Topic: Regulatory Studies

Why Bank Stocks Rose on Bernanke’s Remarks

In a CNBC spot with Steve Liesman & Erin Burnett, I tried to explain why investors in bank stocks had good reason to be pleased with part of Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s speech.  Judging by the response of Steve and Erin, and others on CNBC over the following day,  I must not have been persuasive.

For clarification, I am quoting the exact language from Bernanke’s talk, with my emphasis added.

My main point is that Bernanke admitted that when it comes to the “financial crisis” of some big banks, this is largely an artifact of unduly harsh regulation being applied at the worst possible time:

There is some evidence that capital standards, accounting rules, and other regulations have made the financial sector excessively procyclical–that is, they lead financial institutions to ease credit in booms and tighten credit in downturns more than is justified by changes in the creditworthiness of borrowers, thereby intensifying cyclical changes.

For example, capital regulations require that banks’ capital ratios meet or exceed fixed minimum standards for the bank to be considered safe and sound by regulators. Because banks typically find raising capital to be difficult in economic downturns or periods of financial stress, their best means of boosting their regulatory capital ratios during difficult periods may be to reduce new lending, perhaps more so than is justified by the credit environment. We should review capital regulations to ensure that they are appropriately forward-looking…

Bernanke emphasized the regulators’ dangerous habit of raising capital requirements and loan loss reserves simply because of a strict mark-to-market misinterpretation of the “fair value” of mortgage-backed securities.

He noted that:

Determining appropriate valuation methods for illiquid or idiosyncratic assets can be very difficult, to put it mildly. Similarly, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the appropriate levels of loan loss reserves over the cycle. As a result, further review of accounting standards governing valuation and loss provisioning would be useful, and might result in modifications to the accounting rules that reduce their procyclical effects without compromising the goals of disclosure and transparency.

The key here is Bernanke’s criticism of the rigid use of Basel capital standards, not mark-to-market information per se (which would be harmless if it did not trigger foolish regulations). When combined with Barney Frank’s similar comments on the same day, it begins to look as though sensible economics might finally take priority over dubious bookkeeping.

Regulations vs. Rate Cuts

A set of stories in International Tax Review today illustrate the backwards nature of U.S. corporate tax policy. The first story discusses the high-profile chest-thumping in Washington over corporate “tax haven abuse.” The congressional response to greater international tax competition is to load even more regulations on American businesses.

The second story is entitled “Taiwan Slashes Corporate Tax Rate”:

Taiwan’s government has approved plans to cut the country’s corporate tax rate from 25% to 20%. Ministers hope the cut will encourage investment in the country and stimulate growth in the economy…

America is in the worst recession in decades and it desperately needs to cut its 40 percent corporate tax rate to reinvigorate business investment. Why are U.S. policymakers so clueless about the most obvious way to spur investment when that policy imperative is clear to leaders just about everywhere else?

New Podcast: ‘War on Drugs, War on Guns’

Attorney General Eric Holder said recently that in order to quell the violence spilling over from the drug war in Mexico he will push to reinstate the ban on “assault weapons” in the United States.

But, says Legal Policy Analyst David Rittgers in today’s Cato Daily Podcast, a policy like that won’t do much to quell violence.

The [drug] cartels have access to lots and lots of money because of our prohibitionist policies in the US. And because of this money they can get these weapons whether we have them legal or illegal…and they’ll have access to the black market to get fully automatic machine guns if they want them.

… If you like the war on drugs, you’re going to love the war on guns.

‘Real Regulators’ Redux

Sunday’s episode of 60 Minutes featured a man named Harry Markopolos who repeatedly reported Bernie Madoff’s scam to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC did not investigate.

Steve Croft: How many times did you send material to the SEC?

Markopolos: May 2000. October 2001. October, November, and December of 2005. Then again, June 2007. And finally, April 2008. So, five separate SEC submissions.

Croft: And in spite of all of the things that you did, it still ended up in disaster.

This is a reminder of what I observed in a recent post here called “A Real Regulator.” CNBC’s Erin Burnett had called for a “real” regulator in the wake of Madoff, to which I replied:

When regulators fail to address a problem ahead of time, when they regulate inefficiently, when they hand their rulemaking organs to the industries they are supposed to oversee, those are all the actions of real regulators. That’s what you get with real regulation.

Markopolos isn’t grinding this same ax against goverment regulation. He says, “… [S]elf-regulation on Wall Street doesn’t work.”

So the question is posed: What allowed this to happen?

I don’t think this huge fraud occured in a “self-regulatory” environment. It occured in a regulated environment. Regulators failed to do their jobs, but investors had abandoned their responsibility to look into the people and firms with which they placed their money. They believed that the SEC was taking care of that.

It wasn’t, so nobody was minding the store. Ultimately, the SEC served as a partner to the crime, providing the “confidence” that made a success of Bernie Madoff’s confidence game.

Back to Markopolos:

That’s typically how the SEC does it. They come in after the crime has been committed, they toe-tag the victims, count the bodies, and try to figure out who the crooks were, after the fact, which does none of us any good.

Is “self-regulation” the alternative to government regulation? No. And neither is deregulation. The alternative is market regualtion, where individuals, responsible for the soundness of their purchases and investments, investigate and study who they do business with. Scams like Madoff’s would have shorter duration and do less damage if investors were not under the impression that they were protected by government regulators. Of course, our policymakers are likely to double-down on the bet on governmental regulation, even though we all just witnessed its failure.

The Foreclosure Five Dominate Case-Shiller Price Indexes

A CNNMoney.com report, “Home prices in record drop,” posted a scary map labeled “Falling Homes Sales.” But it actually shows falling home prices. Within the S&P Case-Shiller sample of 20 metropolitan areas, the steepest drop in prices (not sales) were in Phoenix, Las Vegas, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Tampa and Detroit.

All 7 of those metropolitan areas (7 out of 20 in that index) lie within 5 states with by far the worst mortgage problems, as shown in my February 21 article, “The Foreclosure Five.” Yet I also showed that states with the steepest price declines also have had huge increases in home sales, which makes the label on the CNNMoney map doubly misleading.

My article used third quarter house prices because fourth quarter figures were not yet available. That turns out to make even less difference than I expected.

The fourth quarter Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) figures show home prices down 21.8% for the year in Nevada, 20.5% in California, 15.2% in Arizona, 19.5% in Florida, and 11.8% in Michigan. Prices were down 3.7% in the median state, North Carolina, but up 21.6% over five years. That means prices fell by less than 3.7% last year in 24 states— including a half dozen states with home prices up a bit, and New York with only a 3.3% decline.

CNNMoney says, “The decline does not seem to be slowing - just the opposite. The average home price dropped 2.5% between November and December in the 20 top metro areas.” The FHFA data for all 50 states, by contrast, show a small 0.1% increase in home prices between November and December.

The article goes on say, “The S&P Case-Shiller National Home Price Index reported that prices sank a record 18.2% during the last three months of 2008, compared with the same period in 2007. Case-Shiller’s index of 20 major metropolitan areas fell 18.5%, also a record.” The FHFA, by contrast, shows that prices fell just 8.2% during the last three months of 2008, or 3.7% if using a median average. Ten percentage points is quite a wide gap.

What accounts for such huge differences between Case-Shiller and federal price indexes? CNNMoney imagines it’s because “Homes purchased without financing or ones too expensive to qualify for a Fannie-Freddie loan are not counted in the FFHA (sic) statistics.” That’s more than unlikely. The inclusion of cash sales and jumbo loans (larger than $729,750 in pricey area) can’t possibly explain why price declines in the Case-Shiller index look so much more dramatic those in the OFHEO/FHFA index.

The real reason is simple: Case-Shiller indexes are hugely dominated by the Foreclosure Five. In the Case-Shiller index of only 20 “top” metro areas, the Foreclosure Five account for 41.2% of that value-weighted index with California alone accounting for 27.4%.

The “national” Case-Shiller index totally excludes 13 states, such as Indiana and South Carolina, and samples only a fraction of many others. The Foreclosure Five account for 28.3% of that “national” index, with California amounting to 17.1%.

As is true of nearly all reprorting about foreclosures, underwater mortgages and falling house prices, what the Case-Shiller price index really shows is that many people are confusing what has been happening in the Foreclosure Five with what has been happening in the nation as a whole.

Toxic TARP: Mr. Geithner’s Takeover Targets

A front-page story in the February 23 Wall Street Journal describes a plan to let the government convert its preferred shares in Citigroup to common stock, taking 25-40% ownership.

It could be worse.  A brilliant February 19 Journal report by Peter Eavis warned that “Government capital injections sit like ill-disguised Trojan horses in the nation’s largest banks,” showing that under Treasury Secretary Geithner’s socialist scheming the government could seize 74% of Citigroup and 66% of Bank of America. Meanwhile, most other reporters kept claiming bank stocks collapsed simply because Geithner had left out a few details.  On the contrary, he said too much, not too little.

The newer Journal report says, “When federal officials began pumping capital into U.S. banks last October, few experts would have predicted that the government would soon be wrestling with the possibility of taking voting control of large financial institutions… . Citigroup’s low share price already reflects, at least in part, a fear among shareholders that their stakes might be further diluted. A government move to take a big stake could backfire, potentially spurring investors to flee other banks, even healthier ones [emphais added].”

Why is any of this a surprise?  Even before the scary “capital purchase program” was unveiled, I wrote in the October 20, 2008 issue of National Review that, “Conservative legislators who expressed fear about letting the Treasury buy mortgage-backed bonds were strangely enthusiastic about inviting the Treasury to acquire equity in companies.  Critics of derivatives became enthusiasts for warrants … which would give the Treasury secretary virtually unlimited power to confiscate the wealth of stockholders of any company foolhardy enough to play this game.” 

More recently, in a February 11 New York Post piece (subtly titled “A Plan to Kill Banks”) I explained that, “Once a bank or insurance company gets in bed with the government, the property rights of that company’s stockholders become uniquely insecure. When the government jumps into the cockpit, smart stockholders bail out.  And depressed stock prices deflate the banks’ capital cushion.”

If “few experts” predicted these consequences of Treasury purchases of bank preferred shares and warrants, then why are they called experts?

Europeans Want Regulatory Harmonization at G20 Summit

Reuters has a very disturbing article about the wish list that Europeans have put together for the April G20 Summit in London. Rather than focus on the source of the financial crisis by calling for sound money and elimination of housing subsidies, the Europeans want to dramatically increase the size and power of international bureaucracies such as the International Monetary Fund. But if the IMF completely failed to predict the financial crisis, why would anyone think the bureaucrats should get more power and more tax dollars? Not surprisingly, the Europeans also want regulatory harmonization, with every jurisdiction required to impose onerous levels of red tape. Apparently, the private sector needs to be punished to atone for the mistakes of governments. Not surprisingly, the Europeans also want to regulate private-sector pay. But the most dangerous plank in their platform is the call for sanctions against jurisdictions that reject the regulatory cartel and instead maintain market-based financial systems. This panoply of bad ideas is a direct threat to American interests, so it will be interesting to see whether the U.S. delegation acquiesces to these bad ideas:

European leaders met in Berlin on Sunday to prepare a common stance on overhauling global financial rules ahead of a broader summit of G20 nations in London on April 2. Below are highlights from a “chair’s summary” of conclusions from the meeting that was seen by Reuters: …We propose that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) be charged with monitoring and promoting the implementation of the international recommendations on putting the Action Plan into practice. We have today underscored once again our conviction that all financial markets, products and participants must be subject to appropriate oversight or regulation, without exception and regardless of their country of domicile. This is especially true for those private pools of capital, including hedge funds… We also agreed that credit rating agencies should be subject to mandatory registration and oversight. …A list of uncooperative jurisdictions and a toolbox of sanctions must be devised as soon as possible. …We will strongly advocate (at the London summit)…the development of an effective early warning system by the IMF and FSF, working in close cooperation. We will strongly advocate (at the London summit)…the adoption of principles on compensation practices to prevent bonus payments that contribute to excessive risk-taking. …We have agreed today to support doubling the funds available to the IMF.