

CATO INSTITUTE POLICY FORUM

SHOULD THE U.S. ARMY "LIGHTEN UP?"

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Featuring:

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Sean Naylor, Army Times;

Col. Douglas A. Macgregor, U.S. Army,

National Defense University;

Kim Burger, Inside the Army: and

David McGinnis, Independent Defense Analyst

The Cato Institute

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. ELAND: Kim Burger.

KIM BURGER,
INSIDE THE ARMY

MS. BURGER: Good afternoon. As was just said, I have been reporting on the Army transformation very closely for the past year, and particularly focusing on the Army's interest in buying new combat platforms. So that is what I'm going to focus on today from my perspective as a reporter.

Transformation is the Army's effort to become a lighter, more rapidly deploying force that can respond much more quickly to crisis or conflict, and also a force that is more suitable to deal with the full range of threats, including engagements that are less than a full-scale ground war. A key piece of this transformation, and probably the most visible part of it clearly, is its efforts to move away from its Cold War-era platforms, like Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and procure lighter-weight platforms.

That's not the only aspect of transformation. It also includes institutional changes, doctrinal changes and force structure changes in the Army. But a lot of what the Army wants to do to become a more responsive force depends on these new lighter-weight vehicles.

The Army's plans for these new vehicles also has attracted some of the most emotionally charged opposition to transformation. I will attempt to outline generally these two areas of concerns today that the Army is facing. They are a discomfort with moving away from the heavy armor protection the Army has relied on for so long and also the Army's attempts to find the money to invest in these new systems while also maintaining the heavy tanks that it says are still needed.

I should say here that the Army is not getting rid of its tanks yet. The tanks will be around for another 25 years or so and continued to be used. They will be needed until the Army develops the new lighter-weight future vehicle that may ultimately replace the tanks. And if we were to go to a significant ground war, it would be the tanks that would fight that war, the Army says.

I also want to give some background on generally what the Army wants in these new vehicles. They will weigh about 20 tons, so they can fit into the intra-theater airlifter the Army uses heavily. They are expected to require less fuel, fewer

maintenance personnel and less logistics support. These are all things that will help the Army deploy more quickly.

These vehicles also are expected to cost less to maintain than the aging tanks, which have become quite expensive to maintain in recent years. The vehicles also are intended to help the Army in dealing with the kinds of missions that have become more common in recent years; namely, small-scale contingencies, fighting in cities and forested areas.

I would like to start with the vehicle that has gotten the most attention lately, the Interim Armored Vehicle. The Army just awarded a \$4 billion contract to General Motors Defense and General Dynamics for the Wheeled Light-Armored Vehicle 3. However, that award is under protest by a competing bidder in that competition, United Defense; so the contract is currently on hold until that issue is resolved. And it could possibly be overturned, depending on how the General Accounting Office determines that.

I will speak generally about the Interim Armored Vehicle Program as we know about it. This is a lighter-weight vehicle and, as the name suggests, it is intended to serve as a temporary, interim solution. Right now, the Army has light early-entry forces, as well as heavy units. Now it wants something in the middle: units that can deploy within days and also have significant combat capabilities. So the Army is

creating brigade combat teams, which will be quick-deploying units, that will be equipped with the new Interim Armored Vehicle.

Because they are not a replacement for the tank, it will still be the tanks that do the serious warfighting. That has led some to believe that these vehicles will be involved in little more than peacekeeping. Given the moderate level of armor on the IAV and lack of significant firepower in its weapons, some are left queasy by the prospect of these vehicles attempting anything more than peacekeeping. This has led to questions about whether the Army needs to spend billions on new platforms when it is planning on using them for a fairly limited mission.

The Army, however, maintains that this is an immediate that must be filled and can be filled no other way, and that the Interim Armored Vehicle and brigade combat teams will have significant capability that is tailored to certain missions that the current force does not currently have the capabilities best suited for. And that is, namely, to quickly deploy forces that have some staying power.

Congress has shown support for this program, adding considerable funding for fiscal year 2001. However, there is some language in the authorization act, requiring the Army to test its new vehicles against vehicles it already has, to justify the procurement.

Another issue that has been controversial for the IAV program is the wheels versus tracks issue, which has gotten a lot of attention. And I will save that for questions later.

MR. ELAND: We will go next to Sean Naylor, who is a Senior Writer for the Army Times. He covers operations, exercises, training, weapon systems, tactics, strategy, doctrine, force modernization, and the Army's senior leadership, all for the Army Times. In 1987, he travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan as a freelance reporter, where he covered the Afghan war for the Irish Times, the Hot Press of Dublin, and the World and I.

He also flew to Somalia in mid-December of 1992 with the first Army battalion to deploy there. He also accompanied the helicopter assault force that launched off the USS Eisenhower, to seize Port-au-Prince's port facilities during the U.S. military occupation of Haiti. He was also aboard the first U.S. Army vehicles to cross the Sava River, from Croatia into Bosnia on New Year's Eve in 1995. So he has quite a bit of experience out with the troops.

More recently, he spent six weeks in Albania, reporting on the Army's Task Force Hawk. He is also the co-author, with Tom Donnelly, of "The Clash of Chariots: The Great Tank Battles," which was published to favorable reviews in 1996.

Sean.

SEAN NAYLOR,

ARMY TIMES

MR. NAYLOR: Thank you, Ivan.

Just a brief disclaimer. I'm here speaking for myself, so I'm going to try to keep opinions to a minimum. But any opinions that creep out should not be taken as representing the views of Army Times or the Gannett Corporation.

I want to talk to you a little bit about what I feel is a misperception about Army transformation, or at least the first stage of Army transformation; that is, the establishment of the six interim brigades. And if I have time, I also want to talk about some of the challenges, both on and off the battlefield, that the interim brigade program may face.

The misperception is sort of encapsulated in the title of this seminar, "Should the U.S. Army 'Lighten Up'?" I think that right now there is not enough evidence to accuse the Army of lightening up by creating six medium-weight brigades. The reason I say this is as follows:

There are 10 divisions in the Army: six heavy divisions, that is, they are armored or mechanized infantry divisions equipped with the Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and four light divisions composed of some form of light

infantry. That's the 82d Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division Air Assault, which is a helicopterborne light infantry, and two so-called leg infantry divisions. And those are the 25th Infantry Division, in Hawaii, and the 10th Mountain Division, in New York. And those two divisions, basically, walk into battle. They move at the pace of their own feet.

All the attention so far has been focused on the heavy divisions and the perception that the Army is on the verge of junking the Abrams tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and replacing those systems with 20-ton LAV's, light-armored vehicles. I don't think that that's what is going to happen, even in the short term, regarding those six interim brigades. The 10 divisions give the Army 30 brigades. There are about three ground maneuver brigades in each division. That is an infantry, mechanized infantry or armored brigade that is designed to close with and destroy the enemy.

To really make the charge that the Army is lightening up stick, you would have to find evidence that most of the six interim brigades are going to be taken out of the heavy force. So far there has been absolutely no suggestion that that is going to be the case. And in fact, the suggestions from the Army are that the opposite will be the case.

Of the six brigades, one is going to come out of the National Guard. So, at most, you're talking about five brigades

being taken out of 30 in the heavy divisions. And for those who are purists on this, one of those 30 brigades is in fact a separate brigade in Alaska, which is a light infantry brigade.

I think, so far, you've gotten one heavy brigade that is being transformed at Fort Lewis, and one light brigade at Fort Lewis, in the State of Washington. That leaves three more brigades in the active force that are going to be turned into medium-weight brigades. All my sources suggest that a preponderance of those three -- in other words, at least two -- will be light infantry brigades.

The Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, who is the force behind the transformation program, is playing his cards very close to his chest on this, as is his wont on most matters. But it seems highly likely that the brigades to be transformed will probably be taken out of either the 10th Mountain Division, which has two brigades at Fort Drum, New York, or that separate brigade in Alaska that I talked to you about.

If you took the two brigades at Fort Drum and turned them into interim brigades, that would allow the Army to make the 10th Mountain Division its interim division. There are now plans afoot to create an interim division. A final decision has not been officially announced on that yet, but there are currently plans to create an interim division in the Army as part of this program. The 10th Mountain Division would be the most likely

candidate for this. The 25th Infantry Division, in Hawaii, probably doesn't have enough training room in Hawaii to make it the ideal candidate for that.

So, to run through the sort of mathematics of this, at most, if I've got this completely wrong and the Army picks three heavy brigades as its interim brigades, that will mean that it is taking four brigades out of 18 heavy brigades in the active force and making them medium-weight units, which is less than 25 percent of the heavy force. Which isn't statistically an extraordinary lightening up of the Army.

However, if it takes three light brigades and makes them medium-weight brigades, you could argue that the Army is getting heavier and more lethal and better protected. I think you're probably going to see a 2 and 1 or 3 and nothing split between the light and heavy brigades when these decisions are announced. The Army assures those who ask that it is determined to retain its combat effectiveness once the six brigades are transformed. That seems to me to be code for saying we're more likely to add mobility, combat punch and survivability to our light units than we are to take away some of that from our heavy units.

It also makes sense when you look at what the light divisions were designed for. They were designed in the mid-eighties for counterinsurgency operations, really with

Central America and places like that in mind. That threat has receded somewhat and, in the meantime, you're left with light divisions that, as I said earlier, really can't move very fast once they get into theater, and have no forced entry capability, unlike the 82d and 101st. I suspect you'll see the 82d and the 101st left intact until the objective force, equipped with the future combat system, comes online, which the Army is pushing very aggressively to make happen sometime in the 2008-2010 time frame.

The interim brigades are supposed to be sort of the second force into the theater, if you like, in any mid-level contingency. I think the Army still intends any forced entry operation to be conducted by the 75th Ranger Regiment and/or the 82d Airborne Division, both of which have airfield seizures as their mission lead. The medium-weight brigades have no airborne capability. They need an airfield to land on. But they are designed to be combat ready as they roll out of the aircraft.

So the way that Army planners discussed this, or described their concept of operations, is the 82d and the Rangers seize the airfield. The medium-weight brigades arrive shortly thereafter. They roll off the C-130's, the C-17's. And, at the very least, expand and protect the perimeter while the heavier forces are brought in.

I want to talk a little bit about some of the challenges that the medium-weight brigades are going to face. One is momentum. The Chief of Staff of the Army says it's crucial that he retains momentum as he fields the LAV's bureaucratically. That is going to be very difficult for him now that the first unit equipped with these LAV's is not scheduled until spring of 2003. General Shinseki changes out in the summer of 2003. I think that that means that he has to pay particular attention to his general officer assignments between now and then. He must work, if he wants this to succeed beyond him, to put in place loyalists who are going to support his program in the crucial two-, three-, and four-star general officer positions from which the next set of senior Army leaders are chosen.

I'm getting the order to stop, so anybody interested in any other challenges that the program may face, please ask some questions. I look forward to them. Thank you.

MR. ELAND: Thank you, Sean.

Our third speaker is Thomas McNaugher, who is the Deputy Director of the Arroyo Center, the Army's research institute within the RAND Corporation. He is also a professional lecturer at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Study, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He was an Army active duty officer from 1968 to 1975, and he served in Vietnam from 1970 to 1971. As a mobilized Army reservist,

Lieutenant Colonel McNaugher participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Colonel McNaugher then retired from the U.S. Army Reserves in January of this year.

Dr. McNaugher's books included "The M-16 Controversies: Military Organizations and Weapons Acquisition," and also "New Weapons, Old Politics: America's Military Procurement Model."

THOMAS MCNAUGHER,
RAND CORPORATION

DR. MCNAUGHER: Let me start with Sean's disclaimer. I probably sound rather official; I'm the deputy head of the Army's federally funded thinktank. I'm speaking for myself today. RAND very rarely allows me to feel official.

Let me also start with an apology, because I want to sort of dump on my host. I think that a lot is going on in the Army. And the question, "Should the Army lighten up?" really is not a very good way to get into that. And let me start by saying the ways in which I think it's the wrong approach and then try to touch some of the central issues.

First of all, is the Army lightening up? The answer in the near and midterm, I think, is probably very definitely no. I think Sean made this point pretty well, but let me just take it further. I think if you could put all of the Army on a scale

today and then, 10 years from now, put it on a scale, it's probably going to get heavier, and for the reasons Sean stated. I just would suggest that I don't think that's outside the realm of the Chief's approach here.

Remember, when General Shinseki came into office, he complained about both halves of the force. He said: Look, our heavy forces are great at big wars if you can get them there, but they're hard to get there. He might have added, after the experience with M1's in Albania: Once they get there, sometimes they're too heavy for the road network and the bridges, so they don't have much mobility even in the theater.

But he also said: Our light forces can get places fast, but they can get mauled when they get there. And I suspect he had in mind what has since been called the 82d Airborne speed bump of 1990. The division-ready brigade of the 82d Airborne was the first Army brigade into Saudi Arabia, between I think about the 6th and the 13th of August, in 1990, and it took up positions northwest of Dhahran. And I'm told they referred to themselves as a speed bump because they figured that's about what they would pose to advancing Iraqi armor. So, heavying up the light forces to make them more resilient under some of those situations is not a bad idea any more than lightening up the heavy force.

In the end, of course, nobody weighs the whole Army, either for real or in an operation. So whether this Army is

going to be lighter or heavier depends upon the situation. If there were a replay of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait into Saudi Arabia in 1980, and the transformation were to continue apace, one presumes that the Army would actually send a heavier force than the 82d Airborne there. And that would be a good thing, assuming the transformed force works as well as one hopes it does.

Conversely, if the Army were asked to do another Task Force Hawk to a place like Albania, with its limited road network and so forth, one presumes that one would replace those M1's and Bradleys with something a little lighter and you would have a lighter force, and that would be a good thing, too. So, for those reasons, I think the question really gets us distracted.

What General Shinseki is doing, in a sense, is creating a middle. Those of you who know the Army know that, for deep historical reasons, it has evolved into almost two armies: a very light army and a very heavy army. And every 30 years, the Army tries to create a middle. It's a terribly difficult thing to do for all sorts of reasons. It has failed, generally. And I think it failed during the Cold War, because you always had that Soviet threat which demanded a heavy force, and you could preposition that in Europe. So strategic mobility wasn't quite the problem it is today.

I think General Shinseki is going to try seriously to create a middle ground, and then start pushing that out in both directions, toward the light forces and toward the heavy forces. I think it's easier, probably, to heavy up the light forces and make that work than it is to lighten up the heavy forces. In fact, I would argue that whether or not this force can replace the Army's heavy forces is a matter for proof 10-15 years from now, when this FCS, if it comes to fruition, is around.

And it won't be just a matter of whether the technologies prove out or the novel operational concepts give you a force that can operate against a heavy enemy; it's going to be a question, I think, of what the world looks like. Imagine a world -- probably not easy to imagine -- in which the Russians threaten eastern Poland, Iraq threatens Saudi Arabia, the North Koreans are back at it in Korea. Those are heavy threats.

If I were the Chief of Staff then, I would say, boy, thank God we kept all those M1's around. I like those. And I can preposition those in those places. So I don't have to worry about getting places fast. So I think a Chief of Staff, 10 years from now, is going to have some interesting choices to make, because he has this new alternative that hasn't been there for so long.

The bigger reason that I object to the question, "Should the Army lighten up," is because it tends, inevitably, to

focus us on things, on systems, on heavy M1's, heavy Bradleys, lighter vehicles that can fit in a C-130. If I could have a war room slogan, sort of the equivalent of the Clinton "It's the economy, stupid," of 1992, it would be "It's not the vehicle, stupid; it's electronics."

Now, I know that there are a lot of people both inside and outside the Army that think this future combat system is going to be a 20-ton M1 tank. It's going to have all that capability. Now, I never say never anymore; I've been massively wrong too many times. But that's as close to never happening as I can imagine. Moreover, if you design an acquisition project around a 20-ton M1, my guess is you're going to have such a magical set of armor and a Rube Goldberg kind of active defense system that it's not going to be a very good idea.

If this force is going to survive, it's going to survive on some of the things that Kim talked about. First of all, it's going to have to distribute itself. It's not going to create a big target. And that's not just because enemies have nasty anti-armor devices -- there are nuclear weapons out there and they're proliferating, if you haven't noticed. I think all of our services are going to have to distribute themselves to prevent the creation of big targets. But it is going to have to operate in a distributed way. And that takes command and control to synchronize that force.

It also, as I think Kim and Sean both made clear, is going to have to see, shoot and kill before it gets shot. I really don't think you want a head-on, toe-to-toe engagement between a 20-ton vehicle and whatever the world's heavy armor looks like in the year 2012. That means you've got to have perfect or near-perfect situational awareness. And it's not clear to me you can get that, but you certainly have to strive for it. You've got to see way out in front. You've got to be able to shoot way out in front, deep strike.

All of that is what the Pentagon euphemistically calls C4ISR. I probably can't even remember all of those initials, but it's command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. That's where the action is here. And if you see it that way, then the transformation, even though it seems to have burst out of the brain of General Shinseki, really has a background in the Army.

The Army started wrestling with the information revolution about a decade ago. It was actually under General Gordon Sullivan, when he was the Chief. They called it another great name, "digitization." That is the name that they've given to this wrestling match. And most of it is happening out at Fort Hood, with heavy units, the 4th Infantry Division, out there. A lot of what is learned there and a lot of the systems that are there are going to have to make the transition over to this

transformation force if the transformation is going to have any hope of working, and then some. Because this is a lighter force, it doesn't have that insurance that 35 tons of armor give the M1 tank.

Now, let me conclude with two sort of challenges. I've talked about the transformation as if it goes according to plan. I'm kind of a historian of the Army. And if you're a historian of the Army, you realize that very little ever goes according to plan in this organization, especially in the weapons acquisition business. It's a very complicated organization, and it has trouble sometimes putting out a sophisticated project.

The future combat "systems" -- and if you read the official pronouncements, it's a plural, because it refers to a set of vehicles, some of them robotic, some of them guns, some of them artillery, and all of this stuff -- the FCS project, as far as I can tell, also has embedded in it not only a set of systems, but an awful lot of C4ISR, a lot of network communications. That makes it probably one of the most complicated weapons procurement programs I can imagine. It's going to be very tough for that to move forward, let alone on schedule and at cost, which of course never really happens in the acquisitions business anyway.

But let's just say it moves forward. I suspect that the Army is going to have to have very special management arrangements for this. At some point, it's going to have to

create a fairly high-ranked position, give it senior backing, not only financially but also politically, and that's going to have to carry this forward.

The second issue I would raise is the issue of experimentation. If this force is going to survive, it's going to have to operate on the basis of very novel distributed concepts. The Army is a hierarchy. I think the hardest challenge it faces actually is learning to break out of that and distribute itself. The only way I think you can get there is with very extensive experimentation.

And, yet, I know that experimentation is a bad word, because it's often seen as the bureaucrats' best way to defend against change, as in, "Yes, boss, that's a great idea; let's go experiment with that," roughly, as long as you're going to be in that job, so that then I can get back to doing what I was doing. And I think General Shinseki really wants to push these things out into the operational force, these brigades, partly to avoid that.

But at some point the Army has to experiment mightily. And I think the Bush administration will make this point probably more forcefully than Clinton has. So I think the Army has to have a dialogue with itself, as well as with the incoming administration, about how you actually innovate here.

Thanks.

MR. ELAND: Thank you, Tom.

Our fourth speaker today is Colonel Douglas MacGregor, who is a Colonel in the U.S. Army. Colonel MacGregor served in a variety of command and staff assignments, including tank company command in a mechanized infantry brigade of the 4th Division, a component of a division cavalry squadron in the 1st Infantry Division.

During Desert Storm, Colonel MacGregor was awarded the Bronze Star, with "V" device, for valor, while leading combat troops of the 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, in the Battle of 73 Easting.

From November 1997 to December 1999, Colonel MacGregor served as the Chief of Strategic Planning and Director of the Joint Operations Center at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, in Belgium.

He holds an M.A. in comparative politics and a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Virginia. He is currently assigned as a Research Fellow at the National Defense University. And he is the author of the influential book, "Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Land Power in the 21st Century."

COLONEL DOUGLAS A. MACGREGOR, U.S. ARMY,
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

COLONEL MACGREGOR: I certainly appreciate the opportunity to be here today. And I, too, must start with a disclaimer that's particularly important in my case because I'm wearing a uniform. Everything I will say in no way reflects the attitudes, views and opinions of the current leadership of the United States Army, the current Department of Defense, my cat, my wife, or anyone else on the planet. This is exclusively my view, and keep that in mind.

The second thing is that I've had absolutely no role whatsoever in the current transformation program. So what I know is a combination of what I've been told by various people involved with it and, very recently, on Friday, I was given a briefing by Colonel Dan Gursteen to bring me up to date, to ensure that I was aware of all the most recent changes and so forth in the program. So, that's the first thing.

The second thing is, before we talk any further, let's talk about this thing that we're calling transformation, how important the achievements to date are by the Chief of Staff and the senior leadership of the United States Army. First of all, what has been achieved since June of 1998 is not insignificant;

it's very important. We have a change in the mentality of the status quo Army, a change away from the old Cold War mentality. Transformation has come to mean that the Army must become something more mobile and available to the regional unified commands. This is also extremely important. And, finally, transformation means, at least initially, that something smaller than an entire division should deploy to certain kinds of contingencies.

Anyone who knows the constraints within the bureaucratic structure that operates on a chief of service understands how important this is. Just a couple of years ago, the attitude at the highest levels of the United States Army was very simple: Why change? We won Desert Storm, didn't we? We validated our structure, organization for combat, and tactics for 20 years. What's the problem?

So, having moved over the last 18 months from that particular position to the one that we now see, which is that there must be change and we must be different in the future from the way we have been in the past, is extremely important. And the current Chief of Staff deserves credit for having led that particular fight.

Having said that, I want to go to something that came up in testimony in April of this year before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Senator Joseph Lieberman asked a very

important question during the Chief of Staff's testimony on the subject of transformation. Senator Lieberman is always very eloquent when he speaks on military affairs, and on this particular occasion he was more eloquent than ever before. He asked a very simple question at first. He said: What is the operational concept driving transformation?

And he then went on to provide a tutorial, talking about the German experience primarily in the interwar period, but also alluding to the Russian one, where new operational concepts were defined that essentially redefined warfare. And this redefinition of warfare conceptually led to the emergence of new organizations designed to execute the concept. Subsequently, decisions about education, training, reform, and, most importantly, modernization, all resulted in a fundamentally changed force in Germany and in Russia.

Senator Lieberman never received an answer to that question. What he was told was something similar to what you've heard thus far: There is a valid requirement, and there has been since 1991, for some sort of intermediate-range force, something that could be flown into the theater, and that can enjoy some measure of mobility, force protection and firepower. But as for the rest of it, all we could do was essentially listen to a laundry list of features that are desired in the future.

And if you look at the features that are associated with the thing we call the objective force in the future -- the distant future, as my predecessor has just pointed out -- all of these features are desirable: agile, versatile, lethal, and so forth, but they do not constitute an operational concept. And today, that's more important than ever. Because it's not simply a single service operational concept that we're looking for; it is a joint operational concept that is critical to any fundamental change in any of the services. Because all future warfare will be joint, it's impossible to conduct warfare successfully in other than a joint setting.

In addition to that, you need a new organization for combat. We've got the same one that we've had for 50 years. And what we're talking about today is not a fundamentally new organization for combat. We have all the echelons in command and control that we have been accustomed to seeing since the end of the Second World War: brigade, battalion, division, corps, and so forth. These things are unchanged. And this presents an enormous problem, because the Army's traditional structure actually restricts its capability to provide its resources and capabilities to the other services within the framework of a joint task force.

So what we see emerging, at least in the objective force, is not fundamentally new. We're talking about common

divisional designs. We're talking about jointness at the division and corps levels. We are not talking about jointness at a lower level in a new formation that is distinctly different, that is designed to plug in to a joint task force.

There is also the intermediate brigade. And that, too, is largely unchanged. The good news is that there is an attempt now to look at a reinforced brigade as a deployable asset. In this case, it's only 3,500 troops. The problem with its deployment is that, inevitably, for it to operate effectively within a joint task force, it does not have the capabilities of a division.

That means it doesn't have a division commander and a division headquarters that can provide the joint interface, that can manage air space. And this particular change does nothing to create a new joint operational architecture. Because when we talk about echelons of command and control, we're talking about operational architecture. And we have new missions today: theater ballistic missile defense, deep strike operations. These things simply did not exist 50 years ago, when the structure of the United States Army that we know today came into existence.

And then, finally, we really are not addressing the whole issue of internal reorganization and reform, to acknowledge that warfare has dramatically changed. There is an emerging global reconnaissance strike complex. The strike assets in the

United States Navy and the United States Air Force are multiplying. That arsenal will continue to grow. That is good news. But strike assets, in and of themselves, are not a strategy, as we discovered during the Kosovo air campaign, much to our disappointment.

Only ground forces, with strike assets, can provide you with a true strategic setting. Only ground forces, operating with the forces that are in the strike complex, can provide you with the opportunity to strive for positional advantage.

The point is very simple: Integrating ground and air forces in new ways, within the framework of this new emerging strike complex, is critical. Now is the time to do it -- not in 10 years, not in 20 years, but to begin to do so now. This requires a new joint operational concept, a new organization for combat, a new joint operational architecture, that in turn will change the parameters of education, training, recruitment, modernization, and so forth.

Today, we are poised to spend a great deal of money. We are answering questions about modernization which actually should be reserved for a later date, after the questions that I raised earlier have been answered, and answered thoroughly.

So, what does this really mean about transformation? I think what it means is that the mentality is positive, the direction is positive. And we should be grateful for that,

because it is a dramatic change, as I pointed out earlier, just on the basis of the last two years. But we are not looking at something fundamentally new that is designed to integrate the Army's capabilities with the rest of the armed forces in a way that is going to produce a quantum improvement, either in the Army or in the armed forces at large.

Thanks.

MR. ELAND: Thank you, Colonel MacGregor.

Our final speaker is Dave McGinnis. Dave is now retired but, before he retired, which has been very recently, he was a Senior Fellow at the National Guard Association of the United States, where he assisted the Association leadership in the Adjutants General Association of the United States with an analysis of the national security policy and issues of national significance from June 1997 until his retirement earlier this year.

Prior to that, Dave served for four and a half years as the Director of Strategic Plans and Analysis in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. From 1990 to 1993, Dave was the Principal Advisor to the Chief, National Guard Bureau, on the management, integration and modernization of the Army National Guard force structure.

Prior to that, he headed a project to create medium National Guard infantry divisions for the defense of Europe. But

the end of the Cold War terminated the perceived need for those designs at the time.

Dave has served 29 and a half years, in the U.S. Army and the New York Army National Guard, in total. So he has quite a lot of experience on a lot of these issues.

Dave.

DAVID MCGINNIS,
INDEPENDENT DEFENSE ANALYST

MR. MCGINNIS: Thank you, Ivan. Thank you for having me here.

I have a disclaimer, too. If the National Guard Association had their way, I wouldn't be here. But that doesn't bother me anymore, because that's why I retired. That's first of all.

Secondly, I agree with basically everything that has been said -- not everything, but I agree with basically everything -- and specifically, especially with what Doug said. The first question: Should the Army lighten up? Absolutely. Absolutely, the Army needs to lighten. I think General Shinseki has got to move it in that direction. And I'm not talking about equipment; I'm talking about it in the sense that my daughter tells me to lighten up. I think the Army needs to take the

blinders off and take a look at what the future brings and what the country will probably want them to do. And that's figuratively speaking, of course.

Practically speaking, I agree that they're not lightening up. They're moving the light divisions. I helped activate both the 10th and the 6th, so I'm very familiar with light divisions. And I was always very, very fearful of what would happen if either one of those got into any serious confrontation.

Is the Army going to become a peacekeeping force? This is another dumb comment, I think, because it always has been a peacekeeping force. Its history is as a peacekeeping force. We always asserted that we prepare for war to keep the peace. How we do that, there are a number of ways. It's the job that goes with the Army and with the U.S. military.

Is the Army becoming strategically irrelevant? It could be. And that depends on how it transforms.

Has the Army gone far enough in transformation? Based on, and agreeing with, what Doug said, I think the Chief has got the Army moving in a very positive direction. I'm not sure it's going to be the right direction, because the resistance in the Army is such that, as has already been stated, it's going to be difficult to determine until 10 years from now, unfortunately.

General Abrams said, very graphically, one time: If I can move the Army 1 degree, I will have considered my tenure a success. And we're talking about a period of time when I don't think 1 degree is enough.

I've been looking at transformation, at the request of a number of friends of mine, for about four or five months, not within the context of the Army but within the context of the defense establishment. So I'll try to discuss it in that context. My starting point, first of all, is the definition that it's a deliberate creative process to change the nature and function and condition. It is not an attempt to change outward appearance or perception; it is a substantive change. So, for really transforming, we've got to be after substantive change.

Phil O'Dean said that the transformation was necessary. It was the decision of the NDP, the National Defense Panel, that it was necessary to transition the defense establishment in a significant way and not follow traditional bureaucratic or geographic boundaries. And I agree with their five points. And this is how I believe that you can measure whether anything is transforming or not.

The first point is it has to be focused on tomorrow. Second, it needs to be characterized by experimentation and stimulate thought. It needs to divest -- which is now history. That's a trite phrase, but I'll get into a little bit more of

that. It needs to think in terms of change and uncertainty, not in terms of stability. The Army is always talking about risk. Military guys like to talk about risk. I think he's saying here: We've got to take a little risk, responsible risk. And, most importantly, we need to restructure. That's not a desire; it's a reality.

Let's focus on tomorrow, first of all. I believe tomorrow, we're going to apply the principles of war differently. We're already talking about that. We are going to do that. We're going to man and train forces differently. And we're going to have to adapt to a number of different realities.

In terms of stimulating experimentation, the key question I believe is, how are others going to defeat our current and anticipated military superiority? We need to determine that. I don't think we know. I don't think we think about that. But it's not going to be with an armor-heavy force of four corps and 20 divisions, I'll guarantee you that. Because no nation in the world, at least not in the next 20, 30, 40 years, is going to be able to afford that. But somebody will come up with some way to challenge us and possibly defeat us. And we need to understand that.

The third thing, in terms of divesting, the resistance to change needs to be dealt with ruthlessly. We talk about

unnecessary structure because that's how we're going to pay the bills.

Think in terms of change and uncertainty: Who will be our friends? Who will be our adversaries? And what will they fight for?

And, finally, how will we do restructure? There are a couple of points in the Army I would like to focus on. And I've done this mainly in the context of the principles of war, because I was part of something a while back which kind of got diffused and diluted, but it came out eventually as a presentation termed, "The Gift of Time." It got very quickly branded as an air power pitch back in the last QDR, and it really wasn't that. It was really a way to create mass differently. But, unfortunately, it spun off.

Everybody said it was an Air Force thing, and it was actually done by two Army colonels and an Air National Guard colonel. So, if it was air power, it was a couple of Army National Guard colonels out there, and one is me, who were an air power advocate. And I'm not an air power advocate.

But we're going to create mass differently. Since the 17th century, we have created mass with firepower. Gustaf Adolphus made that decision. We got away from the pike. Why is it relevant? We still design force structure that way today, absolutely. We use direct fire weapons --

[End Side A. Begin Side B.]

MR. MCGINNIS: -- ranges. The future military, the military that will be the objective force, if it's going to be successful, is going to have to be capable of having direct fire weapons. That's true. But they'll only use them in self-defense or they'll only use them to clean up. Because we're going to create mass with firepower and with other sources of energy at great distances, not line of sight. I believe that.

The second thing is maneuver. We talked about maneuver. We talked about the light infantry marching at 2 and a half miles an hour. In "my day," it was 20 miles or 25 miles a day. We would hump along, with 10- to 15-minute breaks and, after that, everybody would die. Then we got mechanized, and we're talking in terms of 40 and 80 kilometers. I believe we're going to accelerate towards about 300 kilometers an hour, down the road.

There is only one guy I know who is thinking that way. There may be others, but there is only one guy I know, and that's Jack Keane, when he talks about the Advanced Tactical Transport. Those people who are looking at it are talking in that kind of frame of mind. But we're not going to maneuver over roads with armored formations. We're going to move above. We're going to have to move quickly. And that means Army aviation needs to be

looked at very carefully, as well as tactical aviation in general.

That's also going to put emphasis, I believe, into mobility versus firepower, in terms of platforms. Mobility platforms are going to go up. Strategic, tactical, operational mobility platforms will increase in importance, and COMINT platforms will decrease in importance. And those are combat platforms that directly engage the enemy.

The third thing is manning the force. Manning the force, at least in the United States context, is going to change dramatically. It already has changed. And just in our lifetime, we've progressed. It used to take eight years of education to enlist; now you need 12 years of education to enlist. You needed 12 years to be commissioned; now you need 16. And if you want to be a field-grade, you've got to go to 18.

But as we see the way the Army is moving today, I don't see a lot of movement in any of those directions. We're going to keep and maintain, basically, the legacy force and we're going to invest in the legacy force. It's the best force in the world. The National Guard is the second most modern army on the face of the earth. Take your money and invest in the future requirements. I don't see any reason why we've got to modernize the force we have in the Guard or in the active component today.

It's the first and second most modern army in the world. It doesn't make sense.

As far as manning the force, I'm very concerned about the way the manning concept is going. We're talking about bringing GED's into the force. I don't see that as transformation, either.

But I do see the Chief lightening up the Army. And I think it's a very positive concept. Hopefully it will get a lot of people talking about what needs to be done. And I don't think we should focus really on what's happening. I think we should focus on what could happen around it.

Thank you.

MR. ELAND: Thanks, Dave.

Now we'll do some question & answer. I'll ask the first question, and then I'll turn it over to the audience so we can get some audience participation.

The first question that I have is something that Kim mentioned originally. It seems like the Army is short of money to do transformation. And I'm wondering where they're going to get that money. Will they have to cut the Comanche? Will they have to cut the Crusader mobile artillery piece? What will they have to get rid of to do this? And anyone on the panel can start off by answering that. Would anyone like to answer that question?

MR. MCGINNIS: I think the numbers that some people have talked on -- or I think it was cited anyway -- the Army has been running a \$12 billion deficit since 1996. That's \$12 billion a year. So she is right. That's \$12 billion a year, and most of it has been in the modernization account, if you want to keep the force ready. And it was a little bit less in the first half of that decade. So there's a real problem with money. The aviation force was underfunded by about \$4.1 billion to \$4.3 billion from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 1999 or 2000.

There are only a couple of places to get the money. Convince Congress to give you the money -- and Congress has given them about a half-a-billion dollars, with a very stern caution -- and the rest is internally. I think one of the key places to start is not in the force structure, but in the overhead. And our good friend, the retiring, or outgoing, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, retiring by, I guess, the rules of Congress, was very strong on this last year. In fact, they even legislated, I think it was, a 10-percent reduction, to which basically everybody ignored and they got really upset about that.

So I think the first place to start, if you want Congress to help you, is to help yourself. And I would suggest the first place is in the overhead, to the tune of about a billion dollars in the Army.

MR. ELAND: Is that bases?

MR. MCGINNIS: No. This is headquarters and people. As an example, if the Chief wants to increase the force 40,000 people, the manpower is there to do it. He can reduce what I consider excess officers in the officer corps and pay that bill at a rate of 2 or 3 to 1.

COLONEL MACGREGOR: One quick comment. I think you can make a good argument that all of the major institutions of national security are really approaching block obsolescence. We're still operating with force structures, command and control structures, that were designed in 1946-47, after lengthy testimony at the end of World War II. And at the time, the service chiefs who testified, and they can be forgiven for this, were profoundly influenced by World War II. So, you're talking, at least in the Army's sense, about a war mobilization structure, a structure with tiered readiness, not rotational readiness, a structure that is still operating with policies, some of which go back to 1917, like the personnel policy for individual replacements.

These things have simply continued, with occasional interruption in time of crisis, for decades. These things need to be reexamined. There are undoubtedly savings in that, and some of that has to do with the headquarters overhead, but there is more to it. We have a huge arsenal system. We have an

enormous logistics tail. It's time for all of these things to be examined carefully.

Now, having said that, it is unrealistic to expect a chief of service to do it. A chief of service can't do it. He has too many constraints on him. To expect General Shinseki to do this is unrealistic. He can't. He's done about all he can possibly do. This is where aggressive leadership from civilian appointees and the chief executive is critical. If they do not intervene in the process and begin to restructure and make these decisions, very, very little will change.

MR. ELAND: Does anybody else have something to add?

MS. BURGER: Yes, I have something to add. A problem that the Army keeps running into with this is that I think it was expected that the Army ought to make significant cuts into its heavy equipment in order to finance transformation. The fact of the matter is, and I think everyone here has touched on it, that the Army still needs those heavy legacy forces.

A good example: the Army cut the Wolverine heavy assault bridge last year to pay for transformation. It then went and made it a top program on its unfunded requirements list that it presented to Congress. So Congress added money. The Army still hasn't funded it, though, in the outyears; yet it still makes the case that it needs this program. So the Army is in this battle, fighting over getting funding for Wolverine. And

that's just one example of this sort of conflict between funding for the future and funding the present force that the Army really has to settle.

MR. ELAND: Sean?

MR. NAYLOR: I was just making a few notes, as you asked the question, on potential sources of funding. You touched on one, the Crusader heavy artillery system, which is really designed to support the legacy forces but is scheduled to be in the Army out through 2045, the last briefing I got on it. So, at least a reasonable question could be asked: How much risk do you take by retaining the M109A6 field artillery system and upgrading that, which is what is in the heavy force at the moment, and taking Crusader funds and putting them into the transformation program?

There is a downside to that. The M109A6 cannot keep up with today's Abrams and Bradley tanks. But, as has been mentioned before, this is all about where do you take the risk.

In the heavy force modernization program, the Army is pouring a lot of money, or is scheduled to, into the M1A2 SEP program and the M2A3 Bradley program. There is certainly a chance that those funds could be raided to pay for the interim brigade concept as it moves forward.

I think that the Comanche is the least likely place for funds to be found, because it's the system that most fits in, of

the Army's major procurement systems that are currently in place, that most fits in with sort of the transformation concept.

The Base Realignment and Closure Commission is another place where some strong-willed congressman could make a real stand -- and maybe earn the enmity of their colleagues. But if we could cut some of the infrastructure out of the Army, you would immediately free up funds, over the next couple of years, to pour into transformation.

But I think, crucially, because of the amount of money that is needed, according to the Army, it's imperative that the Chief do a better job of selling transformation to the public. He is notoriously reticent about talking to the media. And the media are the people who will take his message to the public, who pay the taxes that he wants to fund his transformation, and to vote for the people who are going to appropriate those monies for the transformation. He turns down interviews with Newsweek magazine, U.S. News & World Report. It doesn't make any sense for him to do that. He's actually very articulate and good at pushing his case with the press when he meets with them, and he should do it more often.

MR. ELAND: Let's open it up for questions from the audience now. If you could just wait for the microphone, so we can all hear you. And also, keep your questions as short as possible so we can give our panelists a chance to answer.

MR. ATKESON: I'm Ted Atkeson, the Institute of Land Warfare.

I would like to ask Colonel MacGregor a question about the strategic deployment. Very clearly, we are not going to be able to move anything from either Fort Drum or Fort Lewis on a 1,000-mile-range C-130, so we are thinking about transloading these things. Have we thought about the idea of perhaps a little heavier investment in long-range aircraft, like C-17, that would get us where we want to go without having to keep two fleets going?

COLONEL MACGREGOR: First of all, your question is a critical one. I think there was a tendency early in this process to look at forces and look at existing airlift. There was probably a decision behind the scenes to suggest that the Army will never get "from the Air Force" all of the airlift it needs. There are lots of C-130's, so let's look at the C-130 as having some utility. I think that's a mistake.

I don't think these forces, under any circumstances, should be equipped or configured to fit within existing airlift. I think, instead, we need to go back and say that, if we need 200 C-17's, we ought to have 200 C-17's. And the C-17 is a revolutionary piece of equipment. I've seen it take off and land in places like Sarajevo and Skopje in weather that most of you here today would not drive to work in. It is a spectacular

aircraft. Its readiness rates are extremely high. You have to work to break it. So, you're absolutely right, the C-17 is clearly the desired form of transport for that portion of the force which is designed to fly.

Now, that brings me to a second point. All of these questions about modernization miss the point that if you redefine how you're going to fight, and then, within the framework of that redefinition, are willing to restructure your force, reorganize the way you're going to do business, you can make some decisions about how much you may need of one thing or the other. Right now we're stuck in this old division-based paradigm. As long as we're in it, we will not be able to address those questions. That's why the organizational issue, the joint operational architecture issue, up front, must be addressed.

The second thing is we've got to look at the other services. What do they bring to the fight? What do we bring to the fight? What capabilities are Army-unique that they need? If you're an Air Force major general leading a JTF, there are certain things the Army could bring to you that no one else can give you. But these capabilities are within this rather amorphous division structure. You cannot reach into them and pull them out.

And then, finally, the issue of what kind of vehicle, I couldn't agree more with whoever said it's the wrong debate.

Unfortunately, we're stuck with it because we're about to spend, or may spend, \$9 billion to buy it. That's unfortunate. It's the wrong debate to have. But that's where we are today.

If you go back and redefine the way you do business, you may not buy some of the things that we're currently scheduled to buy. Sixty-two percent of all the tonnage shipped to Desert Storm consisted of tube artillery and hard-shell ammunition for artillery. Now, if we learned one thing from Desert Storm, it is that if you are dumb enough, as an adversary of the United States, to entrench yourself in static fortifications, there is this entity called the United States Air Force which will fly over and exterminate you. We did not need all of that artillery. And we are unlikely in the future to need all of that artillery.

If that is so, then perhaps we can begin looking at changes in the parameters of the force. How much artillery do we really need? We may not need any towed artillery, which is really a very ancient piece of equipment. We may need other forms of stand-off target acquisition and weapon systems.

For instance, the Germans have developed something called the Typhoon. This is an armed UAV. It's relatively inexpensive. Essentially, it takes off, it flies around for three or four hours, until you find a target, and it carries a 24-, 25-kilogram warhead that you can then fly into the target of your choice. Well, if you equipped a unit with 200 or 300 of

these things, imagine what that would do for you in terms of accelerating your advance.

The other issue is that today we are still looking at branch-pure formations. We are right now looking, in the context of the IBCT, at a couple of battalions of motorized infantry reinforced with something they call a bunker buster, a gun on a wheeled chassis. Is that really what we want?

I think what we really want in the future, more and more, is an all-arms formation, something that embraces all of the capabilities, because you're never entirely sure what you're going to confront. There's not that much room for specialization in the extreme sense. So we need organic aviation, and probably more of it. We need armed and unarmed UAV's. But you cannot manage airspace without aviation. You can't interface with the Air Force very effectively unless you have aviators. All of these are critical questions that have to be fed into the whole process of developing that organization for combat.

The last point, and this goes to what Dave mentioned earlier, there is a need for simplicity in the structure and organization of the force. Simplicity is always the answer in war. We've learned that the hard way on more than one occasion. And it's more important now than ever because of the nature of the joint fight. Simplified command structures that plug in Army

capabilities to achieve that synergy that you get when you get different service means within a new framework.

And we know that the future of warfare in the next 10 to 20 years will be joint task force warfare. We'll end up with standing joint task forces in the regional unified commands. We will not end up, as Dave McGinnis pointed out, with multiple divisions inside corps, all structured to operate as part of armies and so forth. If this is true, how long do we wait before we make change?

MR. ELAND: Tom?

DR. MCNAUGHER: Let me provide a much less conceptually elegant answer to your original question. I think when any of us wants to go someplace fast, we call the airlines. So when the Army starts talking about going someplace fast, you think airlift.

If you take a reasonable number of C-17's and you try to get a brigade of lighter vehicles from here to anywhere interesting in the world, it's not going to do it. Unless you're into invading Mexico or Canada, you're not really going to get from the continental United States, with any reasonable light brigade, with C-17's.

Now, can you buy more C-17's? Well, I suppose the Nation can. It just adds to the bill we talked about a minute ago, though. But even if you bought more, you could have had all

the C-17's in the world flying around Albania. There's a question of how many can land and how many the Army gets out of those that can land. Remember, humanitarian relief was always the first priority for General Clark in Operation Allied Force. So the Army was constrained by the strip and by priorities.

So, unless you're going to land in Saudi Arabia, where you have ramp space galore, I'm not sure more C-17's is going to solve the problem. And I think the Army has done some of these calculations. I think they started out thinking they could do this with airlift; then they realized it's going to require the same kind of complex array of strategic mobility assets that we've actually been developing since 1990. We've bought large, medium-speed sealift. We've done some prepositioning.

I think it's going to take prepositioning in certain areas of the world. It's going to take the adroit use of sealift. It's going to take some maritime prepositioning. And I don't know that the Army can afford to buy a whole set of these lighter vehicles and stick it on a ship. Fine. Put everything else on the ship and bring the SEP in by airlift. Put all the trucks and the command and control gear and so forth on.

Finally, I think it's time the Nation -- and this is a national debate and not an Army debate -- think about an array of smaller bases around the world. We've spent 40 years focused on Europe and Northeast Asia. We now have global deployments. We

might need to think about bases elsewhere in the world. We're never going to get the kind of prepositioning there we had in Europe or in Korea, but think about acquiring that and putting things there that help us get closer to a theater with some things that are important. And it's there where the C-130 probably comes into play, not in the strategic mobility.

One last thing on the C-130. And I have no special insight into General Shinseki's motives, but I personally, as a student of the acquisition process, see the use of the C-130 as a design constraint on an acquisition process that will always add a couple of tons here and there. The M1 tank actually started as a 54-ton tank because that was the bridging limit in Germany back in the early 1970's. It got jumped to 60 tons before it even got into contract. And it jumped up to 65 or 70, depending upon which variant you have, in actual development. So the C-130 constraint actually disciplines the organization and keeps it below 20 tons.

MR. ELAND: Yes?

MR. AUFLY: I'm Ed Auflly, from the Stars and Stripes.

I've been hearing a lot of talk, and the subject is focusing on the Army itself, but I would like to get the three non-journalists and the two journalists to say what is the effectiveness of the Joint Forces Command down in Norfolk, that has been designed apparently to make this joint revolution

happen? Is this really going on, or is it a Potemkin village down there?

(Laughter.)

MR. ELAND: Who wants to take that one first? Dave will take it first.

MR. MCGINNIS: I think that they're making progress. But I think they're up against the same thing that the entire joint arena has been up against since 1947. It's going to take, as Doug brought up, some political leadership from the next Secretary of Defense to make that move. They're trying, but the favorite topic is Title X responsibilities. You've got to become a lawyer now to understand how you can integrate jointly.

Perhaps Congress, the guys such as Senator Lieberman and other people who have taken an interest in the past, maybe need to go a little bit farther. There has been some talk about redoing the joint legislation.

But that's the problem as I view it right now. There's just too much friction, friction of warfare. There's a lot of friction of warfare inhibiting both them and, more importantly, the Joint Warfighting Center, which is under it, who are doing some great stuff. It's not getting out, number one. And, number two, they're not getting the access or funding they need.

MR. ELAND: Anybody else want to comment?

DR. MCNAUGHER: David can speak, of course, because he's retired. I may be. Let me walk into this.

First of all, though, let me just say I'm not an electronic or command and control specialist, but the closer I get to the subject, the more I'm aware of the enormous complexity of this subject. I don't disagree with Doug MacGregor on the need for jointness at lower levels. The architecture for that is horrendously complicated. It's not something I think the services are going to come up with, so I think you do need a Joint Forces Command.

Although I would suggest that if I were in the DOD, you might think about giving the CINC's, the commanders-in-chief, out in the regions some resources and some spaces, and say: Come up with an operational joint headquarters that suits your region. Because, in the end, what we mean by jointness I think will vary with scenario and vary with region, and you might actually get a lot of different ideas out of that, that then you can play into Joint Forces Command.

I think JFC is walking down the right road. If I were in the next administration, I would give it more resources. It needs to take this more seriously. Next to distributing the Army, and I agree with Doug, this is a very difficult thing for an Army that has been hierarchical for a long time to do. I think getting jointness, real jointness, at the level of

operations, not at the level of a CINC but at the level of a team that goes in early or something like that, is an incredibly difficult challenge, but it's one of the top priorities, I would say.

MR. ELAND: Yes?

MS. GROSSMAN: Elaine Grossman, Inside the Pentagon.

I'm wondering what the panelists see as the proper role for the National Guard and Reserve in a transformed Army and what the current plans are, under transformation, to use those components?

COLONEL MACGREGOR: First of all, I'll let the National Guard expert speak, but something I advocated three years ago was the formation of what I called a strategic reserve corps. The idea was that you also reorganize and restructure the National Guard and the Reserves, and you put them in a rotational readiness context and you identify windows, when certain formations will be expected to perform. This becomes increasingly important for a whole range of reasons.

First of all, there is a human requirement. We owe it to people to make their lives more predictable. The current structure won't do that, and the current institutional policies can't do that. So we need change in those areas.

The second part is spending money. You want to know when you're going to spend money to train someone and when you

won't. And if you're spending money equally all the time for everyone, you're probably not going to get the result that you would like to get.

Interestingly enough, the Guard, which has less personnel turnover in many respects than the active component, because they're regional, would benefit from this very quickly and very early. And I think it would dramatically enhance the Guard's capabilities and contributions to the active force.

MR. MCGINNIS: I would agree with Doug. And we have advocated that for a long time. I think that the one thing that's important to transition is that -- and I'm a firm believer in this, and I'll cite Toffler and historians and a whole bunch of other people if you would like -- we make wars and we make wealth. And one of the reasons we're in a transformation period is because we're changing how we make wealth. That's critical.

And there are a lot more people out there in the Reserves, in all the services, in the rag-tag militia, who are making money, believe it or not, and making a lot of money. And they understand this dynamic. And they also provide that bridge. They provide the bridge technologically and they provide the bridge politically. So I think it's important that, whatever we do, we partner. The common defense is not the military services in isolation. And it has gotten to that, especially in the post-Cold War period, with operational forces. And I think

that's the number one negative of the entire defense establishment. And not just for the Guard but for the Reserves.

MR. ELAND: Sean?

MR. NAYLOR: Just a couple of thoughts on that. One is the Army is already moving to give the Bosnia peacekeeping mission almost entirely to the National Guard now. And I think that's the sort of role that an Army that's going to be stretched both financially and in terms of personnel over the next few years could certainly leverage for the Reserve component.

Moving beyond that, I see a real challenge for the Reserve component in staying current as the Army transforms, in terms of warfighting practices. The point has already been made several times that digitized networked warfare is extraordinarily complex. And there is a real question to be asked as to whether you can stay proficient at that sort of warfare with the very limited training time that the Reserve component has.

Right now, the National Guard has a lot of division headquarters. There could be a question there about whether funds could be found by cutting those division headquarters.

MR. ELAND: I guess the National Guard is only as capable as the amount of training and money it gets. So if you put less emphasis on the Army and more emphasis on the Guard, if you made the decision to do that, you would probably have a more capable Guard than you do.

MR. NAYLOR: But you've got to be careful that you don't split the difference too much. Unless you're training as hard as the active Army is training, you're not going to be as good as that. And those who would shift an awful lot of responsibility to the National Guard -- and I think the Cato Institute and the Air Force are both on the same side of this, from the limited exposure I've had -- are taking a great risk there. Because modern warfare cannot be trained for part-time.

MR. ELAND: Yes?

MR. KOBER: Stanley Kober, with the Cato Institute.

I want to follow up on something that Tom McNaugher said. A lot of this started with the Gulf War, to get forces to the Gulf quickly. But the reason we had to do that was they didn't want us there until they got into trouble. And then they wanted us there. What is our responsibility to defend people who don't want us there until they get into trouble? That's the reason we have to go light. We could be heavy in Germany because they wanted us there before they got into trouble. So there's a political assumption underlying this, that has been implicit, that I think needs to be examined.

COLONEL MACGREGOR: First of all, I want to go to something that Tom mentioned that sort of slipped everybody's attention, I think. He talked about maritime prepositioning. And we had a recent example of what you're just describing. In

early April of 1999, the SACEUR summoned me to his office and said: How do we position Army forces to get rapidly into theater? And I said: Sir, the Army prepositioning afloat; that's the answer. And he wasn't aware of all that was prepositioned at sea. But he said: Okay, great. He asked for permission to utilize it, and it was denied.

The bottom line is that this maritime prepositioning force -- and I'm an advocate for more of it -- currently sits, for the most part, in the neighborhood of Diego Garcia and, on order, can move very quickly, within two or three days, to an area where there is a crisis, and then loiter offshore. And, when the time comes, they can come ashore. And a reinforced brigade, plus logistical elements, can fly in from the United States, already identified, to fall in on this equipment.

Had we done that, we could have had Army forces on the ground in Macedonia 96 hours from the time that the ships arrived offshore. And it wouldn't have taken them more than two or three days to steam up there. They're very fast. So that's an example of the kind of capability.

Back to this issue of lightness, what we're really talking about is some number, some force, that can fly, but then the ability to rapidly reinforce from the sea, from prepositioned SEP's at sea, is equally critical. And I would contend that there is plenty of interest in supporting that on the Hill.

DR. MCNAUGHER: You posed the question, I think, a little bit off where I would pose it. You said: What's our responsibility to defend friends? No, our responsibility is to our interests. And we perceived that we had vital interests at stake when Iraq invaded Kuwait. I happen to agree with that.

Then the question is, how do we defend friends who have a political problem with an obvious American presence? Actually, we've wrestled with that question all through the eighties. Remember, it was really the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that set us off on worrying about a Soviet invasion of Iran -- actually, worrying about the Gulf. I wrote a book on the subject back in the eighties. And I remember the Reagan diplomats scurrying all over the Gulf, looking for a base, and getting a little bit of help from Oman. But nobody up in the Arab sheikdoms was going to be very helpful.

I thought we did a remarkable job, in the 1980's, of developing kind of a complex array of ways of getting to the Gulf in a hurry without access to bases.

Now, would bases have helped? Sure. But strategy is first of all politics. And if, by putting a base in Saudi Arabia, you make life worse for a friend, that's not good strategy. So I think we did it all very well. Doug's point about the maritime prepositioned force and allied force, I assumed -- and you know better than I -- that the reason that was

denied was, again, that politically President Clinton was not into signaling in even the slightest way that he was contemplating ground force assets. And that may occur in another future crisis. But you sure want to set up the situation so that if the door opens and you can deploy with maritime prepositioned forces you can do it. It's a great way to get things places.

MR. ELAND: I do think it's curious that the foreign policy establishment, if you will, is sometimes more concerned about defending other countries than they are themselves. So I think maybe that's the point that Stan might have been trying to make there.

We have another question up here. We just have time for one more question, because the time is running out.

QUESTION: I wanted to ask if a lot of military resources are used, financial resources and human capital, in the drug war, and how you feel about that?

MR. ELAND: Does anybody want to address that?

COLONEL MACGREGOR: The first thing I would tell you is that the Army, like all the armed services, but the Army most important in my view at this stage, has to be structured, organized, equipped, and postured to do whatever we're asked to do. What we feel about it is irrelevant.

MR. ELAND: Anybody else? Dave?

MR. MCGINNIS: You asked the question and I'll give you an answer. It has nothing to do with defense. I don't think the problem of the "drug war," in itself, should be a problem with national security, although we've made it one, mainly because of the characters who are playing on the other side.

We've seen a lot of it on both ends -- and the Guard has participated in a lot of it on both ends - and I have become a firm believer, because of that, that if we spent a tenth of the money at home on use reduction -- and I'm not talking about law enforcement, I'm talking about education -- that we would do ourselves a lot better than spending a lot of money overseas, chasing these clowns.

Now, if we want to chase them for some other reason, that's fine, because of political stability or whatever. But I think we contribute to that more by creating and maintaining the market here than any other reason.

MR. ELAND: That's all the time we have for questions now. I would like to invite you to an informal buffet lunch upstairs in the Winter Garden. And I would also like to thank our speakers for an excellent panel.

(Applause.)

(Whereupon, the Policy Forum was concluded.)