Topic: Trade and Immigration

Genetically Modified Foods and the Limits of Trade Agreements

Last week-end, the Washington Post had a good article about how difficult it will be for the upcoming U.S.-European Union trade talks to deal with the issue of genetically modified foods. In the Huffington Post, I have a short piece in which I explain why, in my view, trade talks can’t solve this issue.

Here’s my conclusion: 

However, asking trade negotiations to solve the issue in the next year and a half–the projected time-frame for the talks–may doom the whole process of US-EU trade negotiations. Let’s not risk killing a possible free trade deal on a quixotic quest to improve the EU regulatory process. Instead, put the EU arguments to the test: If protectionism is not the reason for the reluctance to approve genetically modified foods, the EU should have no objection to lowering tariffs and removing quotas for U.S. food products that are not genetically modified. Let’s push the EU on that issue instead, moving us towards free trade in the most simple and direct way we can.

My point here is that in order for international trade negotiations to work, we have to focus on what is actually achievable. Tariffs, quotas, and other explicit forms of discrimination are the core of protectionism, and there are plenty of those left. I’m happy to focus on those issues for now. It’s hard enough convincing the U.S. government not to regulate too much; using trade talks to rein in other governments’ regulation is asking a lot.

Toward Managed Trade in Solar Panels

Rumor has it that the United States, European Union and China are looking to negotiate a deal that would settle a developing trade dispute over solar panels. According to the New York Times, the deal would require China to limit its exports of solar panels to the U.S. and Europe and would impose a minimum price for those panels. In exchange, the U.S. and EU would drop existing antidumping duties (of around 30 and 50 percent, respectively). 

You might call this an “un-trade” agreement. Rather than agreeing to lower their own barriers to trade, the U.S. and EU are convincing China to acquiesce to those barriers by altering their form. The purpose of tariffs is to impose an additional cost on foreign manufacturers that limits competition and keeps prices high. The new model also keeps prices high and limits foreign competition, but unlike tariffs, a mandated minimum price enables the foreign manufacturers to benefit from those high prices. 

The agreement would be beneficial for existing U.S. and Chinese manufacturers, but not for U.S. consumers. For consumers, the effect of this agreement would be the same as if U.S. and Chinese solar panel makers agreed to divide up the market and not to compete on price. Actually making such an agreement between themselves would, incidentally, be highly illegal. So their governments are going to arrange it for them.  

The bizarrest aspect of this new development, and indeed the entire dispute, is that the market for solar panels would hardly exist if not for government subsidies. Increasing the cost of solar panels is completely at odds with any environmental policy to decrease emission of greenhouse gases. Even if you support the creation of “green jobs”, restricting trade in panels is counterproductive because it reduces employment in downstream businesses like solar panel installation. That our government would impose artificial barriers to direct artificial demand toward favored companies highlights the follies of green industrial policy, not just as a mind-boggling waste of taxpayer money, but as an impediment to the success of the broader green energy agenda.

Is the TPP a Waste of Time and Energy?

I hate to say “I told you so” but, well, “I told you so.”

Back in March 2010, I warned that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, a preferential trade agreement between the United States and then seven– and now 11, with the subsequent addition of Canada, Malaysia, Mexico and almost-officially Japan– other Asia-Pacific economies would be a hard slog, and that the signs towards a significant degree of liberalization were not promising. I followed that up with news about what then-United States Trade Representative Ron Kirk told a closed-door meeting with dairy lobbyists, and what it said more broadly about the administration’s commitment to free trade.

Today comes news from the latest round of TPP negotiations in Lima, Peru that industry groups have raised concerns about the way that the United States and Peru are approaching the negotiations: i.e, by negotiating with individual countries bilaterally rather than offering the same market access to all of the TPP members at once, a concept trade wonks call a “plurilateralism.” In addition, the United States is not re-negotiating market access with any of the TPP countries with which it already has an agreement (that’s six of the eleven other members).

Pluralizing the deal would be more fitting for an agreement that the Obama administration touted as being a “21st Century” agreement to reflect new world trade realities, like global supply chains. It would lessen the potential for an unholy mess that businesses find unworkable. A Wal-Mart representative said at the meeting “it’s a little hard to see how you have this very comprehensive agreement if we have bilateral market access negotiations that everybody doesn’t necessarily understand, and how you essentially plurilateralize those with common sets of rules of origin.” (Rules-of Origin are the methods by which customs officials determine the origin of a product, and thus which tariff rate should apply. They can get really messy when supply chains are complex).

So what did the U.S. and Peruvian chief negotiators say when they were called out on the self-defeating bilateral approach? They gave answers which do not pass the laugh test (the following quotes come from the same article linked to above, all emphases my added):

In response to [a] question, Weisel and Peruvian chief negotiator Edgar Vasquez both defended the bilateral approach to negotiating goods market access. Weisel argued that it makes more sense to import zero tariff rates that the U.S. already has with various TPP countries into the new agreement, rather than conducting a new market access negotiation with those countries.

Welcome to the Whimsy-conomy, Energy Trade Edition

The AP reports some bad news for anyone seeking a little security and predictability in the US and global energy markets:

Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz said Tuesday he will delay final decisions on about 20 applications to export liquefied natural gas until he reviews studies by the Energy Department and others on what impact the exports would have on domestic natural gas supplies and prices.

Moniz, who was sworn in Tuesday as the nation’s new energy chief, said he promised during his confirmation hearing that he would “review what’s out there” before acting on proposals to export natural gas. Among the things Moniz said he wants to review is whether the data in the studies are outdated.

A study commissioned by the Energy Department concluded last year that exporting natural gas would benefit the U.S. economy even if it led to higher domestic prices for the fuel.

The AP adds that Secretary Moniz justified this delay as his “commitment” to Senate Energy Committee Chairman Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) who opposes natural gas exports and has criticized the DOE study.  Moniz’s statement comes just days after his department (quietly, on a Friday) approved one pending export application—moving the grand total of approvals to two out of 20 total applications, most of which have been sitting on DOE’s desk for several years now.

And who says the U.S. government isn’t swift and efficient?

Sugar Is Already Rationed

Seeking to draw attention to their…uh…“plight,” the U.S. sugar lobby took to Congress this week to protect their interests and defend against an amendment to the Senate farm bill that would roll back the wasteful and corrupt U.S. sugar program. But in so doing, Big Sugar has used a tactic that would be more appropriately used by their pro-reform opponents. According to a Congressional Quarterly article today [$],

…the American Sugar Alliance, a trade group for the sugar industry, is taking no chances. In a statement, the group said it delivered replicas of 1940s, World War II-era sugar rationing coupons to Senate offices.

Rationing happened because the United States was dependent on foreign sugar at the time, the group said. Changes like those proposed by Toomey and Shaheen could once again lead to a flood of imported sugar and the loss of the domestic industry, said Ryan Weston, the Sugar Alliance’s chairman. [emphasis mine]

Actually, sugar is already rationed already in this country. The USDA tightly controls the domestic supply of sugar through “marketing allotments” and sugar imports through a system of tariff-rate quotas. These interventions cost American sugar consumers and sugar-using industries billions of dollars a year through higher-than-world-average sugar prices. As my colleague David Boaz blogged recently, it really is a sweet deal for the sugar growers. Nothing rational (sorry) about it.

Senators Levin and McCain: Two Peas All Up in our iPods

Earlier this year, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) announced that he will be retiring after many, many, many decades of lawmaking when his term expires in January 2015. But he doesn’t intend to make for the exits without sealing his legacy of disdain for America’s wealth creators. After holding hearings last September to shed light on the “loopholes and gimmicks” employed by U.S. multinational companies to avoid paying their “fair share” of taxes, Levin resumed his inquisition today by holding a hearing intended to publically shame one of America’s most successful and most bountiful companies:

Apple sought the Holy Grail of tax avoidance. It has created offshore entities holding tens of billions of dollars, while claiming to be tax resident nowhere. We intend to highlight that gimmick and other Apple offshore tax avoidance tactics so that American working families who pay their share of taxes understand how offshore tax loopholes raise their tax burden, add to the federal deficit and ought to be closed.

Man, the spite in those words is palpable.

At the outset, it is important to note that no illegalities have been alleged, nor have any likely been committed. Like most other U.S.-based multinational corporations, who face tax rates of 35 percent on profits repatriated from abroad, Apple has tax avoidance specialists on its payroll to figure out the most effective ways to minimize their tax burden. They’d be sued for corporate malfeasance by their shareholders if they didn’t.

Unlike foreign-based multinationals whose governments don’t tax their profits earned abroad (or do so very lightly), U.S multinationals are subject to double taxation—first in the foreign countries where they operate at local tax rates and then by the IRS, at up to 35 percent, when profits are brought home. Well guess what? That system discourages profit repatriation, depriving the economy of working capital, and it encourages elaborate, legal tax avoidance schemes.

Oddly, Senator Levin’s problem is not with these perverse incentives, but with the act of following them. Thank you, sir, may I have another! But even worse, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) acknowledges the faults and disincentives of the system, but still casts the blame on those following Congress’s incentive structure:

I have long advocated for modernizing our broken and uncompetitive tax code, but that cannot and must not be an excuse for turning a blind eye to the highly questionable tax strategies that corporations like Apple use to avoid paying taxes in America. The proper place for the bulk of Apple’s creative energy ought to go into its innovative products and services, not in its tax department.

A company that found remarkable success by harnessing American ingenuity and the opportunities afforded by the U.S. economy should not be shifting its profits overseas to avoid the payment of U.S. tax, purposefully depriving the American people of revenue. It is important to understand Apple’s byzantine tax structure so that we can effectively close the loopholes utilized by many U.S. multinational companies, particularly in this era of sequestration.

Apple’s byzantine tax structure?

Should Apple be blamed for optimizing according to the legal incentives created by the likes of Senators Levin and McCain? Rather, the public would be better served if Senators Levin and McCain were hauled before a public panel to explain why the tax system they helped create and have failed to reform penalizes U.S. companies, and discourages domestic reinvestment.

No Time for Mercantilist Posturing in Transatlantic Trade Talks

Pitched as a cure for Europe’s woes, salvation for the multilateral trading system, and the last best chance to restrain the Chinese juggernaut, the stakes are high for the upcoming Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. Of course the primary objective of the TTIP is to reduce nagging impediments to commerce between the United States and the European Union. But success is far from a sure bet.

Given the numerous bilateral trade frictions that have eluded resolution for many years, the goal of a “comprehensive” agreement by the end of 2014 – the current target – is simply not credible. Success would require negotiators to lay down their calculators and spreadsheets, disavow the “exports good, imports bad” mantra of mercantilist doctrine on which they were raised, and act on behalf of their citizens instead of their domestic producer lobbies.

That outcome would be too good to be true, but there may be a certain genius to the tight timeframe: it will demand that negotiators forego excessive posturing and will limit the potential for ever-shifting political calculations to subvert progress. Regardless, success can only take the form of a less comprehensive agreement or, perhaps, a two-phased agreement where the first phase meets the 2014 deadline by achieving accord on relatively agreeable matters, while the tougher issues are relegated to a later train.

A recent paper co-published by the Atlantic Council and the Bertelsmann Foundation presented the results of a survey of American and European trade policy experts about the prospects for a successful TTIP agreement. More than half thought the negotiations would produce a “moderate agreement,” and most thought the agreement would take effect by the end of 2015 or 2016.

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