Topic: Trade and Immigration

E-Verify in the States

Many state legislatures are proposing to expand E-Verify – a federal government-run electronic system that allows or forces employers to check the identity of new hires against a government database.  In a perfect world, E-Verify tells employers whether the new employee can legally be hired.  In our world, E-Verify is a notoriously error-prone and unreliable system.

E-Verify mandates vary considerably across states.  Currently, Alabama, Arizona, Mississippi and South Carolina have across the board mandates for all employers.  The state governments of Georgia, Utah, and North Carolina force all businesses with at least 10, 15, and 25 employees, respectively, to use E-Verify.  Florida, Indiana, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Texas mandate-Verify for public employees and state contractors, while Idaho and Virginia mandate E-Verify for public employees. The remaining states either have no state-wide mandates or, in the case of California, limit how E-Verify can be used by employers.

Despite E-Verify’s wide use in the states and problems, some state legislatures are considering forcing it on every employer within their respective states. 

In late April, the North Carolina’s House of Representatives passed a bill (HB 318) 80-39 to lower the threshold for mandated E-Verify to businesses with five or more employees.  HB 318 is now moving on to the North Carolina Senate where it could pass.  Nevada’s AB 172 originally included an E-Verify mandate that the bill’s author removed during the amendment process. Nebraska’s LB611 would have mandated E-Verify for all employers in the state.  LB611 has since stalled since a hostile hearing over in February.

E-Verify imposes a large economic cost on American workers and employers, does little to halt unlawful immigration because it fails to turn off the “jobs magnet,” and is an expansionary threat to American liberties.  Those harms are great while the benefits are uncertain – at best.  At a minimum, state legislatures should thoroughly examine the costs and supposed benefits of E-Verify before expanding or enacting mandates.

Scott Platton helped to write this blog post.

The Ex-Im Bank and Globalization

This is from a Wall Street Journal article about President Obama’s push for the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP):  
Mr. Obama also warned of rising anti-globalization sentiment in Washington, reflected in Democratic opposition to the trade agreement [TPP], Republican efforts to kill the Export-Import Bank, and congressional unwillingness to approve new rules for operation of the International Monetary Fund.
I agree that opposition to the TPP often, although not always, reflects anti-globalization sentiment; I’m not familiar with the IMF issue here.  But on the Ex-Im Bank issue, I think the President has it backwards. His logic, I assume, is that subsidies from the Ex-Im Bank promote exports, and are therefore pro-globalization.  But this logic is flawed.  The reality is that all export subsidies are a form of economic nationalism, in the sense that they try to give an advantage to domestic products over their foreign competition.  This leads to escalating trade wars and international economic tension.  The pro-globalization approach would be negotiate an end to the subsidies provided by export credit agencies, and let all products compete in the global marketplace without government support for domestic industry. 

Public Support for Immigration Increasing

John Hinderaker at the powerlineblog posted immigration polling data from the Republican Senate staff.  You can read the poll results here.  According to the top Gallup poll reported by the staff, 60 percent of Americans are dissatisfied with the current immigration system while 33 percent are satisfied.  Of those dissatisfied, 39 percent wanted less immigration and 7 percent wanted more, a subgroup wants less immigration is hardly a ringing endorsement of more restrictions.

However, here is another poll question that Gallup has asked periodically since 1965 that shows public opinion becoming more supportive of increasing immigration as the annual number of green cards climbs.  The question is: “In your view, should immigration be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?”  Surprisingly, Americans have become more supportive of liberalizing immigration over time.  In 1965, only 7 percent of respondents wanted to increase immigration while 24.5 percent did in 2014 (average of two polls in that year).

Chinese Free Trade Is No Threat to American Free Trade

I’m seeing a lot of support for the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) on the basis of reasoning along the lines of “we must stop China from dominating Asia.”  Here are two recent examples.

First, an analyst with the Third Way think tank says:

The Chinese economy is built on low labor standards, and they want to export these standards to the world.

This analysis of Chinese and U.S. trade deals demonstrates that, in the area of worker rights, there is an immense cost to ceding trade and commerce rules to China. And with China trying to impose those standards on the rest of the world, policymakers need to be extremely concerned with the effect on American workers.

Second, the Washington Post editorial board says:

the TPP would ensure that the Pacific Rim plays by U.S.-style rules and regulations, rather than by China’s neo-mercantilist ones

There are two arguments here: (1) China is imposing low labor standards on the rest of the world; and (2) China is spreading mercantilism through its trade agreements. Neither is true.  As I explain in this Free Trade Bulletin, China does not care what labor standards its trading partners use, and it is not trying to impose its standards on anyone through trade agreements.  In addition, Chinese trade agreements liberalize trade in goods and services, just as other countries’ trade agreements do; China is not using trade agreements to push for its trading partners to have more interventionist economic policy.

I conclude:

Chinese free-trade initiatives in Asia and the Pacific region should give the United States an incentive to get its own free-trade act together, but not for the reasons suggested by some. Chinese free trade is not a threat to American free trade. The justification for U.S. trade agreements is that free trade is good, not that China is somehow bad. Thus, the TPP should succeed or fail on its economic merits. The concerns about letting China write the rules are misguided. China’s trade rules are not a version of state-led capitalism. They are the removal of protectionist trade barriers, just as our trade rules are.

Immigration and Economic Inequality

Discussions of economic inequality are common nowadays thanks to Thomas Piketty’s new book Capital in the Twenty-First Century.  There are several good critiques of Piketty’s book and at least one wonderful podcast.  I’m not convinced that economic inequality in a (mostly) free-market economy matters one way or the other for economic growth, social stability, or political stability (ceteris paribus), so this blog is a response to those concerned that liberalized immigration could exacerbate wealth inequality.   

Papers on how immigrants affect the wages of Americans almost uniformly present the results as relative gains or losses compared to the wages of other workers.  While that work is valuable, below I will only discuss papers that focus exclusively on economic inequality caused by immigration. 

Borjas et. al. found that immigration (along with trade) only modestly affects earnings inequality – a role not substantial enough to account for more than a small percentage of the change.  Instead, he attributes the growth in income inequality to the acceleration of skills-biased technological change (SBTC) and other institutional changes in the labor market. 

David Card failed to find a substantially causal relationship between increased immigration and growth in wage inequality.  He discovered that immigration explains about 5 percent of the rise in overall wage inequality between 1980 and 2000.  An important distinction is between the wage inequality effects of immigration on natives and the effects on wage inequality for immigrants and natives.  While 5 percent of the growth in overall wage inequality can be attributed to immigration, immigration’s effect on native wage inequality is negligible.  Immigrants tend to have either very high or very low wages compared to natives, meaning that immigrants have a naturally higher residual level of income inequality than natives do.  Thus, immigration causes the economy-wide level of wage inequality to increase without changing native wage inequality.  Immigration has little, if any, effect on native wage inequality according to Card.

What’s Really in the New Trade Promotion Authority Bill?

After months of internal wrangling, a trade promotion authority bill has finally been introduced in the Senate.  If passed, TPA could prompt conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations and facilitate the deal’s eventual ratification by Congress.  The basic function of TPA is to affirm that future trade agreements will receive a timely up-or-down vote in Congress while setting negotiating objectives and procedures for congressional oversight.

Politically, the debate over TPA (and the TPP) has pitted the Obama administration and Republicans against congressional Democrats.  The reason the current bill took so long to devise is that proponents needed the support of Senate Finance Committee ranking member Ron Wyden (D–OR) in order to get at least a handful of other Democrats on board.

So, any differences between this bill and one that was introduced but scuttled by Harry Reid last year is due to Wyden’s influence.  His main concerns are not related to specific trade policy issues but to the role of congressional oversight and transparency in the negotiations.  Wyden has given the current bill his seal of approval, as have the White House and Republican leaders.

The first thing we should keep in mind when talking about TPA is that while its basic function is beneficial in facilitating the passage of trade agreements, the bill is 113 pages long because it’s full of caveats and reservations.

Making Sense of the Trade Negotiations Secrecy Debate

In Tuesday’s New York Times, law professor Margot Kaminski laid out a compelling case for increased transparency in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations.  On Wednesday, John Murphy of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce offered a fairly convincing response in defense of confidentiality.  The problem is that—as is common in trade policy “debates”—they’re not talking about the same thing.  That’s frustrating to me because I think they’re both right.

Kaminski makes the point that the U.S. Trade Representative has been overbroad in what it deems classified material, that the current approach improperly privileges business lobbying over public interest groups, and that as negotiations cover more non-trade issues negotiators need more exposure and guidance from different people.

Murphy responds by noting that trade agreements are successfully increasing U.S. exports, that confidentiality in negotiations is both appropriate and helpful in achieving this outcome, and that systems are in place to ensure that all interested parties have input. 

Murphy’s concern is that “public disclosure of confidential negotiating texts would mean a weaker hand for U.S. officials at the negotiating table.”  For Kaminski, “it’s a question of whose input we’re getting on decisions that reach far beyond trade — into questions on the price of generic drugs or whether websites will have to monitor users online.”

Murphy is right about the value of confidentiality.  Trade negotiations are negotiations, which means the final agreement is the result of some necessary compromise.  Compromise is politically difficult, and negotiators need to know that they’ll be evaluated on the final product regardless of their initial positions.  In any event, we don’t know what’s in the agreement until it’s completed, and there will indeed be time after the negotiations conclude to debate the package.  Murphy’s also justified in being generally defensive about secrecy complaints, which often simply mask general antipathy toward trade liberalization.