Topic: Trade and Immigration

A SANE Immigration Reform Proposal

Arizona has been the source of immigration contention for years.  Representative Jeff Flake (R) and Senator McCain (R) have been at the center of many recent immigration reform proposals before the firestorm over the Legal Arizona Workers Act and SB 1070.  From former governor and now head of DHS Janet Napolitano (D) to current governor Jan Brewer (R) and Sheriff Joe Arpaio (R) of Maricopa County, Arizona is home to politicians who have made their careers in immigration.

It’s only fitting that now reform plans are coming from the state.  Arizona Employers for Immigration Reform, a non-partisan immigration reform group, came out with just such a plan yesterday called SANE.  It is similar to past immigration enforcement proposals and includes the 4 legs of the stool common to all such plans:

1.  Security increases on the border.

2.  Account for unauthorized immigrants here through earned legalization.

3.  Necessary increases in lawful immigration and work visas.

4.  Employment sanctions and other reforms.

This is merely the first plan of the new season and I predict there will be many more that are similar.  Border security is already at historic heights, unauthorized immigration at lows, and employer sanctions and workplace identification requirements like E-Verify have reduced the liberty of American workers without reducing the size of the informal labor economy.  However, increasing lawful immigration and a large and flexible guest worker visa, depending on the details, will be the most important components of any reform that will greatly diminish unauthorized immigration going forward.

TAFTA We Hafta?

In today’s Washington Post, David Ignatius makes the case for a Trans Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA), also referred to as a U.S.-EU Free Trade Agreement.  He notes that:

a 50 percent reduction in non-tariff barriers (such as unnecessary or duplicative standards) could boost GDP by roughly $160 billion in Europe and $53 billion in the United States. Abolishing all tariffs could produce gains of up to $86 billion for Europe and $82 billion for the United States.

I weighed in on this a few weeks ago.  I was skeptical then, and I’m still skeptical now.  But that doesn’t mean I’m completely opposed to the idea.  Ignatius is right that there would be some large benefits.  However, his op-ed highlights some of my concerns.

He notes that in talking about this idea, Hillary Clinton referred to the “long-standing barriers to trade and market access” that would have to be removed to make the deal possible, such as the European Union’s protectionist agricultural rules.  First of all, let’s not forget the United States’ protectionist agricultural rules.  Europe is not the only offender in this area.  Second, let me quote a recent Reuters article on this point:  ”… both sides appear likely to leave much of the highly sensitive agricultural sector out of the agreement altogether, diplomats say.”  So, yes, there would be great benefits to removing protectionist agricultural barriers, but it’s not clear that will be part of this proposal!

Ignatius also says:

Combined with the North American Free Trade Agreement in Latin America and the ­Trans-Pacific Partnership in Asia, [the TAFTA] could create a global trading system that might be an enduring part of Obama’s legacy.

Well, sort of.  A real “global” system would be done globally.  Lots of bilateral and regional agreements create a bit of a mess.  If you have different rules for some countries than for others, you end up with absurd litigation about where a product “officially” comes from.  Here’s a recent example, from a well-known trade lawyer:

this is a case about whether plasma televisions and video monitors made in Mexico are entitled to be treated as originating under the North American Free Trade Agreement. If so, they may enter the United States free of duty and merchandise processing fee. The problem for Samsung is that the imported units include an assembly from Korea that consists of a plasma flat panel and various support electronics. Under the relevant NAFTA rules of origin, if that non-originating Korean assembly is classifiable as a “flat panel screen assembly” of 8529.90.53 in the HTSUS, then it fails to satisfy the tariff shift requirement of the NAFTA rule of origin.

So, the question is whether two specific configurations of subassemblies are FPSA’s. It turns out that is a complicated question because FPSA is not defined in the tariff nor in the relevant Explanatory Notes. …

… Looking at the two modules at issue, the Court found that each satisfies its requirements to be classified as an FSPA. Consequently, the non-originating components failed to satisfy the NAFTA tariff shift requirement and the imported products were not entitled to duty-free entry under the NAFTA.

There are more details at the link, if you really want them. The basic gist is that the product at issue had enough Korean content that it did not qualify for duty-free treatment under the NAFTA.  This kind of thing is great for trade lawyers, but not so good for free trade!

So, there are some real problems with a bilateral trade agreement with Europe.  That’s not to say I would oppose it.  It may be the best we can do right now.  Some day, though, I hope we can do better.

The Usual Anti-WTO Suspects

A news article out today from the McClatchy news service reports growing opposition in the United States against the WTO after a series of politically popular laws were found earlier this year to be inconsistent with international trade rules.  It’s true that the federal government will face some tough decisions in 2013 as it attempts (or not) to bring currently discriminatory laws on tuna, beef, and cigarettes into compliance.  But most of the outcry has come from the same usual suspects who have always opposed trade liberalization—progressive activists, anticompetitive industry associations, and lawmakers with wealthy business constituents seeking import protection.

These perennial opponents of the WTO rely on some very dangerous myths to make their case, and I’d like to point out two of them in this post that relate to the WTO’s dispute settlement process.  The first is that bringing existing U.S. laws into compliance with WTO rules will necessarily weaken environmental and safety regulations.  The second is that responding to a loss at the WTO by reforming U.S. law amounts to a transfer of sovereignty from the United States to international bureaucrats.  These myths can have a strong impact on the public and lawmakers across the political spectrum, and they are both totally false.

The news article highlights in particular a ruling from earlier this year that the U.S. law regarding the dolphin safe tuna label violates WTO rules.  Among those most vocally concerned about the ruling is Lori Wallach of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch.  She is concerned that bringing the law into compliance will result in “Flipper murder” as U.S. consumers will no longer be able to choose dolphin friendly tuna at the super market.

I have written before about how the law, which defines dolphin safe by prohibiting the use of a label unless certain conditions are met, actually prevents consumers from making informed choices that protect dolphins and other sea life.  But the WTO judicial bodies didn’t rule against the law because they believed that a free market is the best way to maximize the power of consumer choice, they did so because the definition of dolphin safe under the law is misleading and protectionist.

The federal dolphin-safe label requirements that were found to violate WTO rules prohibit the use of such a label if tuna is caught in a particular part of the Pacific Ocean near Mexico where dolphins and tuna school together.  As I wrote in May, the WTO found fault not with what the law prohibited, but with what it allowed:

What makes the law discriminatory and misleading is that tuna caught elsewhere, like the Western Central Pacific where U.S. fishing fleets operate, may be labeled dolphin safe without any certification that dolphins were not harmed. In the WTO case, the U.S. was given an opportunity to justify this different treatment by showing that the policy even-handedly addresses different levels of risk for dolphins in different regions. But the WTO found that fishing techniques used in other parts of the ocean can also harm dolphins, and that excluding Mexican tuna from access to the label under especially strict terms was discriminatory.

Bringing the law into compliance does not require total repeal, although that is the best option.  Alternatives include having a weaker requirement or having a stricter requirement.  Another option would be to keep working with other countries involved in the International Dolphin Conservation Program to develop sustainable fishing practices that severely limit the incidence and consequence of dolphin bycatch.

One of the current law’s leading supporters, Representative Rick Larsen (D-WA), is upset because he thinks any change would be bad for … his state’s tuna fishing industry.  Protectionism is not a good way to save dolphins, and it’s definitely not the only way.

The second myth—that WTO rulings diminish U.S. sovereignty—is especially frustrating.

An association of cattle ranchers is actually suing the WTO and U.S government in federal court to prevent implementation of a ruling against mandatory country of origin labels for beef.  Part of the 2002 Farm Bill, the country of origin label regulation was designed to make it more expensive to purchase Canadian cattle and to roll back the efficiency gains from NAFTA-driven supply chain integration in the beef market.  Carrying the banner of consumer information and safety, the ranchers have teamed up with other protectionists to blame the WTO instead of ‘fessing up when their frankly obvious scheme was exposed.

The WTO has no power to override U.S. law.  Period.  The dispute settlement process at the WTO allows countries to settle trade disputes by submitting their complaints to an independent panel of arbiters.  If that panel finds a country’s law to be inconsistent with the promises it has made as a WTO member, then the complaining members are provisionally excused from their obligations toward the offender.  No one is forced to engage in tit-for-tat retaliation, but the consequence of noncompliance is a loss of protection from such retaliation.  Bringing the offending law into compliance puts a stop to the retaliation and restores the status quo.

Since the end of World War II, the primary character of U.S. trade policy has been to accept the benefits of trade liberalization only if other countries do the same.  This awkward free-trade mercantilism has fostered an international trading system governed by international laws which both restrict and harness the protectionist tendencies of national governments.  The WTO dispute settlement system, and its remarkable success at ensuring compliance, is an example of how liberalization can be achieved by pitting special interests against each other.

The WTO has its faults, but calling out the U.S. for protectionist regulation isn’t one of them.  I would be thrilled if the U.S. adopted a policy of unilateral trade liberalization and recognized that import barriers and protectionism harm U.S. consumers and businesses regardless of what other governments do.  Until then, mooching industries and progressive activists will complain about the WTO installing world government and forcing us to kill dolphins against our will.  And the WTO will continue to expose their protectionist schemes.

Is Turkey Golden?

Recently, Moody’s Investors Service took some wind from Turkey’s sails, when it declined to upgrade Turkey’s credit rating to investment grade. Moody’s cited external imbalances, along with slowing domestic growth, as factors in its decision. This move is in sharp contrast to the one Fitch made earlier this month, when it upgraded Turkey to investment grade.   Moody’s decision not to upgrade Turkey, and its justification, left me somewhat underwhelmed – given how well the Turkish economy has done in recent years.

Since the fall of Lehman Brothers, Turkey’s central bank has employed a so-called unorthodox monetary policy mix. For example, a little over a year ago, it began to allow commercial banks to purchase gold from Turkish citizens and allowed banks to count gold to fulfill their reserve requirements. Incidentally, this was a remarkable success – from 2010-2012, the Turkish banking sector’s precious metal account increased by over 7 billion USD.

For all the criticism its unconventional monetary policies have garnered, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey has, in fact, produced orthodox, golden results. Indeed, as the accompanying chart shows, the central bank has delivered on the only thing that really matters – money.

Turkey’s economic performance has been quite strong (despite some concerns about inflation and its current account deficit) . Turkey’s money supply has been close to the trend level for some time, and it currently stands 2.41% above trend. This positive pattern is similar to that of many Asian countries, who continue to weather the current economic storm better than the West.  And, it stands in sharp contrast to the unhealthy economic picture in the United States and Europe – both of which register significant money supply deficiencies.

So, why would Moody’s not follow Fitch’s lead and upgrade Turkey to investment grade? To understand this divergence, one should examine Turkey’s recent current account activity. Since late 2011, Turkey’s current account has rebounded somewhat (see the accompanying chart).

But, if gold exports are excluded from the current account (on a 12-month rolling basis), a rather significant 47% of this improvement, from the end of 2011 to September 2012, magically disappears.

Where is this gold going? Well, a quick look at the accompanying chart shows just how drastically exports to Iran and the UAE have surged this year.

Taken together, the charts indicate that Turkey is exporting gold to Iran, both directly and via the UAE , propping up their current account in the process. This has put Turkey and the UAE in the crosshairs of proponents of anti-Iranian sanctions.   Those who beat the sanctions drum are now seeking to impose another round of sanctions, aimed at disrupting programs such as Turkey’s gold-for-natural-gas exchange. This proposal clearly highlights some of the problems associated with sanctions, specifically the unintended costs imposed on the friends of the U.S. and EU in the region. Indeed, Dubai has already taken a hit, with its re-exports falling dramatically as a result of the sanctions.

What is the U.S. to do – go against Turkey, its NATO ally? Believe it or not, some in the Senate are allegedly considering such a wrong-headed move.

If these proposed sanctions are implemented, then Moody’s pessimistic outlook on Turkey may turn out to be not so far from the mark, after all – and Turkey will have no one but its “allies” to blame.

Jobs and Trade Agreements

Well-meaning if misguided politicians often tout job creation when they promote preferential trade agreements: freer trade will mean higher exports (the benefits of imports are almost never mentioned), and more exports means more production, which means more jobs. That narrow focus is understandable, especially in times of above-acceptable unemployment, when every bill seems to need a jobs angle to sell: witness, for example, Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack’s verbal gymnastics in a statement yesterday, when he referred to the multi-year spending binge that is the Farm Bill as the “Food, Farm and Jobs Bill”. Politicians, not being the most courageous of creatures, don’t usually have the stomach/spine/etc. to make a principled stand in favor of free exchange across borders for its own sake (if you want to read more on the case for free trade, there are plenty of publications available at the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies website, starting with our position statement at the bottom of the homepage).

Unfortunately, the extent of job creation is hard to quantify, and the case may be oversold. Edward Alden at the Council for Foreign Relations yesterday drew our attention to a recent International Trade Administration study that looks at the jobs created by exports and finds, well, that exports create fewer jobs than often is promised, and that the “job intensity” of exports is falling:

In 1993, which turns out to be the first year for which data are available, the report says that each $1 billion of exports supported just over 12,000 jobs… By 2011, however, that same $1 billion in exports supported only 5,000 jobs. About one-quarter of the difference is due to rising prices over the past two decades, but most of the difference is the result of higher productivity in export-intensive sectors which has reduced the need for labor.

That makes perfect sense. Some three-quarters of U.S. exports are in the goods sector, one-third of those directly in manufacturing, and many of the rest in industries that support manufacturing exports. From 1993 to 2011, labor productivity in the manufacturing sector doubled, compared with just a 50 percent increase in overall productivity. In other words, today it takes many fewer workers than in 1993 to produce the same $1 billion in exported products.

The consequence is that even rapidly growing exports have created very few new jobs. Given the average annual productivity improvements over the past two decades, exports need to grow by roughly 5 percent each year just to support the same number of jobs. Even with the extremely strong U.S. export performance over the past two decades, the total number of U.S. jobs supported by exports in 2011 — 9.7 million jobs – is up just 27 percent from the number of jobs in 1993…

The implication of these figures is fairly stark. As the Obama administration has noted often, export jobs are good jobs – employees in export-intensive industries earn some 20 percent more on average than comparable workers in industries that produce goods and/or services only for the domestic market. But there are simply too few of them to make a significant dent in unemployment, or to lift household incomes which have been flat for the past two decades. The largest number of export jobs are in technology-intensive industries such as aerospace, semiconductors, and motor vehicles. [links in original]

Is there anything wrong with making specious claims about jobs in support of something that is in the best interests of the economy? I guess that depends on your tolerance for spurious means in pursuit of worthy ends. For my part, I worry that when jobs claims are discredited, the case for free trade (and hence public support for it) is eroded. So my advice to politicians when it comes to prognostications about jobs created by trade agreements is: don’t go there. Be brave.

Optimism and Skepticism on Trade Policy in Obama’s Second Term

Over at Foreign Policy, trade experts Phil Levy are Dan Drezner have been debating the prospects for trade and investment initiatives during Obama’s second term. Levy is skeptical that much will be accomplished. Drezner is more optimistic, and he makes some bold predictions:

I’m willing to bet that at least two out of the following four things will happen during Obama’s second term:

1)  A Trans-Pacific Partnership that is ratified by Congress;

2)  Bilateral investment treaties with India and China;

3) A transatlantic integration agreement;

4)  A new services deal within the auspices of the WTO.

I get nervous about making predictions. I’ve been wrong many times before! But I think I’m closer to Levy on these issues. I have serious doubts that any of the items Drezner mentions will be achieved in the next four years. To get specific (and risk being wrong again), I would rate the chances of seeing completed China/India investment treaties or a US-EU FTA at close to zero; a ratified TPP at around 10%; and a WTO services agreement at around 25%.

But just to be clear, I don’t blame the Obama administration for this. I think that if Romney had been elected, the same things would have been pursued, with about the same results.

Why am I so pessimistic? One big reason is this. In recent years, the trade and investment agreements noted above have become much less about free trade and investment. The U.S. is pushing a lot of issues that are not about free trade at all (e.g., intellectual property protection). As a result, there is a great deal of opposition to these agreements from people who do not instinctively oppose free trade. Protectionists and certain interest groups have always opposed free trade, of course, but adding in a whole new set of opponents has made things more difficult. The current trade negotiating template can support agreements with small countries, which often fly under the radar, but can’t make much progress beyond that.

Having offered that gloomy view of things, let me just note that I’m happy to be proved wrong about the prospects for free trade in the near future!

A Cautionary Tale on Negotiated vs. Unilateral Trade Liberalization

Many economists, including myself, take some convincing when it comes to the benefits of bilateral and regional trade agreements. I’m not as skeptical as the likes of, say, Rep. Ron Paul, who often votes against preferential and piecemeal trade liberalization legislation on the basis of it being “managed trade”  (his latest protest vote on that score was a “nay” on granting Russia permanent normal trade relations status).  But since the 1950s, when the work of Jacob Viner showed that when trade agreements cause the importing country to favor less-efficient producers (a phenomenon known as trade diversion), trade theory has pretty-much consistently shown a hierarchy of mechanisms for increasing commerce across borders: unilateral trade liberalization is best, followed by multilateral trade liberalization (although the current WTO round of trade negotiations is dead), and then regional or bilateral agreements. Most economists more-or-less subscribe to this hierarchy on the basis of pure economics, although we disagree on the extent to which political and practical concerns should trump the economic theory in order to harvest at least some benefits for consumers and taxpayers, who have had their wallets picked for decades if not centuries in the name of “leveling the playing field.” (In the interests of preserving appetites in anticipation of Thanksgiving, I will spare the readers further details on the esoteric and internecine squabbles between trade economists on this topic.)

In the early to mid-2000s, the Bush administration (followed by others) tried to turn this thinking on its head, arguing that bilateral negotiations can aid trade liberalization by (a) forcing the hand of foot-draggers, by scaring them into joining the fray and (b) setting up a series of trade blocs that subsequently could be joined together like a jigsaw puzzle (a process known as “competitive liberalization”, a term coined by Fred Bergsten at the Peterson Institute of International Economics). Die-hard unilateralists like Jagdish Bhagwati (a member of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies Advisory Board), instead cautioned of a “spaghetti bowl” of trade agreements. Preferential deals would cause extra burdens for customs authorities, they said, for example by giving rise to complicated and in some cases conflicting rules about deciding where a good comes from for the purposes of assigning tariff rates.

Economists and free trade advocates also worry about the effect that preferential deals have on multilateral trade negotiations. I saw this first-hand when I worked on the Doha Round in 2005-06. Many World Trade Organization members, particularly developing countries, receive preferential (i.e., lower) tariff rates on their exports to developed countries. They thus often raise concerns about non-discriminatory tariff cuts because it would mean their preferences were worth less (called “preference erosion,” in the jargon of trade negotiators).  You then see the somewhat perverse situation of developing countries arguing against tariff cuts in rich countries, or at least demanding compensation for it.

The latest example of the conflict between modes of liberalization – in this case, unilateral v. regional liberalization – comes from closer to home. The trade press is buzzing with the news that the Obama Administration has raised concerns about the efforts of some lawmakers to cut tariffs on certain footwear items (on the basis that we do not make them in the United States and therefore have no competitive interest in the market). These sorts of efforts happen regularly in the form of “miscellaneous tariff bills” (MTBs), usually with little fanfare given the uncontroversial politics of it, Republican concerns notwithstanding. Why would the administration object to limited tariff relief on goods not produced domestically? Because, as is typical among trade negotiators, they want to keep the tariffs in place as bargaining chips:

Alex Boian, director of trade policy at the Outdoor Industry Association (OIA), said in an interview that administration officials in private conversations have made clear their reservations relate to the fact that Vietnam is seeking a reduction in U.S. footwear tariffs in the context of the TPP talks. In the administration’s view, these tariff lines represent “prime negotiating leverage” with Vietnam in [the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations], Boian said. (emphasis added. Source: Inside U.S. Trade [paywall])

A few industry groups have raised a stink, pointing out that the tariff relief provided by the MTB is limited and temporary, so are unlikely to threaten the TPP. And procedurally, it is not clear if the administration even has the right to object to the MTB tariff breaks on this basis anyway. More broadly, I find myself sympathetic to the arguments of the American Apparel and Footwear Association, which in their letter to United States Trade Representative Ron Kirk, said:

…the objection that “Enactment would undermine existing U.S. trade preferences” creates  significant concerns.  In addition to the reasons outlined above, the basic premise of this objection is faulty. To extend the logic outlined in this objection, the current negotiations toward a TPP agreement would “undermine existing U.S. trade preferences” as would negotiations toward a Doha Round agreement at the World Trade Organization.

For that matter, under this logic, any new trade negotiation would “undermine existing U.S. trade preferences.” By making such an objection, the administration is essentially arguing that U.S. trade policy should be brought to a halt altogether. [emphasis added]

Indeed. When it comes to preferential trade deals, caveat emptor.