Topic: Trade and Immigration

U.S. Trying (and Failing) to Contain the Spread of European ‘Geographical Indications’

One of the European Union’s highest priorities in trade negotiations is to globalize its restrictions on the use of place names as generic product descriptions. When they negotiate a trade agreement, they insist that the other country adopt regulations requiring that, for example, all champagne come from Champagne and all parmesan cheese come from Parma. The United States, worried that these rules limit access for U.S. products, is trying to use its own trade agreements to contain the effects of Europe’s push to protect “geographical indications” (GIs) in countries around the world.

Europe’s GI protections restrict the flow of accurate information while reducing competition and innovation. GI protection is not about preventing consumer confusion or false advertising; European rules forbid the use of place names even when phrases like “style” or “type” are added. 

One often overlooked but essential aspect of GI regulation is that use of a protected name requires not only physical location in that place but also adherence to government-mandated production practices.  “Authentic” champagne is therefore not only made in Champagne, but made a specific way required by law. 

By operating this way, the system functions not only to capitalize on a collective brand but also to reduce competition among producers. Once all the producers in a particular country (say, France) are divided by region and style, the industry starts looking a lot like a cartel. There may be multiple producers, but they all agree to keep making the same thing in the same place forever. They no longer have to compete on product quality.

U.S. trade negotiators are rightly resisting efforts to spread this anticompetitive regulatory scheme to other countries. As it stands, there is almost no chance that the United States could convince the EU or its member states to drop their GI regulations. But it is also unlikely that the United States will acquiesce to European demands to adopt such a system here, especially for meats and cheeses.

The battle over GIs is therefore being waged in other countries as the EU and the United States both use trade agreements to influence how GIs are protected in foreign markets. Commercially, the question is whether U.S. companies can continue to sell their generic brands abroad.

Responding to the White House Response on ISDS

Yesterday, my colleague Dan Ikenson blogged here about an op-ed by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) in which she was critical of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions in trade agreements.

Jeff Zients, director of the National Economic Council, posted a response to Warren on the White House website.  In this post, I’m going to comment briefly on his response, going through item by item. His statements are in bold; my comments follow in bullet points. 

Zients: “The purpose of investment provisions in our trade agreements is to provide American individuals and businesses who do business abroad with the same protections we provide to domestic and foreign investors alike in the United States.”

• It’s important to be clear that these protections go both ways. Under ISDS, foreign investors can also sue the U.S. government. Of course, they could already sue under U.S. domestic law. In effect, ISDS means that foreign investors in America have two avenues for a lawsuit, while U.S. investors in America only have one.

• With regard to protections abroad, the result of ISDS is that American investors have protections in foreign countries, but non-Americans do not have protections in those countries. That seems like a bad signal to send: American investors get good treatment, but non-Americans do not. If the concern is expanding protections, there is a better way to do it: encourage these protections to be incorporated into domestic law, so that everyone gets them.

Hyperbole Aside, Elizabeth Warren Is Right About the Risk of Investor-State

Sen. Elizabeth Warren takes to the Washington Post op-ed pages today to warn about the dangers of the so-called Investor-State Dispute Mechanism, which is likely to be a part of the emerging Trans-Pacific Partnership deal.  In substance, if not style, Sen. Warren’s perspective on ISDS is one that libertarians and other free market advocates should share. At least, my colleague Simon Lester and I do

ISDS grants foreign investors the right to sue host governments in third-party arbitration tribunals for treatment that allegedly fails to meet certain standards, such as new laws, regulations, or policies that might have a discriminatory effect on foreign investors that reduces the value of their assets. Certainly, investors – and in this context we’re talking mostly about multinational corporations (MNCs) – should have recourse to justice when these situations arise. But under ISDS, U.S. investors abroad and foreign investors in the United States can collect damages from the treasuries of their host governments by virtue of the judgments of arbitration panels that are entirely outside of the legal structure of the respective countries. This all raises serious questions about democratic accountability, sovereignty, checks and balances, and the separation of power.

An important pillar of trade agreements is the concept of “national treatment,” which says that imports and foreign companies will be afforded treatment no different from that afforded domestic products and companies. The principle is a commitment to nondiscrimination. But ISDS turns national treatment on its head, giving privileges to foreign companies that are not available to domestic companies. If a U.S. natural gas company believes that the value of its assets has suffered on account of a new subsidy for solar panel producers, judicial recourse is available in the U.S. court system only. But for foreign companies, ISDS provides an additional adjudicatory option.

Congress Should Decide Whether Trade Agreements Abide the Terms of Trade Promotion Authority

Trade Promotion Authority (TPA or Fast-Track Negotiating Authority) is not an executive power grab.  It is a compact between the legislative and executive branches, which each have distinct authorities under the Constitution when it comes to conducting trade policy. The purpose of forging such a compact is that negotiations would be impracticable – and likely interminable – if each provision were subject to the whims of 535 legislators.

Opponents of trade liberalization have smeared TPA as a wholesale capitulation to the president, who allegedly is freed of any congressional oversight and given a blank check to negotiate unamendable trade deals in secret without any input from Congress – only the capacity to vote up or down on the final deal. In reality, though, TPA is the vehicle through which Congress conveys its trade policy objectives, conditions, and demands to the president, who negotiates with those parameters in mind. Provided the president concludes a negotiation that abides those congressional parameters, the deal is given fast track consideration, which means essentially that legislative procedures are streamlined and expedited.

The trade committees are reportedly close to introducing trade promotion authority legislation, although there remains some debate about what it should include. Enforceable provisions to discipline currency manipulation would be a bad idea, as would be including provisions to reauthorize the ineffective and misguided Trade Adjustment Assistance program (which is widely acknowledged to be a payoff to organized labor).

But one important provision (or set of provisions) that has created a bit of an impasse between Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and its Ranking Member Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) concerns certification that an agreement abides the requisite congressional conditions to be afforded fast track treatment. Those of us who argue that TPA is not an executive power grab, but a practical, constitutional solution to a policymaking quandary must acknowledge the propriety of such a provision – or a provision that accomplishes as much. There must be a mechanism through which the president is held to account – that the deal reflects the broad wishes of Congress.

Suing Governments for their Environmental Policy under International Law

Some folks over at Heritage have a new Issues Brief in which they argue for including an Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism in the U.S.-EU trade deal being negotiated right now.  In a nutshell, ISDS lets foreign investors sue host country governments in an international tribunal when they feel certain of their rights have been infringed.

I’ve been critical of ISDS.  I do see the potential that such international rules have for protecting property rights, but I worry about other aspects of the rules.  One issue is that these rules protect the rights only of foreign investors.  Using Venezuela as an example, there’s an assumption that the courts there can’t help much with protecting rights. To some extent, ISDS is a response to that. So, if Exxon feels its operations there have been badly treated by the Venezuelan government, it can use the ISDS mechanism to have recourse to an international tribunal.  However, if a small Venezuelan dry cleaner is being subject to governmental abuse, it’s just out of luck.  To me, that seems problematic.  Focusing on the wealthy seems like a fundamentally unbalanced way to protect property rights.

Injunction against Obama’s Immigration Action: Policy and Political Consequences

U.S. District Court Judge Andrew Hanen granted a preliminary injunction to block the implementation of President Obama’s executive actions on immigration – specifically the DAPA program and his expansion of DACA - until he decides on their legality.  Constitutional scholars are going to be writing about this for the near future (I recommend reading Josh Blackman’s comments here and our Cato brief here) and the appeals will come quickly.  In the midst of this lively debate, the political and policy consequences of Judge Hanen’s ruling should not be ignored. 

The political consequences could be immediate.  Speaker Boehner could use this moment of GOP “victory” to pass a clean DHS funding bill as he hides behind the preliminary injunction.  It could tone down the intensity of the political debate on Capitol Hill now that the courts will decide DACA/DAPA’s future.  The GOP does not have the votes to force the Democrats to accept defunding either of those programs.  This preliminary injunction allows Speaker Boehner to stop the DACA/DAPA defund fight while claiming some victory and avoiding the defeat he seems to be preparing for.  Now he can leave it to the courts with some confidence, more than he is likely to be feeling right in the DHS defunding fight, that they will rule in the GOP’s favor in a few weeks.  Regardless, this provides an opportunity for Boehner to skip the bruising DHS funding fight without suffering a political rout.

Federal Judge Stops Obama’s Executive Action on Immigration

Late last night, as the DC area braced for a snowstorm, a federal judge in Brownsville, Texas granted a temporary injunction to the executive action that President Obama announced in November. The expanded Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) was set to go into effect tomorrow, with the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) starting up in May, so a quick ruling was expected after Judge Andrew Hanen held a hearing last month. And based on how that hearing went, it’s no surprise that Texas and the 25 other states suing the federal government succeeded in stopping the executive action at least temporarily.