Pentagon Bureaucracy

Many articles in recent years have expressed concern about Pentagon bloat. Mackenzie Eaglen called for streamlining the Pentagon’s “army of bureaucrats.” Ray Mabus said “Twenty percent of the Pentagon budget, one dollar out of five, is spent on … the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the defense agencies … Pure overhead.”

Robert Gates said the Pentagon is a “gargantuan, labyrinthine bureaucracy,” where 40 percent of spending goes to overhead, and there are 30 layers of staff under the secretary. Fareed Zakaria called the Pentagon “some kind of gigantic socialist enterprise.”

My favorite bureaucracy story is the recent one about the admiral in charge of navy intelligence who has not been allowed to see any secret intelligence for two years. That is pretty absurd, even for a socialist enterprise.

One measure of Department of Defense (DoD) bureaucracy is the number of civilian (non-uniformed) employees, as shown in Chart 1. (Data from the new federal budget and prior ones).

The number of DoD civilians soared from 659,000 in 2007 to 771,000 in 2011, but then declined to 738,000 by 2016. The peak and fall generally followed the peak and fall in the numbers of uniformed service members over those years.

However, Chart 2 shows that there has been an upward trend in the ratio of DoD civilians to uniformed. In President Obama’s first year of 2009, there were 703,000 civilians and 1.54 million uniformed, for a ratio of 0.46. In 2016 there were 738,000 civilians and 1.34 million uniformed, for a ratio of 0.55.

The relative increase in the civilian bureaucracy is a concern. One might think that Pentagon productivity would have increased because of advances in technology. Shouldn’t procurement be more efficient these days, as we’ve moved from paper forms to electronic databases? Apparently, such gains from technology have been dissipated elsewhere. John Lehman says: “With so many layers and offices needed to concur on every decision, it now takes an average of 22½ years from the start of a weapons program to first deployment, instead of the four years it took to deploy the Minuteman ICBM and Polaris submarine missile system in the Cold War era.”

Aside from wasted cost, the more bureaucratic bloat there is, the more it saps the energies of our uniformed service members. John Lehman estimates that “roughly half of all uniformed personnel serve on staffs that spend most of their time going to meetings and responding to tasks from the hundreds of offices that have grown like mold throughout the vast Defense Department.” The fault, of course, lies not with the service members, but with the complex and top-heavy system that Congress and Pentagon leaders have built over the decades.

Decline in U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Overestimated by More Than a Third

Global Science Report is a weekly feature from the Center for the Study of Science, where we highlight one or two important new items in the scientific literature or the popular media. For broader and more technical perspectives, consult our monthly “Current Wisdom.”

First China. Now the U.S.

It was big news last November when it was revealed that China had been under-reporting its coal consumption by nearly 20 percent. The big implication was that China’s greenhouse gas emissions were also much larger than being reported, complicating the (then) upcoming U.N. climate negotiations in Paris.

Now comes evidence that the U.S. has been underreporting its methane emissions—a potent greenhouse gas—by some 50 percent or more.  And what’s worse, is that over the past decade or so, instead of methane emissions having declined by about 10 percent as reported by the EPA, they have in fact grown by more than a whopping 30 percent. Not only would this information also have (had it been available) complicated the U.N. Paris talks, but it would have taken a lot of the shine off the U.S. emissions reduction efforts that President Obama was touting at the conference last December.

The new evidence is presented in a just-published paper in the scientific journal Geophysical Research Letters by a team led by Harvard PhD candidate Alexander Turner. Turner and colleagues examined several measures of methane emissions occurring in the U.S. (including in situ measurements and remote satellite observations) and concluded that EPA estimates were way off. They wrote:

National inventory estimates from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) indicate no significant trend in US anthropogenic methane emissions from 2002 to present. Here we use satellite retrievals and surface observations of atmospheric methane to suggest that US methane emissions have increased by more than 30% over the 2002-2014 period… This large increase in US methane emissions could account for 30-60% of the global growth of atmospheric methane seen in the past decade.

The implications are huge—at least when it comes to our advertised role as a supposed leader in climate change mitigation efforts.

Bernie Wins and Super PACs Continue to #FeeltheBern

The Seattle Times reports that more super PAC money has been spent in express support of Sen. Bernie Sanders than for either of his Democratic rivals, including Hillary Clinton. For the record, Sanders would happily abolish super PACs by working to overturn one of the two major court rulings that gave rise to the super PAC:

Of course, that’s not quite how it works, but you get the idea. A President Sanders would do his level best to make sure that he becomes the last candidate to receive the benefits of supportive speech facilitated by the super PACs.

The fight for free political speech is a regular topic on the Cato Daily Podcast (subscribe!: iTunes / Google Play / CatoAudio). I recently spoke with Paul Sherman of the Institute for Justice about Bernie’s massive support from super PACs and common misconceptions about how the groups actually function.

 

Protectionism Wins in New Hampshire

Last night, Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump won their respective parties’ presidential primary elections in New Hampshire.  There’s a lot that can be and has been said about this outcome and what it means for American politics.  One interesting thing I’d like to point out is that these candidates are by far the two most protectionist candidates running for either party’s nomination, and they are the only candidates that have made opposition to free trade a part of their campaign’s message.

The conventional wisdom is that good trade policy fares poorly during election season.  Foreign trade is an easy scapegoat for complex economic problems, and restricting trade is a simple “solution.”  It’s no surprise that the two most populist candidates are also the ones trumpeting an anti-trade message.

At the same time, however, trade is rarely ever an issue that animates voters.  Regardless of their preferences on trade policy, other issues almost always take precedence in voters’ minds when they go to the polls.  It’s endlessly frustrating to free traders that, even though it doesn’t help politicians get elected, they consistently promote harmful myths about international trade during their campaigns.

I’m not sure that was the case in New Hampshire.  During last night’s news coverage, I watched a reporter from one of the cable news networks interview voters.  When asked why they supported Donald Trump, one couple said their biggest concern was that jobs were going to Mexico.

I suspect we’ll hear more anti-trade rhetoric from both Trump and Sanders in the coming weeks as they try to differentiate themselves from their competition and cash in on nativist sentiments.  We’ll have to wait and see if it drives the other candidates toward more illiberal trade policy positions as well, or if it gives them cover to stake out more moderate positions.

Supreme Court Stops Obama’s Latest Power Grab

Last night, while everyone was focused on New Hampshire, the Supreme Court issued an order that is likely to end up being more consequential than the primary victories of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders: By a vote of 5-4, it stayed the implementation of the so-called Clean Power Plan. A group of states led by West Virginia challenged the regulation, and eventually sought a stay from the high court pending resolution of that lawsuit in the lower courts. 

As I described in a recent op-ed:

In June 2014, the Environmental Protection Agency proposed a new rule for regulating power-plant emissions. Despite significant criticism, on August 3, 2015, it announced a final rule. It gives states until 2018 — it “encourages” September 2016 — to develop final plans to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, with mandatory compliance beginning in 2022. EPA cites Section 111 of the Clean Air Act as justification for the Clean Power Plan, but that section can’t give the agency such authority. Section 111(d) doesn’t permit the government to require states to regulate pollutants from existing sources when those pollutants are already being regulated under Section 112, as those deriving from coal-fired plants are.

The Supreme Court’s stay is a welcome development. The regulations constitute an unprecedented assertion of agency authority, so the Court had to step in to prevent irrevocable harm to the energy sector. As we saw last term in Michigan v. EPA, often it’s too late to fix administrative abuses judicially after the fact. Lawlessness must be nipped in the bud.

And this move may have foreshadowed the death knell of the Clean Power Plan altogether; the only question is whether the justices will have a chance to strike it down for good before the next president reverses it.

For more commentary, see Jonathan Adler.

In Africa, Institutions Matter More than Infrastructure

Washington Post article recently highlighted the impressive but uneven progress that Africa has made in its struggle against poverty. The article looked at questions pertaining to material wellbeing, including “the number of times that an average family had to go without basic necessities.” On that measure, Cape Verde saw the most rapid improvement. And so the article asks, “What did Cape Verde do right?” 

Cape Verde’s superior infrastructure, the Washington Post explains, is partly responsible for that country’s economic progress. Surely that cannot be the full answer. The United States did not have an interstate road network till the Eisenhower Administration – decades after the United States became the richest and most powerful country in the world. Similarly, Germany was the most powerful and richest country in Europe a long time before constructing its famous autobahns. 
  
In fact, it is Cape Verde’s policies and institutions that we should look to as reasons for that country’s superior performance relative to, say, Liberia, where poverty increased the most – according to the Washington Post. According to the Center for Systemic Peace, Cape Verde is a democracy. Liberia, in contrast, is far behind.

Russia Won’t Attack the Baltic States

When the Cold War closed many people believed that history had ended. Europe was certain to be free and undivided.

Alas, it hasn’t worked out that way. But no worries. At least NATO officials are happy. Following Russian intervention in Georgia and Ukraine the alliance rediscovered a sense of purpose through its old enemy, Moscow.

The Obama administration just announced a multi-billion dollar program to bolster U.S. forces in Eastern Europe. Now a Rand Corporation report warns that Russia could easily overrun the three Baltic members of NATO is raising additional alarm.

Said David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson: the “unambiguous” result of a series of war games was that “As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members.” The Rand researchers recommended a substantial allied military presence to deter Moscow.

Shalapak and Johnson dismissed the cost, estimated at around $2.7 billion annually, but more commitments require more force structure, and that burden almost certainly would fall upon America rather than the Europeans. Just like the administration’s new initiative for Eastern Europe involving a single brigade.

Their conclusion illustrates the folly years ago of treating NATO as a social club and inducting new members which were irrelevant to the continent’s security and possessed minimal military capabilities. Now the alliance realizes that it is obligated to war against nuclear-armed Russia on behalf of essentially indefensible countries.

Equally striking is how NATO membership has discouraged the Baltic nations from doing much for their own defense. Last year Latvia and Lithuania devoted 1.06 percent and 1.14 percent, respectively, of GDP to the military. Estonia was 2.04 percent—the first time Tallinn met the official NATO standard.

Yet the surging fear over Russian adventurism is misplaced. Vladimir Putin’s behavior is bad, but poses little threat to America, “old” Europe, or even most of Russia’s neighbors.

He has taken Moscow back to the Russian Empire, not the Soviet Union. His government demands respect for its status, protection of Russia’s borders, and consideration of its interests.

Mikhail Saakashvili’s Georgia was actively anti-Russian, pursued close ties with America, and sought membership in NATO—all certain to antagonize Moscow. Ukraine always mattered more to Moscow than Georgia or the Baltics for historical and cultural reasons, as well as the naval base of Sebastopol. Putin acted only after Europe pushed a trade agreement to reorient Ukraine away from Russia and both Brussels and Washington backed a street revolution against the elected president who leaned toward Russia.

Even then, Putin sought to weaken, not conquer, Ukraine. His brutal response was murderous and unjustified, but militarily on par with U.S. interventions.

Putin continues to demonstrate no interest in ruling those likely to resist Russia’s tender mercies. Seizing the Baltic states likely would generate substantial popular resistance.

Moreover, as weak nations currently containing no foreign troops, the Baltics pose no potential threat to Russia. Finally, the Baltic ethnic Russian populations, though significant, demonstrate little sentiment for joining Mother Russia. They prefer cultural connection to political affiliation, creating a poor target for the sort of destabilizing tactics deployed against Ukraine.

So what would Russia gain from attacking the Baltics? A recalcitrant, majority non-ethnic Russian population. A possible temporary nationalist surge at home. A likely short-lived victory over the West. 

As I argue in National Interest: “The costs would be far greater. Grabbing the Baltics likely would spur population exodus and trigger economic collapse. Launching a war without the convincing pretext present in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine might leave the Russian public angry over the retaliation certain to come.”

Worse, Moscow certainly would rupture economic and political relations with the U.S. and Europe and probably start a losing conventional war with NATO. Even more frightening would be the prospect of a nuclear conflict.

The U.S. should stop making defense promises which serve the interests of other nations rather than America. The Europeans should prepare their own defense.