Topic: Tax and Budget Policy

Raise Minimum Wage, Kill Jobs

During his State of the Union address, President Obama announced that he intended to raise minimum wages to $10.10/hour for certain workers. Based on data from EU countries, it is clear that minimum wage laws kill jobs. I concluded that hiking the minimum wage will kill jobs in the U.S., too. Executives surveyed in the Duke University/CFO Magazine Global Business Outlook Survey agree.

Chief Financial Officers from around the world were interviewed and the majority of them concurred: a minimum wage increase from $7.25/hour to $10.10/hour would kill a significant number of jobs.

Here’s what the CFOs had to say:

Sweden, Spending Restraint, and the Benefits of Obeying Fiscal Policy’s Golden Rule

When I first started working on fiscal policy in the 1980s, I never thought I would consider Sweden any sort of role model.

It was the quintessential cradle-to-grave welfare state, much loved on the left as an example for America to follow.

But Sweden suffered a severe economic shock in the early 1990s and policy makers were forced to rethink big government.

They’ve since implemented some positive reforms in the area of fiscal policy, along with other changes to liberalize the economy.

I’m particularly impressed that Swedish leaders imposed some genuine fiscal restraint.

Here’s a chart, based on IMF data, showing that the country enjoyed a nine-year period where the burden of government spending grew by an average of 1.9 percent per year.

Swedish Fiscal Restraint

From a libertarian perspective, that’s obviously not very impressive, particularly since the public sector was consuming about two-thirds of economic output at the start of the period.

But by the standards of European politicians, 1.9 percent annual growth was relatively frugal.

And since Mitchell’s Golden Rule merely requires that government grow slower than the private sector, Sweden did make progress.

Real progress. It turns out that a little bit of spending discipline can pay big dividends if it can be sustained for a few years.

This second chart shows that the overall burden of the public sector (left axis) fell dramatically, dropping from more than 67 percent of GDP to 52 percent of economic output.

Swedish Spending+Deficit as % of GDP

By the way, the biggest amount of progress occurred between 1994 and 1998, when spending grew by just 0.27 percent per year. That’s almost as good as what Germany achieved over a four-year period last decade.

American Society as Chessboard

One of my favorite Adam Smith passages is:

The man of system … seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board. He does not consider that the pieces upon the chess-board have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but that, in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might chuse to impress upon it.

Today, the men and women of system in the nation’s capital have a high regard for their ability to arrange the chess pieces of American society. There are 318 million individuals, 28 million businesses, 50 state governments, 89,000 local governments, and countless churches, charities, and other organizations in this great nation. Congress passes laws to intervene in the affairs of all of these people and groups, trying to impress its design.

But federal policymakers usually ignore, or fail to understand, the principles of motion in society. They impose minimum wages and health laws, and businesses cut hiring. They subsidize water, which exacerbates droughts. They subsidize flood insurance, which increases the damage from floods. They impose the world’s highest corporate tax rate, and they are shocked when corporations shift their profits abroad.

Federal attempts to arrange state government policies bring surprises as well. Federal policymakers offer matching grants for Medicaid, and are surprised that it prompts rapid state spending growth and dubious schemes to boost payments. Federal policymakers provide state aid for schools, but states probably just substitute added federal funding for their own.

The latest lesson on society’s principles of motion regards food stamp aid. From the Washington Post:

Congress last month passed a revamp of agriculture and food policy that was supposed to save the U.S. government $8.6 billion in food-stamp costs over a decade. That may not happen, though, now that some states are finding a way to avoid the cuts.

New York, Connecticut and Pennsylvania are triggering extra nutrition spending by adding money to a home-heating subsidy tied to increased food-stamp aid. The move feeds needy families while thwarting spending-reduction goals … If more follow, the federal government would have to spend much of the $8.6 billion it planned to save, as states reduce spending on other programs to meet the new mandate.

“These federal cuts have made it harder for our state’s most vulnerable residents to put food on the table. The state has intervened on behalf of these low-income New Yorkers,” Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo (D) said in a statement Feb 25. “New York is stepping up to help families in need.”

How Much Tax Revenue from Legalized Marijuana?

Some marijuana legalizers push the argument that legalization will generate additional tax revenue. Opinions differ widely, however, on exactly how much revenue.

In mid-February, Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper predicted that the taxes, licenses, and fees on medical-plus-recreational marijuana would generate $134 million for the fiscal year starting in July.

In my 2010 Cato White Paper, I predicted that full legalization (federal and state) would generate roughly $55-60 million per year for Colorado.

Now just released data from Colorado for January, the first month of fully legal marijuana sales, show about $2 million from recreational marijuana and about $3.5 million for medical-plus-recreational marijuana.  The latter figure implies annual revenues of about $42 million.

This January figure may turn out to be misleading.  On one hand, the industry could grow over time, boosting revenues. On the other hand, initial hoopla over legalization may have inflated January sales.  And, longer term, sales in Colorado could decline if other states legalize or medicalize.

If the lower revenue numbers persist, does that weaken the case for legalization?

No: Increased tax revenue was never the main reason for legalization. Instead, the crucial goals of legalization are greater freedom for marijuana users and elimination of prohibition’s unintended consequences (crime, corruption, poor quality control, diminished civil liberties, restrictions on medical uses, and expenditure on enforcement).

Collecting revenue on legalized marijuana is perfectly sensible; it allows lower tax rates on everything else. But this appears to be a small effect, and it is not the main benefit of legalization in any case.

A Fiscal Lesson from Germany

Germany isn’t exactly a fiscal role model.

Tax rates are too onerous and government spending consumes about 44 percent of economic output.

That’s even higher than it is in the United States, where politicians at the federal, state, and local levels divert about 39 percent of GDP into the public sector.

Germany also has too much red tape and government intervention, which helps to explain why it lags other European nations such as Denmark and Estonia in the Economic Freedom of the World rankings.

But I have (sort of) defended Germany a couple of times, at least on fiscal policy, explaining that the Germans didn’t squander much money on Keynesian spending schemes during the downturn and also explaining that Paul Krugman was wrong in his column on Germany and austerity.

Today, though, I’m going to give Germany some unambiguous praise.

If you look at last decade’s fiscal data, you’ll see that our Teutonic friends actually followed my Golden Rule on fiscal policy for a four-year period.

Here’s a chart, based on IMF numbers, showing total government spending in Germany from 2003-2007. As you can see, German policy makers basically froze spending.

German Fiscal Restraint

I realize that I’m a libertarian and that I shouldn’t be happy unless the burden of spending is being dramatically reduced, but we’re talking about the performance of European politicians, so I’m grading on a curve.

By that standard, limiting spending so it grows by an average of 0.18 percent is rather impressive. Interestingly, this period of fiscal discipline began when the Social Democrats were in power.

And because the economy’s productive sector was growing at a faster rate during this time, a bit more than 2 percent annually, the relative burden of government spending did fall.

The red line in this next chart shows that the public sector, measured as a share of economic output, fell from almost 49 percent of GDP to less than 44 percent of GDP.

German Spending+Deficit as % of GDP

It’s also worth noting that this four-year period of spending restraint also led to a balanced budget, as shown by the blue line.

In other words, by addressing the underlying problem of too much government, the German government automatically dealt with the symptom of red ink.

That’s the good news.

The bad news is that the German government wasn’t willing to sustain this modest degree of fiscal discipline. The Christian Democrats, who took office in mid-2005, allowed faster spending growth beginning in 2008. As I noted above, the budget increases haven’t been huge, but there’s been enough additional spending that Germany no longer is complying with the Golden Rule and the burden of the public sector is stuck at about 44 percent of GDP.

The moral of the story is that Germany shows that good things happen when spending is restrained, but long-run good performance requires long-run spending discipline.

That’s why I’m a fan of Switzerland’s spending cap. It’s called the “debt brake,” but it basically requires politicians to limit spending so that the budget doesn’t grow much faster than inflation plus population.

And that’s why Switzerland has enjoyed more than a decade of good policy.

To see other examples of nations that have enjoyed fiscal success with period of spending restrain, watch this video.

The Canadian example is particularly impressive.

Tax Reform Error #2: Phasing-in Lower Tax Rates

Since 1981, Republican legislators have shown a strong penchant for phasing-in tax rate reductions over several years.  That tradition is maintained in Ways and Means Committee Chair Dave Camp’s proposed 979-page “simplification” of the U.S. tax system.  The Camp draft retains a very high top tax rate of 38.8 percent on businesses that file under the individual income tax as partnerships, proprietorships, LLCs or Subchapter S corporations. For those choosing to file as C-corporations, by contrast, the Camp proposal would gradually reduce the corporate tax rate by two percentage points a year over five years, eventually reducing it from 35 to 25 percent. 

The trouble with phasing-in lower tax rates is that it creates an incentive to postpone efforts and investments until later, when tax rates will be lower.  Reducing the corporate tax rate by two percentage points a year would create an incentive to repeatedly delay reported profits, year after year, holding back the economy and tax receipts.  Sensible tax planners would write-off expenses soon as possible, including interest expenses, but defer investment until future years when the tax rate would be reduced on any resulting added earnings.  

Meanwhile, the widening gap between corporate and noncorporate tax rates (a difference of 13.8 percentage points after five years) would encourage many small businesses, farms and professionals to set up C-corporations to shelter retained earnings.  Owners of closely-held private corporations can defer double taxation indefinitely by not paying dividends and taking most compensation in the form of tax-free corporate perks. Many enterprises contemplating the new incentive to shift income from individual to corporate tax forms after five years would postpone expansion plans until after they made that switch, further depressing the economy and tax receipts.

The Republican Party’s proclivity for phased-in tax cuts may have originated with former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan.  In his January 25, 2001 testimony before the Senate Budget committee, Chairman Greenspan said, “In recognition of the uncertainties in the economic and budget outlook, it is important that any long-term tax plan … be phased in.”  That was the same advice he gave in January 1981 when Greenspan and I served on President Reagan’s transition team.  Unfortunately, his advice to phase-in lower tax rates was followed both times, with disastrous results.

During the deep recession from July 1981 to November 1982, Congress opted to postpone most tax relief until the 1983-84 tax years.  Individual tax rates were ostensibly reduced by 5 percent in October 1981, but with only three months left in the year that meant just 1.25 percent.   Rates were again reduced by 10 percent in July of 1982, but that applied to only half of that year’s income.  Meanwhile, bracket creep from high inflation kept pushing people into higher tax brackets (until indexing took effect in 1985), negating much of the intended effect.  The final 10 percent reduction in July 1983 was not fully effective until calendar year 1984. 

Oddly enough, the painful blunder of phasing-in the Reagan tax cuts after a recession was repeated by the Bush administration in March 2001, three months after the economy slipped into recession.  Aside from the fiscal frivolity of adding a 10 percent tax bracket on the first $12,000 of income (cutting taxes $300-600 at all incomes), reductions in the four highest tax rates were originally scheduled to be very gradually phased-in by 2006.  Congress later came to its senses in May 2003 and reduced marginal tax rates. Yet substantial damage was already done.   University of Michigan economists Christopher House and Matthew Shapiro found, “The phased-in nature [of lower tax rates] contributed to the slow recovery from the 2001 recession, while the elimination of the phase-in helped explain the increase in economic activity in 2003.” The harmful impact of the phase-in was confirmed by Cornell University economist Karel Mertens and Morton Ravin of University College London. 

Mertens and Ravin also found that lower corporate tax rates do not reduce U.S. tax revenues, partly because lower tax rates increase domestic investment while reducing tax incentives to take on excess debt.  The Camp plan to phase-in a 25 percent corporate tax rate over many years would be as unnecessary as it would be counterproductive.  Most other countries reduced their corporate tax rates to 25 percent or less long ago – creating marginal effective rates on new investment that are commonly less than half the U.S. level – with clearly beneficial effects on their economies and tax receipts.  

The important, unlearned lesson of 1981 and 2001 is that phased-in reductions in marginal tax rates can make things worse before they make things better.

An uncompetitive U.S. corporate tax rate fosters excessive tax-deductible debt and gives a big cost advantage to foreign enterprises.  There is nothing to be gained, and much to be lost, by improving the U.S. tax climate slowly rather than quickly.

Tax Reform Error #1: Confusing Tax Expenditures with Revenues

House Ways and Means Chairman Dave Camp has released a complex 182-page “discussion draft” called The Tax Reform Act of 2014. Rather get bogged down in details, I will take this opportunity to review several fundamental errors that repeatedly plagued most past and present efforts to reform the federal income tax, including the Camp proposal.

One of the most pernicious errors among would-be tax reformers is to assume that, as the Tax Policy Center asserts, “tax expenditures are revenue losses” attributable to various “loopholes.” On the contrary, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) clearly states that the estimated dollar value of any “tax expenditure … is not the same as a revenue estimate for the repeal of the tax expenditure provision.” As the JCT explains, “unlike revenue estimates, tax expenditure calculations do not incorporate the effects of the behavioral changes that are anticipated to occur in response to the repeal of a tax expenditure provision…. Taxpayer behavior is assumed to remain unchanged for tax expenditure estimate purposes … to simplify the calculation.”

One glaring difference between revenue estimates and tax expenditure estimates involves taxation of capital gains if those gains are realized by selling assets from a taxable account (unlike IRAs or most home sales). Estimated tax expenditures from not taxing realized capital gains at the top income tax rate of 43.4 percent is listed as a big revenue-losing tax expenditure, even though Treasury, the JCT and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) revenue estimates would rightly predict that the behavioral response to such a high tax would crush asset sales and thus lose revenue. 

Mainly because the artificially estimated “tax expenditure” from a lower capital gains tax is wrongly equated with estimated revenues, the Simpson-Bowles plan hopes to raise an extra $585 billion over ten years. In reality, investors realize fewer gains when the tax rate goes up, so the higher tax on fewer transactions means revenues fall rather than rise.