with Iraqi intelligence is enough evidence to take him out. But this same former Congressman passed out a picture, which he had in an elaborate case, of him shaking Saddam's hand in 1982. So I was wondering, if we applied that evidentiary standard to his behavior, would we have to bomb his house since he met with the top dog?

I don't think we need to prove in a court of law that Saddam had something to do with those attacks, but a little more convincing evidence than this might be needed. And maybe more evidence will be cited today in our forum.

Of course, some analysts don't require such evidence and would like to use the war on terrorism to get Saddam once and for all. Which brings us to a key question, and I think a question that will probably be addressed today at the forum: How big of a threat to the United States is Saddam? Is he a bigger threat than any other rogue state that we have to deal with?

Saddam probably has weapons of mass destruction, or is undoubtedly working to reconstruct them because he had them before. He has invaded his neighbors and he has used weapons of mass destruction in the past. But Qaddafi also has weapons of mass destruction and used them in his intervention in Chad in the 1980's. Also Iraq is a threat to Israel. But isn't Syria, which actually borders Israel, a bigger threat to that state?

Is Iraq a bigger threat than the other poor rogue states simply because it borders Saudi Arabia and the United States needs to defend the oil? Or is all this talk about Saddam just because we went to war with Saddam in 1991 and won, yet he continues to thumb his nose at us? Is this a visceral reaction on our part that makes him seem more evil than other dictators, or is he really more evil? That's the question.

We probably should note a little embarrassing history here. As with so much of American interventions overseas, our relationship with Iraq turned out to be counterproductive in the end. Remember in the 1980's, when the United States was scared

that Iran would win the Iran-Iraq war, we indirectly helped Iraq, the original aggressor, in that war. Even worse, after Iraq won the war, the first Bush administration continued to support Saddam instead of switching to support Iran and keep a balance of power, or simply just extracting itself from the whole mess.

So the question is: Is Saddam a quantum leap above other dictators and a threat to the United States or is this an emotional response, much like Reagan's interactions with Qaddafi in the eighties or Bush's interaction with Noriega in the same decade? Saddam got the villain of the 1990's award, narrowly beating out Milosevic, but will he be restored to his number one perch once diabolical bin Laden is killed or apprehended?

Another question is: Did the first Bush administration have good reasons for not going to Baghdad in the first place -- for example, fear of dismembering Iraq and the chaos that might ensue, Iranian gains from a weakened Iraq, or not having the support of Arab allies, et cetera? Or was the elder Bush just a weak-kneed leader who had no stomach to go all the way? That's the question.

If the administration does want to topple Saddam, how would they go about doing it -- with indigenous forces on the ground and U.S. air power, using the Afghan model that we are now using, or a full ground invasion, or some other method? What

will we get after we do take out Saddam? Will there be chaos, as there may be yet in Afghanistan?

We had no choice but to induce instability in Afghanistan. The perpetrator of the vile September 11th attacks and the regime that supported him had to be taken out. But don't we have a choice whether to destabilize Iraq? Alternatively, to prevent instability, would U.S. forces have to occupy Iraq after taking down Saddam?

Can we guarantee that a government that replaces Saddam will be any better? In other words, would it be another post-Soviet Afghanistan all over again?

And finally, the last question is: After we take out Hussein, will we continue on and take out every regime that we don't like who is developing weapons of mass destruction -- for example, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya, et cetera?

These are the questions that I think at least need to be asked, and hopefully our two distinguished panelists will help us answer some of them today.

One final note. I am going to allow each speaker roughly 20 minutes to speak, with five minutes each for rebuttal, and then we will go to Q&A.

Let me introduce our first distinguished speaker. James Woolsey is now a partner in the law firm of Shea and Gardner in Washington, D.C., where he returned after serving two

years as the Director of Central Intelligence. That is probably his most familiar position, I think, to the public. But before that he served in the U.S. Government as Ambassador to the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, in Vienna, from 1989 to 1991; Under Secretary of the Navy from 1977 to 1979; and General Counsel to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee from 1970 to 1973.

He has been a member of the National Commission on Terrorism; the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the U.S., that is, the Rumsfeld Commission; and the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, that is, the Scowcroft Commission. We are very pleased that he is here today to talk about the Iraq situation.

Go ahead and take it away.

JAMES WOOLSEY, FORMER DIRECTOR,  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MR. WOOLSEY: Thank you. I was honored to be invited to be here today to debate with Bill. He and I go way back. We both were whiz kids when his hair was a different color and mine existed, in Alain Enthoven's office in the Pentagon, he in the early to mid-sixties and me in the late sixties. But, to tell you the truth, since I am a Washington lawyer who has spent some

time out at the CIA, I am pretty well honored to be invited into any polite company for any purposes whatsoever.

One question that was stated was: Should we use the war against terrorism to get Saddam? To my mind, this is something parallel to asking: Should we, as of December 7, 1941, use the war against fascism to get Hitler?

We have here, for all practical purposes, what is a declared war on the United States, some portions of it silently and some portions of it openly, particularly now, after the bin Laden tape of today, a sort of combination of Hitler's and Torquemada's, who have moved against Western civilization, against civilization period, and against the United States. And there are various facets and aspects of this question. But the first and, I think, most important point is: The way you ask the question is going to determine the answer.

If you ask the question, could we prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law that Iraq was behind and directing the attacks of September 11th or the anthrax, then the answer is likely to be no. And if that is your decision criterion, if that's the question you ask, you may decide that you don't think we need to do anything with Iraq.

If you ask a different question, is it clearly demonstrable to any reasonable person that Iraq has been substantially engaged in terrorism against the West, and the

United States in particular, over the course of the last decade, that there is a reasonable chance that they were involved in September 11th and the anthrax, that they are developing weapons of mass destruction, particularly biological and nuclear in order to terrorize their neighbors, I would submit the answer to that question is a clear yes. And there is probably not much dispute about it.

So the answer you get is going to depend, in part, on the question you ask. Now, let's go through a couple of these one at a time.

First of all, weapons of mass destruction. A lot of questions are is he working on chemicals, but biological and nuclear are the ones that are truly mass destruction weapons. And biologicals, we know, are in Saddam's kitbag. We know from the U.N. inspections. We know that he went to great lengths to hide the type of programs he had in anthrax and the others, the nature of the strains, that he moves the equipment around for production with his Special Security Services, that he is working hard.

We know from Khidhir Hamza, his chief bombmaker until 1995, from his book, that he is working hard on the nuclear program, that he has dispersed the enrichment facilities for uranium and plutonium around the country so that it would be difficult to attack them. There is so much evidence with respect

to his development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, from the Rumsfeld Commission findings, I consider this point really beyond dispute. If people disagree, we can talk about it, but this is a very vigorous program that the Iraqi Government has long had in the past and has today.

Second, has it been involved in terror, including particularly terror against the United States? Again, this one is a slam-dunk. If you go back to 1993, when Saddam quite clearly tried to kill former President Bush in Kuwait in the spring of 1993, both the FBI and CIA sent forensic teams to look at the unexploded bomb which the Kuwaitis had obtained. Both reported to President Clinton that this was clearly a Mukhabarat, an Iraqi intelligence, bomb.

I would submit to you that the Mukhabarat is not a rogue elephant, as Senator Church once famously termed the CIA. It wasn't either, but certainly the Mukhabarat is not. What it does, it does on orders of Saddam. It follows, as the night to the day, Saddam tried to kill former President Bush eight years ago. That was the reason President Clinton said it publicly and did shoot a couple of dozen cruise missiles into an empty Iraq Intelligence Headquarters building in the middle of the night.

I have never understood why a determination to kill Iraqi cleaning women and night watchmen had much to do with an effective response against an attempt to assassinate the

President of the United States, but, again, it is a slam dunk that Saddam has been, at least in 1993, engaged in terrorist operations against the United States, terrible terrorist operations, which happily was thwarted by the Kuwaitis.

Now, there are some indications that he has been involved in others. The evidence for this is circumstantial, but it certainly adds up. First of all, there are numerous meetings between Iraqi intelligence, including Mr. Hajazi, a very senior official in the Mukhabarat, who until very recently, at least nominally, was the Iraqi Ambassador in Ankara, meetings between him and senior al Qaeda people in both Afghanistan and in Iraq.

The notion that is fostered by some, that there could be no cooperation between the Iraqi regime because it's secular and al Qaeda because it's deeply Islamist is just nonsense. There has been close cooperation between a number of these terrorist organizations and intelligence services in Sudan, Iran, Iraq, al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, for years -- meetings, money moving around. And again, this, I think, is quite clear.

There is some reasonable chance that Saddam was involved in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. The two key individuals, Yassin, who escaped the FBI's clutches in New Jersey and returned to Iraq, where he has sat for now about eight years in Baghdad, like a cat on a fence taunting a dog, was one of the principals, and he is an Iraqi citizen. He was one of the

principals of the World Trade Center attack. The other, Ramzi Yousef, entered the United States on an Iraqi passport, was known as "Rashid, the Iraqi," when he lived in New Jersey. And there is some circumstantial evidence that he is tied to the Iraqi Government.

With respect to September 11th, we have, announced by the Czech Government, three trips by Mohammad Atta, the lead bomber, to Prague. And on one occasion at least, he met with Iraqi intelligence, in the form of Mr. Al-Ani, a senior Iraqi intelligence officer, who has been historically in the business of assassinations and the like, in Prague. Neither of these were casual trips to Prague. In one last year, Atta, living then in Hamburg, first tried to get into Prague by air. He did not have an appropriate visa. He went back, drove to Prague, and met with Al-Ani quite possibly on that occasion. He flew from Prague directly to the United States, where he began his preparations for the bombing.

Last April he flew from the United States to Prague and met with Al-Ani. Both of these trips to Prague were for 24 hours or less. This is unlikely to be a tourist jaunt to look at Prague's lovely medieval architecture. On the second trip, he flew back within 24 hours to Florida. And, within a few days, \$100,000 was transferred to him from the UAE, and he began the final preparations.

Again, is this a slam-dunk? Is this a smoking gun? I would say it is suggestive only, but it is very suggestive.

And then we have Salman Pak, located on the southern edge of Baghdad, the site of one of Iraq's two major biological weapons facilities from the mid-1990's. A number of eyewitness accounts -- two from former U.N. inspectors, both American citizens, and three from Iraqi defectors -- that have seen one or another aspect of the following at Salman Pak. First of all, two training camps, one for Iraqis, one for non-Iraqis, at both of them at different times, using a Boeing 707, which is still there and which can be seen on commercially available satellite imagery today, for training on aircraft hijacking, and a substantial part of the training was training using knives.

Now, perhaps Saddam just has a grudge against Icelandic Air and he has not given vent to it yet and he is sort of working on the problem. But, again, as with Mohammad Atta's trips to Prague, there is another explanation which is far more likely.

With respect to the anthrax, this is a work in progress. The investigation goes in all sorts of different directions. The only thing I would say about that is the following. One hypothesis, and it must be a hypothesis -- and apparently some in the government are following it -- is that this is entirely separate from September 11th, has nothing to do with September 11th. It is, let's say, a crazed American Nazi

Ph.D. microbiologist with a fully equipped laboratory in a cave somewhere under Trenton, New Jersey, who just gets his anthrax ready and mails it -- sort of a Kaczynski figure.

Two problems with asserting that anthrax has nothing to do with September 11th. If this is this crazed Nazi Ph.D. microbiologist operating entirely alone, then it is a coincidence -- and I would say it is a very substantial coincidence -- that he had his anthrax all ready to go and was just kind of sitting there, waiting to do something when September 11th happens. And he thinks, ah, that's a good opportunity for me to follow on. And so, one week later, he starts mailing anthrax. And 28 days later, he starts mailing highly refined, militarized, sophisticatedly processed anthrax.

If it seems a little unlikely to you, well, the only other possibility, if September 11th is unconnected with the anthrax, is that this crazed American Nazi Ph.D. microbiologist hadn't done anything with anthrax until after September 11th, at which point he gets the idea and, quick like a bunny rabbit, gets his lab assembled and starts refining and processing it. That would mean he would have had to have done the first part of the work within seven days, and the sophisticated work within 28 days, from a standing start.

I would suggest neither of those scenarios is plausible. It does not mean that the anthrax has been fully and

completely directed by al Qaeda or whoever al Qaeda is working with. There is at least one American we know of, Walker, who has fought with the Taliban and perhaps, to some extent, under al Qaeda's influence. There is an Australian, in the paper this morning, who did the same thing.

It is not impossible that some crazed American, either a naturalized American citizen or an American citizen who looks somewhat like me -- maybe with more hair -- has been an individual involved in this. And we don't know exactly where the anthrax came from, where the technology came from, where the guidance came from, where the timing came from. The one thing that seems very unlikely is that whatever this individual has done and however he has done it -- or individuals -- they have done it completely apart from September 11th.

I would submit it is most probable that September 11th and the anthrax are involved in one way or another. And if that is true, then we have to ask: What organization or what government is al Qaeda closest to that is most likely to have access to and that has had a sophisticated anthrax program? There are only three countries that have had sophisticated militarized anthrax programs -- the United States, the former Soviet Union and Iraq.

It is not impossible that something was stolen from American laboratory. It is not impossible that Russian organized

crime has somehow obtained technology wherewithal, anthrax itself, and transmitted it to al Qaeda. But, again, the country that is closest to al Qaeda and working with it, I would submit, in a number of meetings and all the rest, is Iraq.

Now, what about other possible states? If we agree that time is of the essence because Iraq is working day and night, as fast as possible, to produce weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons, to obtain the fissionable material -- because they already know how to build a bomb, it's a question of getting the fissionable material -- and to work on their biological weapons programs, is delay in our interest? I would submit not. I would submit that their work on ballistic missiles, biological weapons and nuclear weapons, and their ties to terrorism suggests a certain urgency.

With respect to other nations, such as Iran, Syria, Sudan, that have backed terrorism in the past or back it today, there is, I would suggest, not nearly the same sense of urgency. And there is also a real possibility that, with some of these other countries, we will be able to affect their policies, their regimes, and see changes without going to war. In Iran, for the last month, there have been a number of demonstrations, tens, and in a few cases hundreds, of thousands of young people, demonstrating against Khomeini and Khamenei. Most of these demonstrations follow and surround soccer games in Teheran,

chanting "USA, USA," with smiles on the faces. And my favorite chant just from last week is "Death to the Taliban" in Kabul and in Teheran.

Now, the young people of Iran -- half of Iran, roughly, is under 21 years old -- the young people of Iran have never known the Shah and SAVAK and any of that. What they know as those who oppress them is the mullahs. Why are we popular? We are popular because the mullahs hate us.

So although we certainly don't want to do anything to interfere with that popularity, we don't want to do anything to cozy up to the wali-he faghieh, the group of mullahs that manage the power institutions in Iran, nonetheless, Iran is an interesting country with a real constitution, with voters who go to the polls, with structure, but also with tension and with potentially change within itself. Perhaps we should assist in some fashion. But there is hope for Iran; there is no hope for Iraq.

Iraq is not containable in the sense the Soviet Union was containable in the Cold War. The Soviet Union eventually threw up a Mikhail Gorbachev, an honest communist, who really wanted from each according to his ability, to each according to his need. And by trying to make the system work honestly, he made that thoroughly rotten system collapse. Containment worked

pretty much the way George Kennan said it would work over half a century ago. It just took a long time.

But Iraq is not going to throw up a Mikhail Gorbachev. This is far more like Nazi Germany in terms of the motivation, attitude and aggressiveness of the structure in Iraq than it is like the evil but somewhat cautious Soviet Union.

Briefly, what do we need to do if we decide, as the President I believe has suggested but not clearly stated, that Iraq's work on weapons of mass destruction, its terrorizing of its neighbors and its backing for terrorism generally is enough, and we don't need to show a clear and decisive link to September 11th or the anthrax? First of all, I would submit we do need one ally very much -- Turkey. We need bases for tactical aircraft in the north. We need some land access. We have access from the sea in the south, with the aircraft carriers and amphibious ships in the Persian Gulf. We have access for bombers from Diego Garcia.

We do need Turkey for a number of reasons, but I would submit we don't need a great deal more than that. It is useful to have other countries support us, but I would suggest it is not essential. The thing that is different, that very few people have noticed until the last few days, with the quick and decisive victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan, is what has happened in the revolution in military affairs. In the Gulf War, we had only

10 percent smart weapons, and it took an average of about 10 weapons to destroy a target. Today 90 percent of the weapons that U.S. aircraft drop are smart weapons and we take an average of two weapons to destroy a target.

That means, even with a radical reduction in numbers of sorties and aircraft, one can have a several-fold improvement in destruction of targets over the Gulf War. And we didn't do too badly with our air forces during the Gulf War. Iraq is not Vietnam. It is not very mountainous. It certainly has no jungles. Armored forces of any kind, a modern military without air cover in that environment, are sitting ducks, as much sitting ducks as the Taliban have been.

This would not be as easy as Afghanistan. We would, if we decided to move against Iraq, first destroy its air defenses. They have been degraded by 30 to 40 percent, according to most public reports, by our bombing in the north and south, in the no-fly zones, over the course of the last several years, but we would need first to take out the rest of their air defenses.

If we did that successfully, the Republican Guard, or any other Iraqi divisions -- the loyalty of which in the latter case is extremely doubtful as far as Saddam is concerned, but even the Republican Guard -- is about half the strength of what it was in 1991. It has no place to hide.

As Joe Louis once said of one of his opponents in the boxing ring: He can run, but he can't hide. They could hide, I suppose, in the middle of cities, in the middle of Baghdad. But if they do that, for indigenous forces -- Shia in the south, Kurds and other Sunni in the north -- to take control with American help, some Americans on the ground, Special Forces, perhaps Marines, perhaps some Airborne, but along the lines of what we have done in Afghanistan would, I submit, be a doable thing, particularly in the north and south. And that's where the oil is. It is not in Baghdad.

A quick offensive, arming the Iraqi opposition and utilizing devastating American air power against Iraq would, I suggest to you, be quite likely to achieve substantial and relatively early gains in the northern and southern parts of the country. At that point, we can figure out how to move to complete the war. I believe we could successfully prosecute it.

Iraq is not Afghanistan. It is not a particularly tribal area. There are divisions between the Shia and the Sunni and the Kurds, but there is broad acceptance among all of those groups that they want Iraq to hold together. If we pledged that we will assist in Iraq being kept as a single country, holding together, no separate Kurdistan to act as a magnet for Turkey's Kurds, I believe, in this relatively sophisticated and well-educated country, one of the most technologically and

socially advanced countries, until Saddam took over, in the Muslim world, I believe that we would have a very good chance of bringing a reasonable and democratic regime of some stripe to power in Iraq within a number of months.

Keep in mind, the world is full of the destroyed reputations of individuals who, beginning around half a century or so ago, said: The "blank" will never be able to become democrats, will never be able to run a democracy. At different times, from 1945 on, with the Morgenthau Plan originally and so forth, the "blank" was, first of all, the Germans, then the Japanese, then the Russians, then the Koreans, then the Chinese. But from Seoul to Taipei to Berlin to Tokyo, today -- even to some extent, to Moscow -- people seem to have found out how to make free governments, or at least substantially free governments, work.

Democracy is not something that is solely the province of this country. It is not alien to the Muslim world. Bangladesh is a functioning democracy. What we need to do is move to destroy this regime that wants badly to destroy us and to terrorize its neighbors, and begin the process of convincing the world that America is again on the march and that America is on the side of democracy and the people of the Mideast.

Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. ELAND: Thank you, Mr. Woolsey, for a great presentation.

Our next speaker, and the last speaker, is our Chairman here at the Cato Institute, Bill Niskanen. He has served as the Chairman here since 1985, having previously served as acting Chairman of President Reagan's Council on Economic Advisors. He is one of the most highly regarded microeconomists in the nation. He has also served as the Director of Economics at Ford Motor Company and as a defense analyst for the Pentagon, the RAND Corporation, and Institute for Defense Analyses. He takes a great interest in defense and national security issues, and has throughout his career.

Bill.

WILLIAM NISKANEN, CHAIRMAN,  
CATO INSTITUTE

MR. NISKANEN: Thank you, Ivan.

America's war in Afghanistan has been unusually effective. And for that, I suggest the Bush administration deserves our respect and our support.

My case today, in contrast, is that the United States should risk peace in our relations with Iraq. I choose these words with special care, recognizing that the risk of peace may

sometimes be substantial, but that the inherent nature of war should make it the foreign policy of last resort except in response to a major attack on American lives and property.

May I first acknowledge that Saddam Hussein is a dangerous, evil man. At his direction, Iraqi forces and agents invaded Iran and Kuwait, brutally suppressed domestic insurrections, used poison gas against both Iranian and Kurdish forces, they may have sponsored several prior terrorist incidents and the attempted assassination of former President Bush, and, to a now uncertain extent, have acquired or developed several types of weapons of mass destruction.

For all of that, I conclude the Bush administration should not follow a successful prosecution of the war in Afghanistan with another war in Iraq unless, unless they present conclusive evidence, credible enough for at least Tony Blair, that Saddam helped finance, organize or implement the September the 11th attacks or that he has supplied weapons of mass destruction to some terrorist group to use against American lives and property.

Despite the concerted efforts of Jim Woolsey and Larry Milroy and others, no such conclusive evidence has been presented to date. Among those who have recently attested to this conclusion are the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the British Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Defense

Secretary, the NATO Secretary-General, and the head of Israeli Military Intelligence. For those of us who do not now have the security clearances necessary for an independent evaluation of this evidence, we must rely upon such official validators.

If Mr. Woolsey draws a different conclusion from the available evidence, he must make his case to some public official that we both trust and respect. No purpose, I suggest, is served by trying to make this case to us who are not in a position to evaluate the evidence.

In the absence of such evidence, or a future attack on American lives and property that is more clearly attributable to Saddam, we should be concerned about the following possible consequences of another war in Iraq.

One, American popular support may not be sufficient to prosecute a war against Saddam. Some dramatic event, such as Pearl Harbor or the September the 11th attacks, has usually been necessary for broad popular support of a military response by the United States. Americans have properly learned to be suspicious about ambiguous evidence of a distant event, such as that which led to congressional approval of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the buildup of American forces in Vietnam.

Two, we may have few, if any, of the regional allies necessary for logistics support, bases and overflight rights. Turkey is concerned that supporting Kurdish forces in Iraq might

lead to a Kurdish state on their border. The Turkish Minister of Defense was recently quoted as saying "Turkey was not in favor of attacking Iraq within the context of the war against terrorism." He suggested that there may be other evidence developed or other considerations, but he said that Turkey was not supportive of attacking Iraq within the context of the war against terrorism. Kuwait is concerned that they would be anathematized by the rest of the Muslim world.

Three, we may have little if any support from the other major governments of the world. Several European governments have already warned the U.S. Government that they would not support another war in Iraq based upon the evidence presented to them to date. The British Defense Secretary recently commented that a coalition action against Iraq did not seem justified. And the German Chancellor recently questioned the basis for continuing anti-terrorist actions in the Middle East "other than the ones underway in Afghanistan at present."

Now, support of the European governments for another war in Iraq, though valuable, would probably not be necessary. But their continued willingness to locate and prosecute local terrorist cells and to share intelligence across the world is critical to the success of the broader and, I think, more important sustained war against terrorism. I think that a unilateral U.S. action in Iraq, even with the cooperation of

Turkey, may very well break apart the larger coalition that is necessary for the successful prosecution of the broader war against terrorism.

Four, in the absence of allies and regional bases, it is not clear how U.S. forces could prosecute another war in Iraq. In any case, such a war could be more costly in time, lives and resources than the first Gulf War. The successful prosecution of the war in Afghanistan to date provides no assurances, at least to me, of a similar successful, low-cost war in Iraq. Iraq still has about 400,000 military personnel, with moderately modern arms, compared to the lightly armed Taliban of about 40,000 troops.

The opposition forces in Iraq are small, unorganized and lightly armed, even in comparison with those in Afghanistan on which the U.S. has relied for almost all ground combat. The only victories of the Iraqi National Congress since 1996 have been here in Washington. Moreover, Saddam may be more willing to use some weapons of mass destruction if his regime is at stake, in which case the costs would be unusually high.

And last, another war in Iraq may serve bin Laden's objective of unifying radical Muslims around the world in a jihad against the United States, increasing the number of anti-U.S. terrorists and probably future attacks. In contrast, the September the 11th attacks and the successful prosecution of the

war in Afghanistan have divided the Muslim political elite, and maybe the Muslim street.

Yes, there would be one benefit of a successful prosecution of another war in Iraq -- the death of one dangerous, evil man, maybe his regime, and the temporary reduction of the potential of one government to inflict great harm on us and others. But what do we do for an encore? There are any number of dangerous, evil men in the world, and a much larger potential supply. One way or the other, we have to learn to live in a world of dangerous, evil men, without an indefinite series of wars against them, unless they initiate or assist in attacks on our vital national interests.

In technical terms, the optimal strategy in a prisoner's dilemma game of uncertain duration is a tit-for-tat strategy -- an initial cooperative move, followed by a proportionate response to each successive move by the other party. The most viable long-term strategy is probably not a series of wars to reduce their potential to do us harm, but changes in our policies that would reduce their incentive to single out the United States as a target. The best defense may be to give no unnecessary offense.

Yes, there are surely some better alternative to our status quo policy in Iraq. The key issue is whether we try to achieve a better outcome by negotiation, by threat or by

conquest. Cato Institute analysts, for example, have made a case, a good case to my mind, to negotiate the restoration of U.N. inspection of facilities that may be producing or storing biological or chemical weapons in exchange for suspending the bombing and reducing the scope of the embargo to those Iraqi imports that may have a dual military capability.

Nuclear inspections, in contrast, have continued, but should probably be broadened. An inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency last January verified that Iraq was in full compliance with their own commitments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards and Security Agreement, but the Iraqi agreement was less restrictive and less comprehensive than called for by U.N. Resolution 687. But even the status quo policy toward Iraq, however unsatisfactory the outcome, seems to me to be superior to another war, unless it proves of course that Saddam has been a terrorist of global reach -- the Bush criterion that has fortunately focused the war on terrorism to date. We have lived with this policy for a decade at no great cost, or much benefit, to us.

In conclusion, we should continue to avoid another war in Iraq unless we have more justification than a shared agreement that Saddam is indeed a dangerous, evil man. In the spirit of the season, we should be prepared to risk peace.

Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. ELAND: Now I'm going to give each speaker five minutes for a rebuttal, and then we will go to questions and answers after that.

MR. WOOLSEY: Thank you.

As I said at the beginning, the outcome of this debate depends on the question you ask. The question Bill asked is: Do we have conclusive evidence of Iraqi involvement in September 11th or supplying weapons of mass destruction to terrorists? As I said, I don't think that evidence could be regarded as conclusive. What is conclusive is that he has conducted terror against the United States, at least in trying to kill President Bush, and that he is working on weapons of mass destruction in order to terrorize his neighbors. And so the answer, again, depends on the question.

On the question of popular support, if you look at the public opinion polls, if you look at the fact that in no place in the country can stores keep American flags in stock because they sell out too fast, if you look at the fact that not only the New Republic but Christopher Hitchens, in the Nation Magazine -- my goodness -- all sound like Tony Blair. If you look at the fact that we were attacked on this continent ourselves and thousands of Americans were murdered by these people, I would suggest having popular support is about as far from the ambiguities of

the Gulf of Tonkin as one could get. And I speak to you as the Founder and President of Yale Citizens for Eugene McCarthy for President in 1967-68.

Turkey and the Kurds -- what matters in Turkey ultimately, and will affect the politicians as they think about it, is the views of the Turkish military. And I would submit that those who have known and worked with them would find that they are with us in a pinch if we need them.

The Europeans may not support it. Right. But we really don't need the Europeans. And I think it is quite incorrect to suggest that they would stop sharing intelligence with us or stop helping other governments -- say the Philippines -- to fight terrorism if we moved against Iraq against their will. They will be the first in line to pat us on the back following success, and say that they were with us all along.

Bill said that Iraq won't be as easy as Afghanistan. On the eve of the war beginning in earnest in early October in Afghanistan, the New York Times editorialized: Nobody should think that this war in Afghanistan is going to be as easy as the Gulf War against Iraq in '91.

And following the clear successes in Afghanistan, the New York Times editorialized: Nobody should think that going against Iraq is going to be as easy as going against Afghanistan.

I would submit, if one can adopt this line of thinking, one will never use force. It is always going to be, in some people's opinion, harder the next time around. I would submit to you that is not the case.

What has happened as a result of the smart weapons revolution that I described is the other way around. The dominance of American air power makes a huge difference, whether it is 400,000 troops or 40,000 troops. And most good analyses that I know of would suggest that the loyalty of the non-Republican Guard divisions is quite, quite sketchy in Iraq. The Republican Guard will fight, and that is the problem, but it is half the size that it was in 1991. It was also decimated and we saw a lot of surrenders from it during the Gulf War from air power.

Saddam may use weapons of mass destruction if we fight. That, to my mind, is an argument for fighting sooner rather than later. As every day goes by, he gets more sophistication, more capability, more ability to use ballistic missiles of greater and greater range to carry weapons of mass destruction. We are getting more in danger every day by his existence and the existence of his regime.

We may add to the incentive for jihad and anger in the Arab street? Quite the contrary. If you look at the Arab street since the fall of Mazar-e Sharif, silence, absolute silence,

except, not Arab, in Teheran, where the crowds are cheering us, and in Afghanistan, where the crowds are cheering us. The reason the Arab street has gotten quiet is because they have begun to realize, the very small Islamist minorities in any of these countries, that they misjudged the situation, that we are not the paper tiger that they thought we were after our flaccid and feckless two decades in the Mideast, but rather that something has been awakened in this people and in this country that can move almost on a dime, halfway around the world, to a landlocked state, and win a war within three months of a standing start from being attacked.

The Arab street is shocked and somewhat fearful. We really need to make them a bit more fearful. A very distinguished Mideast expert said to me shortly after September 11th: Depending on how we respond to this, when this is over, we are either going to be regarded with contempt in the Mideast, as we are today because of our having fled Beirut, having fled Mogadishu, having failed to prosecute the war successfully against Saddam, and having betrayed the Iraqi resistance, and on and on and on, either we are going to be held in contempt, as we are today, or, he said, we are going to be both feared and respected.

The point is, there is nothing in between. There is no generally being tolerated and liked for being sort of halfway

decent, nice guys. That world is gone. We have to reestablish respect for ourselves. And that means victory in war and fear to some extent. After the war we can become our regular nice Americans again and help rebuild things and establish democracy and doing all of the things that we have done all over the world. But that cannot take place without victory.

Reduce their incentive to come after us, and don't give them offense? My response to that would be the one I had a few weeks ago from a member of one of my favorite subcategories of humanity, the grizzled, somewhat elderly black Washington, D.C. cabdriver. It was the day after President Clinton's speech at Georgetown, in which he had implied -- not quite said, but implied -- that what we were going through, in some fashion, was a payback for slavery and our treatment of the American Indian.

I asked the cabdriver what he thought, if he had seen reports of the President's speech. He said: Yes, I read about it in this morning's paper. I asked: What did you think about it? He said: These people over there don't hate us because of what we've done wrong. They hate us for what we do right.

And that is the point. We give offense by you women not wearing veils. We give offense by being a democracy. We give offense by tolerating all religions. We give offense by free speech. These are the functional equivalent of Nazis.

These people hate us for exactly the best things about this society.

Certainly, if we would move away from reliance on Mideast oil, a subject of a whole other discussion, we could not be as vulnerable to that part of the world. We might not need to keep as many people in that part of the world. But as far as not giving offense, the Bill of Rights is what gives offense to these people.

I don't think Iraq is going to accept any kind of reasonable inspections. I think it is clever of the President to ask for it. Tariq Aziz has already turned it down. I think that presents, as far as I am concerned, *causa belli* already.

Unless Saddam has been a terrorist of global reach, Bill says, we should continue to live with him. I think it is clear he has attempted to kill the President of the United States. He is developing longer and longer-range ballistic missiles to carry his weapons of mass destruction. Living with him voluntarily, I would submit, is the most dangerous course. Give war a chance.

(Applause.)

MR. NISKANEN: Two simple points. Why hasn't Jim been able to make his case to people with access to the same information, and broader information, in Britain, in Germany, in France, and Turkey, or Israel? Have they all somehow buried

their head in the sand, to ignore or pay no attention to certain kinds of evidence that he offers?

I suggest, again, that it serves no purpose for him to try to make his case on the intelligence issue to us. We are not in a position to evaluate his statements in that regard. He ultimately will have to make it to somebody that we both trust and respect as a means for paying attention to that.

Now, in the Afghani and the Taliban and the al Qaeda and so forth, the evidence was all not that clear at the beginning, on September the 11th. But the Bush administration has been quite good in making it clear, initially to allies around the world and then to the larger public, and then with the tape that was released this morning of bin Laden's testimony, that the evidence is overwhelming. I suggest that Jim ought to make his case to this crowd of people who have validated our reading of the intelligence in the Afghanistan case, and they would then be able to take the case to us.

In the absence of that, I think that there is no basis for American support of a war in Iraq without, again, some conclusive evidence or some event, some clear attribution of some event, in which Hussein is clearly responsible for an attack on the United States.

Finally, I do not want to live in a world in which the United States is respected only because we are feared. I want

everybody in the world to recognize that if they attack our vital interests, we will respond directly and overwhelmingly and forcefully. But I don't want a United States in which people respect us abroad only because they think that we may invade them and overthrow their regime and their leaders at the time. That defines who we are. I want to be on the side of saying I want the United States to be respected for who we are. And I think who we are is not a nation that is prepared to go to war, more or less, with anybody who might be potentially dangerous to us in the future.

(Applause.)

MR. ELAND: We are going to start the question-and-answer period. I am going to ask the first two questions, and I am going to be deliberately provocative to both participants here and try to play a little devil's advocate on the presentations. The first one I'm going to ask is to Bill Niskanen.

It seems to me, from what I've heard here, many rogue states support terrorism. They develop weapons of mass destruction. Some of them have invaded their neighbors. It seems to me that really the only thing that distinguished Iraq from the other rogue states prior to the 1991 Desert Storm counterattack after the invasion of Kuwait was the fact that Iraq borders on Saudi Arabia and that we need to defend those

oilfields. Don't we need to defend the oilfields? When we strip away all the fluff talk about terrorism and all this sort of stuff, doesn't it come down to oil and don't we really need to defend that?

MR. NISKANEN: Both in 1991 and in 2001, oil is not worth a war. Oil serves the interests of whoever controls it only if they sell it to us and to other people in the world. And American national interests are independent of the question of who owns that oil, with the exception of the question of the wealth of that country. Now, that would be the case whether it was soybeans rather than oil. And it is independent of whether we import a lot of oil or whether we were net oil exporters.

The price of oil in Japan is the same as it is in Britain, where Japan imports all of its oil and Britain is largely self-sufficient in oil. We have a world market for oil. The one thing that can damage our access to oil is if there is actual physical damage to the oilfields and to the oil production facilities in the Middle East. That is much more likely to be provoked by war or be a side cost of war than provoked by a change in who happens to own the oil in the Middle East.

I don't think that we need to have a massive military presence in the Middle East, in the Persian Gulf, in order to assure our access to oil. Japan has not had, except in support of our operations in the Gulf, any military forces in the area.

It is entirely dependent upon oil from that region and from Indonesia.

So oil is not worth a war. It was not in 1991 and it is not now.

MR. ELAND: Now the question for Mr. Woolsey, and I am being deliberately provocative here. We were Saddam's friend up until the Kuwait incident and he invaded Kuwait. We took it upon ourselves to defend Kuwait largely for the oil which Bill just said that we don't need to defend by use of arms. So didn't we really start this whole thing with Iraq? And he did try to assassinate President Bush, but of course I think our military was probably trying to assassinate him during the war. I don't know if you would technically call it assassination but they were certainly targeting what they call the command centers of the Iraqi Government, which one would assume is Saddam.

The other thing is, according to the State Department Terrorism List, the Iraqis support four terrorism groups. None of them have traditionally attacked the United States, and three of them are in serious decline. So I am wondering, is there more to the fact that we can't negotiate with these people? It seems that we, as Edward Peck, the former Ambassador to Iraq, once said at a Cato Forum, we negotiate with every other despot in the world -- Kim Jong-Il, the Syrians, Qaddafi -- but we can't seem to get past the Gulf War and negotiate with Saddam Hussein.

And some of the things that you have said make me think that we cannot negotiate. You said we cannot contain them like we did with the Soviet Union. All they understand is force. But then, curiously, you said, but they can adopt democracy after it's all over. So I'm wondering, are these people so unreasonable that we can't negotiate with them? And do we have to go to war with them?

MR. WOOLSEY: The answer to the last question is we are not going to war with the Iraqi people any more than we were going to war with the Afghani people. We are freeing the Iraqi people. We have no quarrel with the people of Iraq. They have lived under this regime that manages by torture for 30 years. And it is the regime.

If I were to paraphrase Mr. Carville's slogan for the 1992 campaign and put it into this context, I would say "It's the regime, stupid." It's the regime that needs to be changed. The Iraqi people are fine people, just like people in other countries. I think there is no reason why they cannot govern themselves and become a democracy.

As far as Ambassador Peck is concerned, I was on Wolf Blitzer with him the other evening, and he started out the discussion by saying that it's the United States that is the terrorist state in the Mideast. And I think that proposition so

refutes itself I am going to not address Ambassador Peck's views any more.

As far as the U.S. targeting Saddam, sure, the war was on in the Gulf War, and just as we did shoot down Yamamoto's aircraft in 1942 or 1943, we would do our best to destroy Saddam, or would have done it during the Gulf War if we had been able to find him. He was part of the command structure of the government that we were at war with.

But I think the idea that he has embarked upon a 30-year career of terror -- and actually he was a hit man before he was a dictator; that's kind of how he earned his living before he became dictator, this is a man who kills people for enjoyment -- I think to suggest that all he has been doing since is responding to our attempt to destroy his regime, that was unfortunately aborted in 1991, just completely misunderstands his background and behavior.

The fact that we were backing him and helping him with intelligence to some extent in the 1980's, during the Iran-Iraq War, was I think a very poor decision during the Reagan administration. I must say that this Scoop Jackson Democrat has a high regard for Ronald Reagan and I give him credit for playing a huge role in ending the Cold War. And I think most of the decisions the Reagan administration made over eight years on defense and foreign policy were on the right side of the ledger

rather than the wrong side. But backing Saddam in the war between Iran and Iraq was a particularly stupid thing to do. It would have been fine to have let those two regimes, both of which are hideous, just fight it out for a long, long time.

But, unfortunately, I think by cozying up to him in the eighties, by withdrawing in 1991, when we had him on the ropes, and not destroying his regime, or at least supporting the Kurds and the Shia when they were willing to, by responding weakly to the terrorist acts in 1993 and others that he has undertaken -- and even going back into the eighties, fleeing Beirut when the Marines were killed, and all the rest -- the main point of all of this is that we had given him, understandably, the same impression that we had given to the Japanese as of early December of 1941 -- the impression that we were a flaccid, feckless, wealthy, sleepy, cowardly country that would not fight.

And he has attacked us and supported people who have attacked us, and bin Laden has attacked us, I think, for exactly the same reason as the Japanese attacked us in 1941 -- they didn't think that we would fight. We give that impression sometimes after we win a world war. We gave that impression after World War I, in the twenties, and we gave that impression after we won the Cold War, in 1989-1991. We go on a national beach party. That is what we were doing in the nineties. And we

have ourselves, in part, to blame for the tyrants and terrorists of the Mideast misjudging us.

The point is not that we want to be only respected because we are feared -- I never said that -- the point is that in order to be able to do those wonderful American things we do -- bring democracy to people, help rebuild countries, be respected, in part, for the good things that we do -- we have to read a little bit of Machiavelli and realize that we are not going to be able to be successful in being respected for those reasons until we again reestablish our reputation as somebody you don't cross, and especially you don't cross by flying airplanes into our World Trade Center and Pentagon and killing thousands of Americans.

MR. ELAND: We are going to open it up to the audience. Just a few quick rules. If you would state your name and your organization, if you have one, and please try to limit yourself to a question and not make a speech. And also keep your questions short so we can take as many as possible during the time we have here. And please also address who you want to put the question to.

MR. DREYFUS: My name is Bob Dreyfus. I'm with Rolling Stone Magazine.

I wanted to ask Mr. Woolsey to respond to the question that Mr. Niskanen made, which is: Have you made this case to

American Government officials in the Defense Department or elsewhere about what we should do vis-à-vis Iraq? And what kind of response have you gotten from them?

MR. WOOLSEY: In the first point -- and I've said this twice and I'll say it for a third time -- I reject Bill Niskanen's statement of what the case needs to be. I hate to sound like Bill Clinton, but it all depends on what you mean by "case."

(Laughter.)

MR. WOOLSEY: What I mean by case is proving beyond a reasonable doubt, let's say, that Saddam has been involved in terrorist acts within the last decade against the United States -- and he clearly has, in the attempt to assassinate former President Bush -- and that he is developing weapons of mass destruction in violation of his international legal obligations. And that is also clear. As far as I'm concerned, that case is a slam-dunk, beyond a reasonable doubt, way beyond a reasonable doubt.

Now, if you ask the question, because you don't want to go to war with Iraq, if you ask the question and say that the case means you have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt -- conclusively Bill said -- that the Iraqi regime was involved in 9/11, the first thing I say about that is I reject that definition of the case. I reject that that is necessary in

order, in the current circumstances, for us to destroy the Iraqi regime. I believe there is, and I said it in my opening remarks, information that is suggestive along these lines. If I were trying this before a court, I would say I think there is a preponderance of evidence that Saddam was involved in some way in 9/11 or the anthrax, but I wouldn't say it is beyond a reasonable doubt, the criminal law standard.

And it is not up to me to make a case to anybody except when somebody calls me and asks me what I think. Cato called and asked me if I would debate Bill, and I said sure. My phone rings, I answer the phone. If the press or one of these advisory boards I serve on for the government asks my advice, I tell them what I think. And the facts that I have cited here, about 9/11 for example, are ones that have been widely reported in both the American and British press particularly. And I think very few people, on those facts, would have any quarrel with them as generally accepted having occurred -- the Mohammed Atta visits, the Salman Pak and the rest.

But does that amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Saddam was involved in 9/11? No. But, again, I do not think that is necessary.

I serve on four advisory boards to the Federal Government. These are uncompensated advisory boards. Two are to the Defense Department, one is to the Navy, one is to the CIA.

All have had meetings since 9/11. When I sit on these boards and people ask my advice, I give my advice, period.

MR. ELAND: Another question, this gentleman here.

MR. COWAN: I'm Edward Cowan, with AEI. This question is for Mr. Woolsey.

You make an interesting but perhaps limited moral case for the United States deploying its great military resources. But let's put that aside for a minute and go to the question of cost and success, which you acknowledge, in your opening presentation, those questions are unclear and open-ended. You are talking about attacking a military establishment of 400,000 troops, well-armed and trained as you acknowledge, and hopefully, you offer the possibility, many of them will defect. We don't know that. That has been the great hope of the CIA and some people in this government since 1991, and there has not been much that has happened to reinforce that hope.

Beyond that, there is the question of the engagement of U.S. resources. You mentioned paratroopers. You mentioned Marines and so on. It sounds like a very open-ended, broad, and possibly very long-term and costly engagement. It's hard to see the outcome and, beyond that, hard to see the political outcome.

Why not, let me ask you, take on a much more limited strategy of continuing the policy of containment which we've had for 10 years, which has been pretty successful, protected Iraq's

neighbors from Iraqi expansionism, and supplement it with selected, targeted attacks on the places in Iraq that produce the weapons of mass destruction and produce the missiles that might deliver them?

MR. WOOLSEY: First of all, certainly not all 400,000 Iraqi troops are, as you say, well trained. The non-Republican Guard divisions are particularly ill-trained. And in fighting against the INC units in the north in 1995 and again in a recent sortie into the north against the Kurds, a large number defected.

In one recent incident, sort echoing the surrenders that we saw from Iraqi mainline units to American unarmed, unmanned aerial vehicles in the Gulf War -- and you maybe remember those pictures, a small American drone would fly over with a television camera on it and the Iraqi troops would come out and surrender to it -- we have seen one low-flying American aircraft, not too long ago, draw people coming out with their hands up.

I think that the Republican Guard would fight, but I think that is a relatively small share of Iraq's military. I think for the rest, it is a substantial question. And I believe there would be a substantial number of defections. This has not been the CIA's hope, at least after I left. After early 1995, I think the CIA's views on many of these matters shifted, and there has not been, really, support for the Iraqi National Congress

since early 1995. The Iraqi National Congress has been betrayed at least two times by the United States Government, in 1995 and 1996.

I think the point of continuing containment and saying that it is successful is really a very fanciful notion. Saddam has worked his way out from most of the restrictions. He is shipping more oil than he did in 1990, when he invaded Kuwait. He has built 50 palaces for himself. One of the reasons some of his people don't have enough food is he takes the money himself. And he has weakened the resolve, through talking about contracts, oil contracts and the rest, with the Russians and the Chinese and the French.

He has weakened the resolve of the Security Council to press forward with inspections. We had to withdraw the inspectors three years ago because the Clinton administration didn't press it. I think it is completely false to say containment has been successful. He is working hard on ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction precisely because the containment has not been successful.

And as far as targeting those facilities is concerned, that is a completely worthless option. Because we know from Khidhir Hamza, his bombmaker until 1995, we know from other defectors, we know from the inspections up through 1998 from UNSCOM, that he has dispersed virtually everything that is being

used to work on weapons of mass destruction into locations at such places as underneath schools, underneath hospitals. His facilities for making biological weapons have been put on trucks and they move around with his special security units when he moves.

Of all of the bad options that exist -- and some of you may believe war and trying to replace that regime is a bad option, and some, like me, believe continuing to sit and wait is a bad option -- the worst option under any circumstances is to try to do pinprick bombing with cruise missiles, ala the Clinton administration, and believe you are going to be taking out anything that matters. You are going to end up hitting schools. You are going to end up hitting hospitals. It is an absolutely terrible idea.

MR. ELAND: I want to follow up on that. A year or so ago, I guess, I'm not sure of the exact time, a London newspaper ran an article that said that Saddam had two nuclear weapons even before the Gulf War, and it implied that we didn't challenge his regime. If we went downtown on Baghdad, so to speak, isn't there a possibility -- what if that is true?

MR. WOOLSEY: I don't believe that report. The person to listen to about Saddam's program is Khidhir Hamza, who was the head of the program until 1995, when he came out. He lives here in the Washington area. He has written a very fine book, called

"Saddam's Bombmaker." He does not believe that report and, consequently, neither do I.

MR. NISKANEN: Let me say that I don't think that Iraq shipping more oil to the rest of the world or Saddam building 50 palaces is very much of a threat to the United States. More importantly, Jim seems to be making a case that we ought to go against Iraq because we can. Technically, we have the capability of prosecuting a successful war against Iraq.

What I think we cannot do is that we cannot prosecute a successful war against Iraq with the broad support of the American people, with the support of our European and other allies around the world, and maybe without the support of Turkey, unless we have the kind of evidence that we are all looking for. Unless we have that kind of evidence, we cannot have, I think, the clear support of the American people and our allies around the world, even though we have the military capability of replacing the regime in Iraq.

MR. ELAND: Another question here.

MR. EDEL: My name is Tom Edel. This is for Mr. Woolsey.

As the head of the CIA, it would seem that there would be another option. We seem to have a quarrel with one man in this country, and you've even said that we don't really have a quarrel with the country. Is there another alternative?

MR. WOOLSEY: I guess the implicit suggestion is why not just take our Saddam himself? Again, let me say it is the regime. It is the regime and bringing democracy to Iraq. Taking out Saddam would not do this. This is why any support for coups is, I think, a bad idea.

First of all, it is a thing Saddam is best able to defend against. His writ does not run very well in the north and south of the country. He is strong in and around Baghdad and he is strong particularly among those who are close to him because, once anybody raises his head in any way, says a contrary word or gives any indication to any of his multitudinous spies that they might be thinking about replacing him, he simply kills them. He has been murdering people like that for 30 years. So I think a coup has always been a bad idea. And trying to take Saddam out as an individual would leave the regime in place.

If you got either of his two sons, Qusay or Uday, in both of those cases you end up with people who, demonstrably, kill people for fun. There is no reason to expect that we would improve the situation for the people of Iraq, or us or anyone else, by just getting rid of one man. It has to be the regime, not the Iraqi people, but the regime that holds them in thrall, just as the Taliban regime held the Afghan people in thrall.

MR. ELAND: Yes, a question in the back.

MR. MILLAR: My name is Alistair Millar. I'm with the Fourth Freedom Forum, a foundation here in Washington.

I just want to look at the record on containment with regard to Iraq over the last 10 years. And in fact, we will see that the arms deficit that we have seen with Saddam Hussein has been more than \$50 billion that we have denied him. Since 1990, U.N. controls of Iraqi oil revenues have denied Saddam Hussein access to approximately 90 percent of his country's oil earnings, totaling more than \$150 billion. And the cumulative arms import deficit of Iraq since 1990 is more than \$50 billion.

I wonder why, in your analysis of this question today, you overlooked the fact that the restrictions on oil, as Mr. Niskanen has pointed out, have actually been effective in preventing Saddam Hussein from threatening the United States, rather than what you point out, he is building palaces which is not a threat to us, and how bombing Iraq would affect the controls that we have over his oil supply.

MR. WOOLSEY: Keep in mind, I don't want to just bomb Iraq; I want to destroy Saddam's regime. I am opposed to a pure bombing option. And his oil sales have been affected, to some extent, and the sanctions have had some impact. That is one of the reasons why his conventional military is not nearly as effective as it was in 1991 and is at half-strength or -- some would say less -- 40 percent or so.

But because he has been engaged in very heavy smuggling and because he dominates the financial transfers, he has been able to use the sales from the oil that he does export, which is still substantial, in order to work hard on his weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. It is not just palaces. Again, I will say it, it is weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

In the Rumsfeld Commission, Iraq was one of the three states -- the other two being North Korea and Iran -- that we said, within a relatively limited number of years, would have multi-stage ballistic missiles, capable of carrying nuclear or biological warheads to Europe and, beyond, to the United States at some point. Keep in mind, as poor a country as North Korea, working with SCUD technology, has developed a three-stage missile. The third stage didn't successfully separate in the summer of 1998, but that was the last step before they had an intercontinental missile.

One does not have to have something like the U.S. Air Force's capabilities these days to use SCUD technology to develop three-stage missiles that can reach the United States. So, insofar as you are willing to sit on your hands and wait, and say, well, he is not doing this and he is not doing that, he is not building up his conventional armed forces as effectively as he had them before, therefore there is no danger, I would submit

to you that you are dead wrong. The work on biological weapons, nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles continues at a very substantial pace. And I don't know any responsible observer of this, inside the government or out, that would deny that fact.

MR. ELAND: A question over here.

MR. BARE: Gordon Bare, U.S. Army, retired.

Would you address what the United States can and should do toward several other state sponsors or havens for terrorism? I am thinking of Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, several of which have moved closer to us or at least are talking about moving closer to us since 9/11?

MR. WOOLSEY: B-52's have turned out not to be only an excellent tool for women's liberation; they turn out to have a substantial impact on opinion in certain capitals. I don't know if you have paid attention to Qaddafi recently, since even September 11th, but certainly since October 7th, he sounds pretty much exactly like Tony Blair.

(Laughter.)

MR. WOOLSEY: It's marvelous what those F-111's that President Reagan so wisely launched against him and the memory of those, together with seeing the absolutely devastating effect of American air power in Afghanistan, does for the leadership of some of these countries.

I believe that Sudan, although it is one of the most unsavory regimes in the world, is moving to provide some intelligence with respect to al Qaeda to the United States. That has been widely reported.

Somalia doesn't really have a government. There are some al Qaeda training camps there which might effectively be attacked by U.S. Special Forces, and I imagine it is one of the things that is being thought of now.

And Yemen, like Sudan, reluctant to help much on the Cole attack -- helped some but not nearly as much as it should have -- has also noticed those B-52's and the other evidence of American air power, and is starting to make some friendly noises about providing information about terrorism and the like.

You may not like it, but all of this is, I am afraid, proving the wisdom of that long-ago Florentine, Niccolo Machiavelli, which is that in a circumstance of this sort, the clear demonstration of power has a marvelously civilizing effect on the likes of the rulers of places like Libya, Sudan and Yemen.

MR. NISKANEN: The issue is whether we need to do that again in Iraq, after what has been a clear and very successful demonstration of power in Afghanistan.

MR. ELAND: We have time for one more question.

MR. LYNCH: Tim Lynch, with the Cato Institute.

Mr. Woolsey, if Iraq is responsible for the anthrax attack, if Saddam Hussein has military-grade anthrax, why hasn't he used those weapons against Israel? Why hasn't he used those types of terror tactics against Israel? Does it go back to your point that he possibly fears Israel more than he does the United States?

MR. WOOLSEY: I'm not sure that Iraq is behind the anthrax attacks. I think there are some things that are indicative of his being involved in some way, but I don't believe that that is proven beyond a reasonable doubt at all, and that investigation continues. But the reason he might well supply anthrax for terrorist attacks, where he could hide his hand and would not use it overtly against Israel -- if he could smuggle some into Israel, I'm sure he would try -- but the reason that he wouldn't use it, say, in the nose cones of SCUD missiles attacking Israel, as he did with explosive warheads in the Gulf War, is because most types of attacks entail leaving the address of the attacker. And he well knows what would happen to him if he used anthrax against Israel -- Baghdad would not exist for long, nor would he.

And the reason I think he may well have been willing to provide covert assistance to terrorist groups, with anthrax or other assistance for September 11th, is because he thought (a) we wouldn't detect it and (b) if we did detect it, we would behave

the way we have throughout the nineties, namely, with sort of aimless fecklessness.

MR. ELAND: That is all the time we have for the program today. Thank you for coming.

I would also like to thank the interns and the Conference Department for putting on a good program. Please join us upstairs in the Wintergarden for some lunch. Thank you.

(Applause.)

(Whereupon, the Cato Institute Policy Forum concluded.)