Topic: Trade and Immigration

Time to Trade with Cuba: Regime Change through Sanctions Is a Mirage

President Barack Obama used negotiations over a couple of imprisoned Americans to refashion the entire U.S.-Cuba relationship. He aims to reopen the embassy, relax trade and travel restrictions, and improve communication systems.

Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida charged the administration with appeasement because the president proposed to treat Cuba like the U.S. treats other repressive states. But President Obama only suggested that government officials talk to one another. And that peoples visit and trade with one another.

More than a half century ago Fidel Castro took power in Havana. In the midst of the Cold War the Kennedy administration feared that Cuba would serve as an advanced base for the Soviet Union. Having tried and failed to overthrow the regime militarily, Washington saw an economic embargo as the next best option.

But that didn’t work either. Even after the Soviet Union collapsed and Moscow ended subsidies for Cuba, sanctions achieved nothing.

Today Cuba’s Communist system continues to stagger along. The only certainty is that economic sanctions have failed.

Failed to bring down the regime. Failed to liberalize the system. Failed to free political prisoners. Failed to achieve much of anything useful.

After more than 50 years.

But that should surprise no one. Sanctions are most likely to work if they are universal and narrowly focused. For instance, the Institute for International Economics found that economic sanctions did best with limited objectives, such as “modest” policy change.

Do Amnesties Increase Unlawful Immigration?

One popular argument against a legalization, or amnesty, of unlawful immigrants is that it will merely incentivize future unlawful immigration.  Unlawful immigrants will be more likely to break immigration laws because they will eventually be legalized anyway, so why bother to attempt to enter legally (ignoring the fact that almost none of them could have entered legally)?  This claim is taken at face value because the stock of unlawful immigration eventually increased in the decades after the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) that amnestied roughly 2.7 million.

However, that doesn’t prove that IRCA was responsible for the increase in the stock of unlawful immigrants.  The stock of unlawful immigrants may have been increasing at a steady rate prior to the amnesty and that rate may have just continued after the amnesty.  Measuring the flows of unlawful immigrants is the best way to gauge whether the 1986 Reagan amnesty incentivized further unlawful immigration.  If the flows increased after IRCA, then the amnesty likely incentivized more unlawful immigration.  The number of annual apprehensions of unlawful immigrants on the Southwest border is a good way to approximate for these cross-border flows.

It’s perfectly reasonable to think that an amnesty of unlawful immigrants could increase their numbers in the future.  There are at least two ways this could occur.  The first is through knowledge of an imminent amnesty.  If foreigners thought Congress was about to grant legal status to large numbers of unlawful immigrants, then some of those foreigners may rush the border on the chance that they would be included.  Legislators were aware of this problem, which was why IRCA did not apply to unlawful immigrants who entered on January 1st 1982 or after.  IRCA had been debated for years before passage and Congress did not want to grant amnesty to unlawful immigrants who entered merely because they heard of the amnesty.  To prevent such a rush, subsequent immigration reform bills have all had a cutoff date for legalization prior to Congressional debate on the matter. 

Even with the cutoff date, some recent unlawful immigrants would still be able to legalize due to fraud or administrative oversights.  An unlawful immigrant who rushes the border to take advantage of an imminent amnesty still has a greater chance of being legalized than he did before, so legalization might be the marginal benefit that convinces him to try.  This theory of a rush of unlawful immigrants prior to an imminent amnesty is not controversial.

The Airbus Beluga: How Bad Government Makes Cool-Looking Things Sometimes

While government intervention often makes people’s lives worse, it can sometimes have aesthetically valuable side effects. For example, ancient pyramids are true marvels of human engineering, feudal despotism, and slave labor. Also, I’ll admit I’ve always enjoyed the iconic image of 1950s American cars in Cuba, which exist today because Cubans largely have been forbidden from buying new cars for over half a century.

Cuban CarsA more modern consequence of big government causing cool things to happen is the existence of the Airbus Beluga Super Transporter. The Beluga exists because Airbus manufactures different parts of its planes in different European countries. Why does it do this? Subsidies! Lots of subsidies.

Airbus is based in France, where most of its planes are assembled. But the company is also subsidized by the United Kingdom, Germany, and Spain, and they each get at least one factory that makes some airplane component. In order to transport giant airplane parts like fuselages and wings from country to country, Airbus has designed a plane for the sole purpose of carrying plane parts between its factories.

Airbus Beluga

 

Hungry Airbus Beluga
I think it’s pretty cool looking. It’s also absurd. When your business model involves flying airplane parts around Europe in an airplane, it’s very possible you are inadequately concerned about efficiency.

Leveling the Playing Field?

Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-OH) introduced a bill on Wednesday called the “Leveling the Playing Field Act.” According to the accompanying press release, the proposal would “restore strength to antidumping and countervailing duty laws” via a “crack down on unfair foreign competition.” The bill includes several provisions relating to practices used by the Department of Commerce to determine dumping and subsidy margins (i.e., the extent to which imported products are unfairly underpriced). It also contains modest changes to procedures used by the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) in deciding whether domestic industries have been “materially injured” by imports.

Since I have had only indirect exposure to the role of Commerce in antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) investigations, I will leave analysis of those proposed changes to others. However, my 10 years of experience as chairman and commissioner at the ITC provide a reasonable basis for commenting on the bill’s suggested modifications to the injury determination.

The existing AD/CVD statutes instruct the ITC to “evaluate all relevant economic factors” that relate to the effects of imports on the industry under consideration. A number of those factors are specifically mentioned, including the industry’s profits. Not being satisfied with just having the commission examine profits in general, the Brown bill adds, “gross profits, operating profits, net profits, [and] ability to service debt.” As a practical matter, the commission already looks in detail at an industry’s profitability and its ability to repay debts, so this additional wording would contribute nothing of substance.

The Brown bill would add a provision to the effect that an improvement in the industry’s performance over the period of investigation (normally about three years) should not preclude a finding that the industry has been materially injured by imports. Yes, there can be circumstances in which an industry’s results are strengthening, yet it is still being held back by import competition. However, the commission’s existing practice already considers this possibility, so the new language would not really change anything.

The bill also adds a section addressing the possible effects of a recession on the ITC’s injury analysis. It states that the commission may extend its period of investigation to begin at least a year before the recession started, which would allow before and after comparisons of how the domestic industry has performed. The ITC already has authority to adjust the period of investigation under special circumstances, but it relatively seldom does so.

Naomi Klein vs. the Climate

Liberal activist Naomi Klein has a new book out provocatively subtitled “Capitalism vs. the Climate.” (For those of you who don’t want to buy her book, an essay she wrote a couple years ago with the same title is here.)

What amuses me about her attempt to pit capitalism and the climate against each other is that I came across an excerpt from the book in the Toronto Globe and Mail in which, unwittingly, she advocated policies that, even accepting the debate on her terms, can’t be good for the climate.

Not surprisingly, she supports subsidies for renewable energy. It’s hard to have renewable energy without those. But what struck me was that she also argued for tying those subsidies to the use of local content. For example, there is a government program in Ontario that subsidizes solar energy, but only if the energy suppliers use a certain percentage of labor and materials that are made in Ontario.

There are two obvious and related problems with such a requirement. First, by requiring local inputs, you make your product more expensive (especially when local means high-cost Canada). If your goal is cheaper renewable energy, raising the price of inputs doesn’t make a whole lot of sense.

Second, the idea that each sub-federal government should promote local production of a particular product is absurd. Imagine if that happened worldwide: there would be thousands of producers of these products! I can’t think of a more inefficient and energy-wasting approach to manufacturing.

Just to be clear, I know many strong supporters of taking action against climate change who do not believe in this kind of protectionist approach. They recognize that local content requirements are economically harmful and shouldn’t be part of these policies. For reasons that are difficult to understand, Klein seems to have missed this pretty obvious point. (I did tweet it at her, but I’m not expecting much from that!)

Potential Path to a Green Card in Executive Action

In a little-noticed memo on November 20th, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson ordered Customs and Border Protection and Citizenship and Immigration Services to allow unlawful immigrants who are granted advance parole to depart the United States and reenter legally.  This memo is based on a decision rendered in a 2012 Board of Immigration Appeals case called Matter of Arrabally. Allowing the immigrant to legally leave and reenter on advance parole means he or she can apply for a green card from inside of the United States–if he or she qualifies. 

Advance parole can be granted to recipients of DACA (deferred action for childhood arrivals) and DAPA (deferred action for parental accountability) if they travel abroad for humanitarian, employment, or educational purposes, which are broadly defined

Leaving the United States under advance parole means that the departure doesn’t legally count, so the 3/10 year bars are not triggered, and the unlawful immigrant can apply for a green card once they return to the United States through 8 USC §1255 if he or she is immediately related to a U.S. citizen.  Reentering the United States under advance parole means that the prior illegal entry and/or presence are wiped out in the eyes of the law.  Crucially, individuals who present themselves for inspection and are either admitted or paroled by an immigration officer can apply for their green card from inside of the United States and wait here while their application is being considered.

In such a case, unlawful immigrants who receive deferred action and who are the spouses of American citizens will be able to leave the United States on advance parole and reenter legally, allowing them to apply for a green card once they return.  Unlawful immigrants who are the parents of adult U.S. citizen children will be able to do the same.  Unlawful immigrants who are the parents of minor U.S. citizen children and are paroled back into the country will just have to wait until those children are 21 years of age and then they can be sponsored for a green card.

According to New York based immigration attorney Matthew Kolken, “President Obama’s policy change has the potential to provide a bridge to a green card for what could be millions of undocumented immigrants with close family ties to the United States.” 

Google’s Search “Monopoly”

Last week, while we Americans were “unbundling” the various parts of our turkeys, the European Parliament was talking about unbundling Google’s various features:

Members of the European parliament voted overwhelmingly on a measure aimed at keeping companies, such as Google, from dominating the search engine market.

The motion “calls on the [European] Commission to consider proposals with the aim of unbundling search engines from other commercial services as one potential long-term solution” to ensure fair competition.

While the vote was largely symbolic, its outcome could put EU anti-trust commissioner Margrethe Vestager under pressure to pursue complaints against Google, which critics say squeezes out its competitors using unfair advantages.

The Economist weighed in with a bit of criticism:

The European Parliament’s Googlephobia looks a mask for two concerns, one worthier than the other. The lamentable one, which American politicians pointed out this week, is a desire to protect European companies. Among the loudest voices lobbying against Google are Axel Springer and Hubert Burda Media, two German media giants. Instead of attacking successful American companies, Europe’s leaders should ask themselves why their continent has not produced a Google or a Facebook. Opening up the EU’s digital services market would do more to create one than protecting local incumbents.

The good reason for worrying about the internet giants is privacy. It is right to limit the ability of Google and Facebook to use personal data: their services should, for instance, come with default settings guarding privacy, so companies gathering personal information have to ask consumers to opt in. Europe’s politicians have shown more interest in this than American ones. But to address these concerns, they should regulate companies’ behaviour, not their market power. Some clearer thinking by European politicians would benefit the continent’s citizens.

Building on these points, I’d go even further.  It seems to me there is pretty clear demand for a privacy-focused internet company.  But I don’t see why governments need to get involved here.  Instead, companies – European ones, and others, too – just need to recognize this demand, and jump into the market with some competing products.  There are fewer barriers to entry in this market than most other markets; someone just needs to be willing to take a risk.