Topic: Regulatory Studies

The Myth of a Manufacturing Renaissance

By
Daniel J. Ikenson

Have you heard all the banter about a U.S. manufacturing renaissance? Numerous media reports in recent months have breathlessly described a return of manufacturing investment from foreign shores, mostly attributing the trend to rising wages in China and the natural gas boom in the United States, both of which have rendered manufacturing state-side more competitive. Today’s Washington Post includes a whole feature section titled “U.S. Manufacturing: A Special Report,” devoted entirely to the proposition that the manufacturing sector is back!

The myth of manufacturing decline begets the myth of manufacturing renaissance. This new mantra raises a question: How can there be a manufacturing renaissance if there was never a manufacturing “Dark Ages”?

Contrary to countless tales of its demise, U.S. manufacturing has always been strong relative to its own past and relative to other countries’ manufacturing sectors. With the exception of a handful of post-WWII recession years, U.S. manufacturing has achieved new records, year after year, with respect to output, value-added, revenues, return on investment, exports, imports, profits (usually), and numerous other metrics appropriate for evaluating the performance of the sector. The notion of U.S. manufacturing decline is simply one of the most pervasive economic myths of our time, sold to you by those who might benefit from manufacturing-friendly industrial policies with the abiding assistance of a media that sometimes struggles to distill fact from K Street speak.

The myth of U.S. manufacturing decline has long been advanced by policymakers and interested parties as a predicate for industrial policy or trade barriers.  “Because U.S. manufacturing has fallen behind,” the argument goes, “we need to match the efforts of other governments in supporting our factories,” or “because U.S. manufacturing has been hobbled by predatory foreigners we need to erect tariffs to level the playing field,” or “because our industrial base is in ruins, U.S. national security is threatened without subsidies to rebuild manufacturing.”

The assertion that “U.S. manufacturing is in decline” is usually presented as holy writ, without allowance for examination or dissent, before those dubious policy solutions are pitched as our only salvation. Fortunately, the more open-minded and genuinely inquisitive insist upon closely evaluating premises before considering the “therefore-we-musts.” 

As the nearby chart confirms, U.S. manufacturing value-added (the metric most comparable to GDP, which equals the value of manufactured output minus the cost of intermediate goods), in both nominal and real terms, has been trending upward since the end of the World War II. Nominal manufacturing value-added declined on a year-to-year basis only eight times in the past 64 years. Manufacturing value-added took a hit during the Great Recession, as did the rest of the economy, but it plainly defies the data to suggest that U.S. manufacturing is – or has been at anytime – in decline.

As a share of the U.S. economy (the green bars on the chart), manufacturing has declined from a 1953 peak of 28 percent to 11.5 percent in 2011. But that is testament to the growth of U.S. services sectors, not to a decline in manufacturing, which (as you see) has been growing nearly continuously in absolute terms.

Yet some insist that these particular figures don’t tell the real story, which can be found in the manufacturing employment figures. Ah, well. Manufacturing employment has certainly been on a downward trajectory for three decades, after peaking at 19.4 million workers in 1979. Despite increases of about 500,000 workers over the past couple of years, manufacturing employment stands at about 11.8 million today. But manufacturing employment is not a barometer of the health of the sector. If the objective of economics is to make the best use of scarce resources, U.S. manufacturing – with its historic productivity gains in recent decades – has done an excellent job. It is not a reflection of manufacturing weakness that those scarce resources (apparently not so scarce) have not been redeployed elsewhere in the economy. Nevertheless, most of the “manufacturing-in-decline” narrative is the result of conflating the meanings of manufacturing value-added and manufacturing employment.

What the media are today characterizing as a manufacturing renaissance is better understood as a surge. Things aren’t being turned around; they are accelerating in the same direction.

Plenty of manufacturing and manufacturing-related activities have been occurring and growing in the United States for several years. Rising wages in China and the domestic gas boom change the mix of relatively viable manufacturing activities, but they are just two of dozens of considerations that factor into thousands upon thousands of decisions about where to develop, test, manufacture, assemble, package, sell, and perform every other function in a products supply chain from its conception to its consumption. A confluence of considerations from worker skills, total labor costs, degree of risk aversion, desire to produce within a tariff wall, interest in influencing political decisions, infrastructure quality, proximity to lucrative markets, proximity to supply chain locations, the stability of the political and business climates, corruption, the rule of law, access to capital, taxes, regulations, and dozens more all factor into the ultimate decision about where to perform a specific manufacturing activity.

The implication that the shrinking disparity in U.S. and Chinese wages or the growing disparity between U.S. and world natural gas prices recently have surpassed magic benchmarks that will open the flood gates to foreign and returning domestic investment is an oversimplification that erroneously homogenizes manufacturing. In fact, the sector is diverse in its requirements, and thus in the weighting of factors that affect its location decisions. Every business – even in the same industry – considers different factors and weights them differently.

What matters, though, is that direct investment in the U.S. economy – whether from foreign or domestic companies – is something to celebrate. Attracting investment in manufacturing and in other sectors is essential for economic growth. Unlike previous decades when the United States was easily the destination of choice for direct investment, nowadays there is much greater competition, particularly from emerging economies. In fact, the U.S. share of the world’s foreign direct investment stock has dropped significantly from 41 percent in 1999 to 17 percent in 2011.

So rather than observe the migration of some activities back to the United States and assume that a trend is in the making, a better use of the media’s resources would be to take inventory of the factors that encourage direct investment in the United States and spotlight for the public how U.S. policies can encourage, and not deter, an investment renaissance in United States.

Topics: 
Regulatory Studies, Trade and Immigration

The Constitution Protects Even Old-Timey Property Rights

By
Ilya Shapiro and Trevor Burrus

In the 19th Century, when railroads were being built across the West, the federal government granted significant land and benefits to the railroad companies. The Great Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 allowed the government to give railroad companies easements to build tracks — that is, a right to use sections of another’s property without legally owning it. The Brandt family eventually acquired land in Wyoming that came with pre-existing railroad easements.

In 2001, the owner of the easement formally abandoned all claims to it, presumably returning the property to the Brandts. But the government wanted that land. In 2006, it sued for title to the former easement land on the theory that the government retained a residual claim to it after the railroad abandoned it. The Brandts argue that the government has no such right and that taking their land requires just compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.

Although this may seem like a small, unique problem, the scope of the Old West’s railway system was huge and those old easements criss-cross the land of thousands of property owners. In 1983, Congress amended the National Trails System Act to allow the government to take abandoned railroad easements and turn them into land for public recreation and “railroad banking.” Landowners have been fighting the taking of their property under the Trails Act ever since, claiming, as here, that the government’s original grant to the railroads contained no residual right of possession for the government.

Indeed, two federal courts of appeals, the Seventh and Federal Circuits, have held that the government didn’t retain any residuary rights. In the Brandts’ case, however, the Tenth Circuit held otherwise. This circuit split is untenable. Over 5,000 miles of abandoned track has been taken by the government since the Trails Act, and about 10,000 property owners are currently fighting in federal courts to hold onto their property.

Of course, given the possible benefits of not having to pay compensation to landowners, the government has responded to these claims by being aggressively litigious, reaching into its endless war-chest of taxpayer-provided resources to challenge the landowners on every tiny point. As the Federal Circuit said, the government’s behavior is “puzzling” in that it is “foregoing the opportunity to minimize the waste both of its own and plaintiffs’ litigation resources, not to mention that of scarce judicial resources,” but also by advancing arguments “so thin as to border on the frivolous.”

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Topics: 
Law and Civil Liberties, Regulatory Studies

Brown-Vitter: More Hot Air

By
Louise C. Bennetts

Today’s New York Times article by Senators Brown and Vitter (the preview of their much-touted “bank break-up” bill) starts with a very encouraging line: “governments shouldn’t pick economic winners and losers.”

Senator Brown, in particular, seems to have learned this important lesson fairly recently (auto bailout, anyone?). But putting this aside (and also ignoring the ongoing debate about the purported subsidy to large banking organizations, which should be eliminated, if it indeed exists), Senators Brown and Vitter display some disturbing, though not uncommon, misconceptions about U.S. and global banking. And, as is always the case, poorly understood and inaccurate facts create bad policy suggestions.

The first problem is the implicit assumption that large size and diversity of operations are negative traits. In fact, diversity is the key to managing risk in banking. Part of the reason why US banking has had such a checkered history relative to many other countries is because of its historical lack of geographical and product diversity – a result of the long-standing prohibitions on inter-state banking and branch banking and limitations on combining investment and commercial banking activities. One of the single biggest causes of the banking crisis in the late 1920s was a lack of geographical diversity (and, as congressional records show, States that prohibited branch banking fared the worst). Similarly, one of the primary causes of the 2008 financial crisis was a lack of asset diversity - too many banks holding too many securitized sub-prime mortgages.

Second, is the implicit assumption that investment banking and underwriting activity are inherently more risky than loan activities. Certainly, imprudent investment banking can be disastrous. So can making risky loans. And the 2008 crisis was, at its core, a loan origination problem (a fact largely ignored by Congress because of the uncomfortable questions it raises about the two GSE’s - Fannie and Freddie).

Third, is the belief that the 2008 bank bailouts were somehow linked to the FDIC deposit insurance scheme and that if we ‘narrow’ the safety net, all future bailouts will be avoided. I am no fan of federal deposit insurance, but the bailouts were unrelated to it. TARP was a Treasury creation, passed by Members of Congress under extraordinary circumstances. The only way to ensure it doesn’t happen in future is to rein in Congress and limit their ability to (in the words of Brown and Vitter) “pick economic winners and losers”.

As it turns out, the Brown-Vitter Bill is less about bank ‘break-up’ and more a U.S. variant of the FSB’s G-SIFI surcharge – which raises the question why it is necessary at all, except to put the U.S.’s global banks at a disadvantage, even though they are already disproportionately affected by the surcharge. Brown and Vitter’s calls for higher capital requirements are not objectionable per se, but as the ongoing problems with the Basel Accord shows, the devil is always in the details. And if you get it wrong, you risk creating exactly the systemic problems – such as an excessive reliance on sovereign bonds or mortgage-backed securities – that you were trying to avoid.

Essentially, the only way to end the perception of a government backstop is to put in place a credible system to allow large firms to fail if they make poor decisions. To this end, the Brown-Vitter Bill doesn’t add anything except more confusion.

Topics: 
Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy, Regulatory Studies

International Trade in Online Medical Services

By
Simon Lester

The hard-working Cato interns pointed me to this article discussing a constitutional challenge to restrictions on the online provision of veterinary services:

A retired Texas veterinarian has filed a federal lawsuit challenging state regulations that bar him from evaluating animals and giving veterinary advice over the Internet.

Since 2002, Ronald Hines, 69, of Brownsville, Tex., has used his website to provide veterinary advice—sometimes for free and sometimes for a flat $58 fee. Sometimes his clients are overseas with limited access to veterinary services. He gets lots of questions from people who find wounded birds and want to nurse them to health. Over the course of his career, he developed an expertise with monkeys, and said he still gets a lot of monkey questions.

…

Last month, the Texas veterinary board suspended Hines’ license for a year after finding that his Internet practice violates state laws. Texas regulations require a vet to establish a “veterinarian-client-patient relationship,” and they explicitly state that such a relationship cannot be established solely through the telephone or Internet.

Hines’ lawyers at the Arlington, Va.-based Institute for Justice say the rule infringes on their client’s free-speech rights and is an unreasonable restriction on the profession.

Jeff Rowes, an attorney with the institute, said the case could set a precedent in fields that extend well beyond veterinary medicine. He noted that telemedicine continues to be an emerging field and that regulations restricting Internet speech could affect a number of professions, including law, psychology and investment advice.

More details here, here and here.

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Topics: 
International Economics and Development, Law and Civil Liberties, Regulatory Studies

Do New Cybersecurity Restrictions Amount to Regulatory Protectionism?

By
Daniel J. Ikenson

Protectionism masquerading as regulation in the public interest is the subject of an excellent new paper by my colleagues Bill Watson and Sallie James.  As tariffs and other border barriers to trade have declined, rent-seeking domestic interests have turned increasingly to regulations with noble sounding purposes – protecting Flipper from the indiscriminating nets of tuna fishermen, fighting the tobacco industry’s efforts to entice children with grape-flavored cigarettes, keeping U.S. highways safe from recklessly-driven, dilapidated, smoke-emitting Mexican trucks, and so on – in order to reduce competition and secure artificial market advantages over you, the consumer.

The paper documents numerous examples of this “bootleggers and Baptists” phenomenon, where the causes of perhaps well-intentioned advocates of health and safety regulation were infiltrated or commandeered by domestic producer interests with more nefarious, protectionist motives, and advises policymakers to:

be skeptical of regulatory proposals backed by the target domestic industry and of proposals that lack a plausible theory of market failure. These are red flags that the proposal is the product of privilege-seeking special interests disguised as altruistic consumer advocates.

After reading this incisive paper, you might consider whether a new law restricting U.S. government purchases of Chinese-produced information technology systems in the name of cybersecurity fits the profile of regulatory protectionism.  A two paragraph section of the 574-page “Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013,” signed into law last week, prohibits federal agency purchases of IT equipment “produced, manufactured or assembled” by entities “owned, directed, or subsidized by the People’s Republic of China” unless the head of the purchasing agency consults with the FBI and determines that the purchase is “in the national interest of the United States” and then conveys that determination in writing to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.

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Topics: 
Regulatory Studies, Telecom, Internet & Information Policy, Trade and Immigration

New Cato Policy Analysis on Regulatory Protectionism

By
Sallie James

Just in time for today’s release of my and Bill Watson’s new PA, “Regulatory Protectionism: A Hidden Threat to Free Trade” comes a feature article [$] in the specialist trade (in both senses of the word) publication, Inside U.S. Trade on the likely obstacles to a U.S-EU preferential trade agreement (a recent Cato event also hosted a discussion on this topic). And, in an inadvertent PR coup for us, it focusses almost entirely on how regulations and other non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in each economy might inhibit a successful result to negotiations:  

The shifting nature of domestic policies and agricultural trade between the United States and the European Union over the last several decades means that while some traditional trade irritants are no longer present, others have been introduced that will likely prove difficult to unravel in the context of trans-Atlantic bilateral negotiations. Whereas bilateral trade irritants previously centered on export subsidies and competition in third markets for commodities like wheat, now the disagreements primarily relate to non-tariff barriers (NTBs), including divergent scientific standards, food safety regulations and other issues that are hindrances to bilateral trade… But the difficulty in negotiating these issues is that, because they ostensibly relate to consumer health and safety, governments cannot easily make “trade-offs,” as they can with tariffs. Observers believe that this is the chief reason that the talks over agriculture promise to be so difficult.

Indeed. As we discuss in our paper, tariffs and other conventional trade barriers have fallen over the years, so the barriers that remain are more regulatory in nature, and more sensitive to negotiate. What we’re essentially left with is the difficult issues. They get to the heart of national sovereignty and, on a practical level, require the participation of regulatory administrators who may have very little or no trade negotiation knowledge or experience. They also have little incentive to concede their power. Whereas trade negotiators are paid to, well, negotiate, regulators are paid to inhibit commerce. They face asymmetric rewards: a huge fuss if something goes wrong, not many kudos if they remove the reins and let commerce thrive. Under those conditions, it should be no surprise that they are risk-averse. So this trade agreement will not be easy to complete. In the meantime, though, there is much the United States can do to limit the ability of regulators to shackle the economy with burdensome—and potentially illegal—requirements that limit choice and expose American businesses to retaliatory sanctions. For example, ensure WTO obligations are taken seriously and adhered to. From our paper:  

Prior to implementing a new regulation, federal agencies should be required to evaluate the possibility that less trade-restrictive alternatives could meet regulatory goals as effectively as their preferred proposal. Also, the U.S. government should not dilute or bypass the multilateral rules of the WTO through bilateral or regional negotiations that accept managed protectionism. This paper uses a number of recent examples of protectionist regulations to show that the enemies of regulatory protectionism are transparency and vigilance. Policymakers should be skeptical of regulatory proposals backed by the target domestic industry and of proposals that lack a plausible theory of market failure.

Read the whole thing here. And if you are in D.C. or near a computer next Thursday, watch our event to launch the paper.

Topics: 
International Economics and Development, Regulatory Studies, Trade and Immigration

Laws Entrench Liquor Wholesalers At Drinking Public’s Expense

By
Walter Olson

As part of their regulation of alcohol sales, an estimated 33 states maintain so-called At Rest laws, which require that bottles spend time in an in-state warehouse before being sold to consumers. The laws limit competition, drive up prices to consumers, and make it harder to special-order less common labels. Now, as the New York Post revealed in a Sunday exclusive, New York may join the list following generous donations to Gotham politicians from an in-state wholesaler. State Sen. Jeff Klein (D-Bronx) alone got $33,000 from Empire Merchants LLC.

David Waldenberg, of BNP Distributing Co., said 180 small-and medium-sized New York distributors will hurt by the measure.

Those businesses have offices in New York that employ hundreds of people, he said, but use New Jersey storage facilities.

If their warehousing costs go up, these businesses will die and jobs will ultimately be lost, he said.

“The price of wine — it’ll go up $7 or $8 a bottle,” warned wine connoisseur and writer Jesse Nash. “The consumer is going to get nailed.”

In an (alas) still-relevant 1985 article (PDF) in Cato’s Regulation magazine, Federal Trade Commission attorney David Spiegel analyzed how anti-competitive state liquor laws exploit consumers. [adapted and expanded from Overlawyered]

Update: Tom Wark at WineInterview.com (via Michelle Minton, CEI) believes the New York bill as of this point is “going nowhere” following a vigorous campaign against it by small wholesalers who would be hurt by its provisions.

Topics: 
Regulatory Studies

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