The eyes of the international trade community are fixed on Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Ron Wyden (D-OR), upon whom responsibility for crafting bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation has fallen. At last report, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Hatch and Ranking Member Wyden were at an impasse over some important components of the bill, passage of which is widely considered necessary to concluding the long-gestating, 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. That agreement must be concluded before the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations make any progress. Those negotiations will have far-reaching implications for the multilateral trading system, including China, India, Brazil and other countries not currently party to these mega-regional trade agreements. Hence, TPA’s outcome is of worldwide interest.
Trade Promotion Authority has been maligned as a congressional capitulation or executive power grab. It is neither. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority to “regulate commerce with foreign nations” and to “lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises” and grants the president power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. Accordingly, the formulation, negotiation, and implementation of trade agreements require the involvement and cooperation of both branches. TPA is a compact between the branches that obliges these respective constitutional authorities, while guaranteeing an up-or-down vote by Congress, on an expedited basis, of any trade agreement negotiated by the executive branch with foreign governments, provided that the agreements meet the objectives spelled-out by Congress in the legislation. This conditionality is often ignored or brushed over by news reporters, who either spend too much time with trade skeptics or who are looking to economize on words.
Without such a compact, trade agreements would be nearly impossible to conclude because foreign negotiators – knowing that any agreement reached would be subject to congressional revisions – would never put their best offers on the table. The process of negotiating and renegotiating with 535 officials (instead of one agency, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative) would make for an interminable process too cumbersome and costly to pursue. For practical purposes, negotiations have to occur between small parties vested with the authority to speak on behalf of those whom they represent. Trade Promotion Authority is the solution.
A few weeks ago, I wrote about the possibility of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) saying something about the minimum wage, which the White House had been suggesting it would. I was a bit skeptical that the TPP would really do anything on this issue, and subsequently, I spoke to a U.S. government official who seemed to indicate that the whole thing was overblown, and nothing much would happen with the minimum wage in TPP.
But now I see that Victoria Guida of Politico has been speaking to higher ranking U.S. government officials, who said the following:
The Trans-Pacific Partnership pact, which the White House is negotiating with 11 countries, would require members to set and enforce laws on minimum wages, maximum work hours and occupational safety and health standards — things no other U.S. trade agreement has done.
Labor Secretary Tom Perez, too, is practiced at explaining why the TPP should matter to its critics, calling the labor provisions of NAFTA and the Central American Free Trade Agreement “woefully insufficient.” Labor obligations, he acknowledges, must be in the main text — as they have been in the most recent free-trade agreements — and coupled with sanctions if countries don’t comply.
The worker protections in the deals with Peru, South Korea, Colombia and Panama stemmed from the “May 10 agreement” that House Democrats reached with the George W. Bush administration in 2007, which covered freedom of association, collective bargaining rights, the elimination of forced or compulsory labor, child labor and employment discrimination. The TPP would go further with its minimum wage, hours and workplace safety standards, Perez said.
Senator Jeff Sessions’ (R-AL) Washington Post op-ed calls “for an honest discussion on immigration.” He then lays out his case against legal immigration.
Although I appreciate Sessions’ honesty in calling for large reductions in legal immigration–a level of candor too often shrouded by immigration-restrictionists’ political correctness (“I’m only against illegal immigration”)–his op-ed makes a poor case for more government regulation of international labor markets.
Below, I look at Senator Sessions’ arguments against legal immigration. His writings will be in block quotes and my responses will follow.
The first “great wave” of U.S. immigration took place from roughly 1880 to 1930. During this time, according to the Census Bureau, the foreign-born population doubled from about 6.7 million to 14.2 million people. Changes were then made to immigration law to reduce admissions, decreasing the foreign-born population until it fell to about 9.6 million by 1970. Meanwhile, during this low-immigration period, real median compensation for U.S. workers surged, increasing more than 90 percent from 1948 to 1973, according to the Economic Policy Institute.
Senator Sessions only presents the income data for Americans during the time when immigration was restricted. Real per-capita GDP increased by 95 percent during the 1880–1930 period of high-immigration that he cites. There are other sources for wage data from that period, although all of them are troublesome compared to the modern economic information available.
The United States did not have closed borders from 1948 to 1973. The Bracero guest-worker visa program let in nearly five million lower-skilled Mexican workers to temporarily labor in American agriculture, a policy that did more to limit unlawful immigration during that period than any other.
In recent weeks, a number of prominent economists have expressed views on the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson are for it; Tyler Cowen is for it, mainly for foreign policy reasons; Noah Smith is for it; Larry Summers is a maybe; Paul Krugman thinks it’s not a big deal and questions whether Obama should spend “political capital” pushing it; Brad DeLong is more positive than Krugman; Dean Baker is skeptical; and Matt Yglesias is skeptical, noting that “[t]he political economy and public choice issues around what’s become of the mutlilateral trade process stink.”
Before jumping to any conclusons, though, I think DeLong makes an important point here:
“It is foolish to debate whether a trade agreement that has not yet been negotiated is a good idea and should be ratified. Such a debate should properly begin only once there is something to analyze.”
That’s very true: We don’t have a negotiated agreement yet, so it’s difficult to judge its content. If this were an old-school trade agreement whose main function was to get rid of tariffs, it would be easier to make an assessment in advance. If we knew all or most tariffs would be brought to zero, and that’s all that would happen in the agreement, we would know just about everything we needed to know. However, today’s trade agreements have lots of substantive policymaking in them, and the details are important.
Now that a federal judge has enjoined President Obama’s unilateral amnesty, immigration reform will have to be achieved the old-fashioned – and constitutional – way: by compromise with Congress. A grand bargain is not impossible, but it will require a broad re-framing of the issues and a clear sense of what is at stake. For one thing, any such bargain should end, once and for all, governmental discrimination on the basis of race.
Affirmative action and immigration might, at first glance, appear unrelated; in fact, they are profoundly and perversely intertwined. It is often said that anti-immigration sentiment is driven by a fear of competition; Americans are said to fear competing against new immigrants for jobs, for contracts, for educational opportunities. This account leaves out a crucial part of the story: Americans have never lacked competitive spirit or feared a fair fight. What many Americans fear is that these competitions will, in fact, be rigged from the outset. The sad fact is that they are right.
If you don’t yet subscribe to Cato Trade, the monthly newsletter of the Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, you can find the current edition here. Highlighted in this month’s release is Simon Lester’s new paper, Expanding Trade in Medical Care through Telemedicine. Additionally, you will find Cato trade scholars’ commentaries on the Export-Import Bank; the Trans-Pacific Partnership talks; Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS); Trade Promotion Authority (TPA); and, other important matters of U.S. trade policy.
And here are the links to all previous monthly newsletters:
When deciding whether to impose antidumping duties on imports from Vietnam, the United States uses what’s known as nonmarket economy (NME) methodology. That is, instead of comparing a product’s U.S. price with the price for the same or similar product in Vietnam, U.S. authorities compare it with a fictitious price constructed using surrogate values from third countries.
The use of NME methodology is prohibited under the rules of the World Trade Organization. But when Vietnam and China joined the WTO, they each agreed that the use of NME methodology would be permitted against them for an additional 15 years. For China that’s until the end of 2016, and for Vietnam it’s until the end of 2018.
Vietnam, however, is also a negotiating party to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-member free trade agreement that may be concluded this year. Last week, Vietnam’s Ambassador to the United States implied that Vietnam was seeking to have its NME status revoked as part of those negotiations. As reported at Inside U.S. Trade ($):
“I think on the question of the market economy status, we can do it together. Vietnam has been doing it with other countries and I think about three dozen or something countries have recognized that,” said Pham Quang Vinh, Vietnam’s ambassador in Washington. Vinh added that he hopes “when we reach a conclusion of the TPP, then everything [with regard to this issue will] be resolved.”
It certainly makes sense that Vietnam would hope to negotiate the end of NME treatment. As the Ambassador explained, they’ve already secured market economy status in other countries. The TPP is a natural vehicle for getting a similar commitment from the United States . But there’s no guarantee they’re going to get it:
But his counterpart, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Ted Osius, seem to tamp down those expectations. Speaking at the same event, Osius indicated that while TPP might put Hanoi on strong footing to make the economic reforms necessary to become a market economy, a change in its status would be likely be further down the road. Both officials spoke at March 24 event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Osius said that the U.S. Commerce Department process to determine a country’s market economy status is non-political, and that Vietnam still needs to fulfill certain requirements, such as having a convertible currency.
The U.S. official’s characterization is telling. The U.S. government has consistently argued that NME status is a factual question. That is, if Vietnam or China meets the criteria under U.S. law for market economy treatment, their NME status will be revoked accordingly.