Topic: Trade and Immigration

Industrial Policy Courtesy of the Cromnibus…Because No More Inferior Potassium

Though a monument to the ravages of Soviet central planning, the barren Magnitogorsk steel works complex still inspires America’s industrial policy proponents.  “Failure to plan is a plan for failure,” said comrade Rep. Dan Lipinski (D-IL), as he described the “pro-manufacturing” legislation he helped slip into the mammoth Cromnibus bill, which became law this month.

The Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act directs the Secretary of Commerce to establish a “Network for Manufacturing Innovation” to:

  • improve the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing and increase production of goods manufactured predominately within the United States;
  • stimulate U.S. leadership in advanced manufacturing research, innovation, and technology;
  • accelerate the development of an advanced manufacturing workforce; and
  • create and preserve jobs

Of course, the verbs “revitalize,” “improve,” “stimulate,” “accelerate,” “create,” and “preserve” are euphemisms for protect, subsidize, regulate, and intervene.

How Long Is the TPP Going to Take?

We were once told that the Trans-Pacific Partnership would be completed by the end of 2013.  Then it was early 2014, then late 2014, or probably sometime before 2015, or in early 2015 for sure.  At this point, only two things are certain: you shouldn’t believe any predictions about the TPP, and the TPP is taking a really, really long time.

To get an idea for how long the TPP is taking, consider this graph put out by the Peterson Institute earlier this month showing the negotiation and ratification times for previous free trade agreements:

Peterson FTA graph 

The argument they’re trying to make with this graph is that the United States needs to pass trade promotion authority to make sure the TPP doesn’t get bogged down in Congress (the red line) after negotiations finally conclude.  They may be right, but I think it also tells us quite plainly that quick ratification of the TPP, with or without trade promotion authority, is an unrealistic expectation.

Here’s the same data presented with the negotiation and ratification times stacked on top of each other and with the current progress of the TPP (and TTIP) included:

timetable with TPP 

As you can see, the TPP negotiations are taking an unprecedentedly long time to complete. 

Undaunted by the failure of previous predictions, the U.S. Trade Representative is now claiming that the negotiations will conclude and the whole deal can be passed by Congress before the end of 2015.  That would be an impressively abrupt end to a long project, with a blue and red line total of just under 70 months. 

It’s possible that passing trade promotion authority will bring much needed energy to the TPP process.  Hopefully, USTR is right, and Congress will pass trade promotion authority, the TPP negotiations will conclude, and the ratification will be swift. 

It seems more likely, however, that the TPP is a trade policy quagmire the United States entered into with overly ambitious goals and inadequate resolve to see them met.  There’s a lot more than just the lack of trade promotion authority keeping the TPP negotiations from concluding.  And you might notice from the graph above that, even with trade promotion authority in place, the most recent trade agreements lingered in Congress for a very long time after the negotiations were completed.

Maybe I’m wrong.  Maybe the stars are about to align for the TPP.  But if I’m right, how long do we have to wait before we rethink our strategy?

Internationalists vs. Isolationists

Last week, I had a piece in Townhall in which I criticized those who call libertarians “isolationists.”  I explained the various ways libertarians are just as internationalist, if not more so, than those of other political persuasions.  The recent Rand Paul-Marco Rubio back and forth on President Obama’s new Cuba policy helps illustrate the point.  Here is the Washington Post summarizing the exchange:

Hawkish Republicans have long called Paul’s foreign policy “isolationist,” a label he rejects. In this week’s Cuba debate, Paul applied the label to Rubio.

Paul’s comments were unusually personal, beginning with a series of tweets aimed at Rubio followed by a two-paragraph message on his Facebook page. “Senator Rubio is acting like an isolationist” and “does not speak for the majority of Cuban-Americans,” he wrote.

Paul followed up with an op-ed on Time’s Web site Friday afternoon in which he wrote that he grew up learning to despise communism but over time concluded that “a policy of isolationism against Cuba is misplaced and hasn’t worked.” He noted that public opinion has shifted in favor of rapprochement — especially among young people, including young Cuban Americans — and that U.S. businesses would benefit by being able to sell their goods in Cuba.

Rubio responded to Paul’s comments Friday evening, telling conservative radio host Mark Levin, “I think it’s unfortunate that Rand has decided to adopt Barack Obama’s foreign policy on this matter.”

I don’t think there can be much doubt that Paul’s approach of engagement with Cuba is internationalist, not isolationist.  The Rubio approach is harder to define.  It can be seen as isolationist, in a sense; alternatively, it could be some sort of aggressive, interventionist – and ineffective – internationalism.  Either way, the Cuba issue is a good illustration of how libertarians are not isolationists, and hopefully this will put an end to that mistaken characterization.

Republicans in Congress Really Like the Cuba Embargo

President Obama made a number of spot-on arguments yesterday for why the United States should end the ineffective trade embargo that has helped impoverish the people of Cuba for over fifty years.  However, the core components of the embargo are statutory law that will require an act of Congress to overturn.  While it’s very encouraging to see the president take a leadership role in pursuit of a good policy, getting Republicans on board is going to be difficult to say the least.

Over the last 20 years, there have been 11 votes in the two houses of Congress seeking to eliminate or amend the Cuba embargo.  In all of those votes, loosening the embargo got majority opposition from Republicans.  According to Cato’s trade votes database, it wasn’t even close.  Republican support for the embargo has ranged from 61% (in support of travel ban) to 91% (in support of import ban) with the average level of support at 77.5%.  Indeed, in 2005 more Republicans voted to withdraw the United States from the World Trade Organization than voted to end the Cuba embargo.

That’s not to say that positive movement on the embargo in a Republican congress is impossible.  There are encouraging signs as well: shifting opinion among Cuban Americans alters the electoral politics of the embargo in favor of opposition; resurgent emphasis on free markets may temper the Republican party’s reflexive love for belligerent foreign policy; and long-time Republican opponents of the embargo will now have renewed energy. 

In practical terms, embargo opponents will need to persuade House leadership to schedule a vote and find enough support in the Senate to overcome an inevitable filibuster from Marco Rubio and others.  It may not be impossible, but there’s a lot of heavy lifting left to do.  Hopefully, the President’s actions will be enough to get the ball rolling toward more reform of this antiquated and harmful policy.

The Failure of the Americanization Movement

Introduction

Last week I was on an immigration panel discussing my new booklet Open Immigration: Yea & Nay, coauthored with Mark Krikorian of the Center for Immigration Studies.  The other panelists were Michael Barone, George Will, Andrew McCarthy, and John Fonte.  They all had interesting comments about the booklet and the issue of immigration broadly.  However, I do want to take issue with some comments by John Fonte about the assimilation of immigrants and his view that the United States needs a modern version of the Americanization movement – an early 20th century initiative that sought to assimilate newcomers rapidly into American civic life.  Fonte claims that modern immigrants just aren’t assimilating as well as previous waves of immigrants, especially in their patriotism, because there is no modern equivalent of the Americanization movement to help them. 

During the event, I challenged Fonte’s claims about both the assimilation rates of today’s immigrants as well as the effectiveness of the Americanization Movement.  On the former point, research by Jacob Vigdor and others shows solid and sustained assimilation of immigrants over the generations that is comparable to the assimilation rates of previous immigrant groups.  On the latter point about the effectiveness of the Americanization movement, I mentioned that there were no data available from the early 20th century to confirm or disconfirm that it was responsible for the assimilation of immigrants in those groups.  Fonte countered by saying [2:44:15]: “It’s true we don’t have data on how well assimilation worked, but I think we have plenty of anecdotal evidence that Americanization did help.”  Elsewhere Fonte writes “assimilation of the Ellis Island generation succeeded only because American elites (progressive at the time) insisted upon ‘Americanization.’”  The success of the Americanization movement is an empirical question but there is precious little data from that time period.  There may be some anecdotes available that support his position so I will list some others below that question the effectiveness of the Americanization movement.    

Fonte and I clearly disagree over how successful current immigrant assimilation is in the United States, but this blog will focus on the little-researched and less understood Americanization movement of last century.  Contrary to Fonte’s claims, the Americanization movement had no discernible impacts on immigrant assimilation at best and, at worst, it may have slowed down assimilation.  The Americanization movement was not a benevolent government program that sought to assimilate immigrants into American society so much as it was an avenue for American opponents of immigration to vent their frustrations about immigrants.  Such an atmosphere of hostility could not produce greater assimilation.  The Americanization movement, however, did create an air of government-forced homogeneity similar to the government policies of Russia, Hungary, and Germany that tried to forcibly assimilate ethnic and linguistic minorities with tragic consequences – an experience many immigrants came to America to avoid.  The Americanization movement replaced the tolerant cosmopolitanism (for the most part) that defined America’s experience with immigration up to that point, and represented a low-water mark of American confidence in the assimilationist power of her institutions.  Below I will lay out the history of the Americanization movement, how it worked, and why it was likely ineffective.

Time to Trade with Cuba: Regime Change through Sanctions Is a Mirage

President Barack Obama used negotiations over a couple of imprisoned Americans to refashion the entire U.S.-Cuba relationship. He aims to reopen the embassy, relax trade and travel restrictions, and improve communication systems.

Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida charged the administration with appeasement because the president proposed to treat Cuba like the U.S. treats other repressive states. But President Obama only suggested that government officials talk to one another. And that peoples visit and trade with one another.

More than a half century ago Fidel Castro took power in Havana. In the midst of the Cold War the Kennedy administration feared that Cuba would serve as an advanced base for the Soviet Union. Having tried and failed to overthrow the regime militarily, Washington saw an economic embargo as the next best option.

But that didn’t work either. Even after the Soviet Union collapsed and Moscow ended subsidies for Cuba, sanctions achieved nothing.

Today Cuba’s Communist system continues to stagger along. The only certainty is that economic sanctions have failed.

Failed to bring down the regime. Failed to liberalize the system. Failed to free political prisoners. Failed to achieve much of anything useful.

After more than 50 years.

But that should surprise no one. Sanctions are most likely to work if they are universal and narrowly focused. For instance, the Institute for International Economics found that economic sanctions did best with limited objectives, such as “modest” policy change.

Do Amnesties Increase Unlawful Immigration?

One popular argument against a legalization, or amnesty, of unlawful immigrants is that it will merely incentivize future unlawful immigration.  Unlawful immigrants will be more likely to break immigration laws because they will eventually be legalized anyway, so why bother to attempt to enter legally (ignoring the fact that almost none of them could have entered legally)?  This claim is taken at face value because the stock of unlawful immigration eventually increased in the decades after the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) that amnestied roughly 2.7 million.

However, that doesn’t prove that IRCA was responsible for the increase in the stock of unlawful immigrants.  The stock of unlawful immigrants may have been increasing at a steady rate prior to the amnesty and that rate may have just continued after the amnesty.  Measuring the flows of unlawful immigrants is the best way to gauge whether the 1986 Reagan amnesty incentivized further unlawful immigration.  If the flows increased after IRCA, then the amnesty likely incentivized more unlawful immigration.  The number of annual apprehensions of unlawful immigrants on the Southwest border is a good way to approximate for these cross-border flows.

It’s perfectly reasonable to think that an amnesty of unlawful immigrants could increase their numbers in the future.  There are at least two ways this could occur.  The first is through knowledge of an imminent amnesty.  If foreigners thought Congress was about to grant legal status to large numbers of unlawful immigrants, then some of those foreigners may rush the border on the chance that they would be included.  Legislators were aware of this problem, which was why IRCA did not apply to unlawful immigrants who entered on January 1st 1982 or after.  IRCA had been debated for years before passage and Congress did not want to grant amnesty to unlawful immigrants who entered merely because they heard of the amnesty.  To prevent such a rush, subsequent immigration reform bills have all had a cutoff date for legalization prior to Congressional debate on the matter. 

Even with the cutoff date, some recent unlawful immigrants would still be able to legalize due to fraud or administrative oversights.  An unlawful immigrant who rushes the border to take advantage of an imminent amnesty still has a greater chance of being legalized than he did before, so legalization might be the marginal benefit that convinces him to try.  This theory of a rush of unlawful immigrants prior to an imminent amnesty is not controversial.