How did Adam Smith feel about fiat money?
Here’s what McCain-Feingold did and did not do.
1. BCRA successfully prohibited most party soft money fundraising by federal officials.
So what? 527 groups took up most of the slack.
2. Parties raised as much hard money in 2006 as they had soft and hard money in 2002.
Yes, but they did not raise as much soft and hard money as they would have in 2006 if BCRA had not been passed. This had an interesting consequence…
3. BCRA cost the Democrats 20 House seats in the 2006 election.
4. BCRA made it illegal to broadcast advertising for a movie criticizing the president of the United States.
If the ads were to run 30 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election. Unless, of course, the film enjoys the media exemption.
5. BCRA criminalized attempts to get people to contact their member of Congress.
If they mention a member’s name in an ad, if it’s 30 or 60 days, you know the drill. But the Supreme Court may yet overturn this part of the law.
6. BCRA may destroy the presidential public financing system.
By raising the hard money contribution limits, thereby making it possible for presidential candidates to run outside the system. But credit must also go to the Internet for lowering the costs of fundraising.
7. BCRA enabled a majority of the Supreme Court to be cowardly in the face of a frontal assault on the First Amendment.
Did I say cowardly? I meant BCRA gave the Court the chance to show “proper deference to Congress’ ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise.”
8. BCRA did not prevent corruption.
Remember why congressional Republicans were in trouble in 2006? BCRA didn’t prevent that corruption. Nor did it punish the malefactors. The voters did.
9. BCRA did not restore confidence in government.
Yes, I know. People should not have too much confidence in government. But justices of the Supreme Court care about such things. The American National Election Studies trust in government index fell in 2004 after rising continuously from 1994 to 2002. No prizes for guessing whether it fell or rose in 2006, surely one of the worst years on record for people’s faith that their government is not corrupt. So BCRA passes in 2002 and trust in government falls thereafter.
10. BCRA made John McCain a credible candidate for the presidency.
For now, at least.
11. BCRA did not hurt the Republican party.
They did that all by themselves.
What has the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act accomplished over the last five years?
Not much. But don’t take my word for it. Mark Schmitt helped fund the struggle for BCRA as a program officer at the Open Society Institute. Now he has written a candid and thoughtful analysis that begins:
Judged by the most visible results on promises like getting big money out of politics or cleaning up politics, campaign finance reform has been, to put it mildly, a disappointment.
On March 14, The Washington Post ran an op-ed by Duke law professor Erwin Chemerinsky. I sent the following letter to the editor in response:
Prof. Erwin Chemerinsky claims [“A Well-Regulated Right to Bear Arms,” March 14] that the federal court of appeals for the D.C. Circuit “interpreted the Second Amendment as bestowing on individuals a right to have guns,” and as “creating a right for individuals to have firearms.” Yet the court took great pains to explain that the amendment neither creates nor bestows the right to keep and bear arms. According to the court, “The wording of the [amendment] indicates that the right to keep and bear arms was not created by government, but rather preserved by it,” and that it is “a right that pre-existed the Constitution like ‘the freedom of speech’” [emphasis in original].
The fact that both Prof. Chemerinsky and the Post’s editorial page (which had previously criticized the court’s opinion) missed that laboriously made distinction suggests that they might have read the opinion more closely before criticizing it.
Prof. Chemerinsky also claims that even if courts conclude that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, the D.C. gun ban should nevertheless stand. He argues that the Supreme Court should not apply “strict scrutiny” to laws that curtail the right to keep and bear arms because he sees no reason to distrust legislatures in this area. Instead, he argues that the courts should apply the less rigorous rational basis test to such laws, which they have applied to laws restricting the constitutionally protected right to property. Chemerinsky concludes that the D.C. gun ban should be upheld as being “rationally related to achieving [the] legitimate government purpose” of reducing gun violence.
I see serious problems with Chemerinsky’s case. First, the Constitution gives no indication that some of the rights it secures should receive less protection than others. Second, even if one were to accept that premise, the right to self-defense is leaps and bounds more important than the right to property or the right not to be discriminated against by the government on the basis of race. Even if we accept that some constitutional rights are more equal than others, then by Chemerinsky’s rationale the courts should apply strict scrutiny because there is ample reason to doubt any legislative act that infringes on so important a right. Third, as my colleague Bob Levy points out, “In Carolene Products, economic and property rights are relegated to second-tier status, but the rights expressly secured by the Bill of Rights – like the right to keep and bear arms – get top billing. So Chemerinsky’s suggestion that rational basis applies is at odds with Carolene.”
Finally, the D.C. gun ban should not survive even the rational basis test. To do so, it would have to be shown that an effective prohibition on the use of firearms for self-defense is a reasonable restriction on the right to keep and bear arms. Such a severe law is not reasonable, because it leaves peaceful citizens defenseless against violent criminals. And neither is it a mere restriction of the right to keep and bear arms; it is outright repeal. If the rational basis test can be used to uphold the repeal of a constitutionally protected right, then neither that test nor the Bill of Rights have any meaning. Chemerinsky’s logic would allow the District to abolish private property so long as it had a “rational basis” for doing so.
“I’m for free enterprise, but –” You can hear it coming. “I’m against all these government giveaway programs, but –” It’s a common and frustrating experience for a libertarian, hearing a ringing declaration of principle followed by a qualification that the speaker doesn’t have any intention of giving up his own subsidy, regulation, tariff, or pet project.
Years ago, when I was raising money for a free-market business group, I remember one of those letters: “I agree with everything you say. Government is too big. Subsidies and regulation are impeding the operation of our free enterprise system. But the Hawaiian sugar industry is unique.” A friend told me once that he’d persuaded his father, a dentist, to become a consistent libertarian–except on licensing for dentists. What about licensing for brain surgeons? I asked. No, my friend said, I think he’s OK with letting the free market work there.
And now NPR has brought us the latest example. On the way home, my mind wandered as “All Things Considered” reported on a biodiesel refinery in Washington state. And then I heard a familiar opening line from the tech millionaire who is now the CEO of Imperium Renewables, which built the refinery.
I’m a pretty conservative guy, generally. I’ve voted Republican my whole entire life. And I’m very skeptical of the government’s role in any kind of market.
Wait for it, wait for it – you just know there’s a “but” coming.
But, in this case, there’s no other way to do it but with government support and mandates.
Turns out biodiesel is profitable with a federal tax subsidy of up to a dollar a gallon, and with the anticipation of restrictions on greenhouse gases. So a guy who’s normally “very skeptical of the government’s role” supports subsidies in this case because there’s “no other way to do it.” But that’s the whole point of markets and prices–to tell us what economic endeavors make sense. If Hawaiian sugar, or South Carolina textiles, or biodiesel fuel isn’t economically viable without subsidies, then that means it’s not the best use of our limited resources.
One of the values of a political philosophy–sometimes dismissed as “ideology” or “dogma”–is that it gives us a rule, a set of principles, for deciding such questions. We don’t have the time to look at all the data and decide what we think about every issue, and we’re certainly all subject to personal biases on the issues that touch us. There are lots of speakers I’d personally like to shut up, but if I remember that I do believe in the First Amendment, I realize I have to allow even offensive speech. I may want Amtrak to run fast trains between Washington and New York, or I may want to keep my own factory in business. But if I remember that the free-market economy produces the best results for all of us, then I will accept the outcomes of the market process.
People should think about the benefits of the whole libertarian system–free markets, free speech, freedom of religion, constitutional limits on government–whenever they’re tempted to say “I’m for freedom, but–”.
It’s not often that you can point to a stirring article about American liberty by a Weekly Standard editor. But Chris Caldwell’s piece in the Financial Times on cock-fighting is a fine read. Yes, cock-fighting. Presidential candidate Bill Richardson doesn’t want the legality of cock-fighting in New Mexico to burden his candidacy as he travels the length and breadth of this great land. So rather than defend New Mexico as the last bastion of American freedom, he chose to sign a law banning it to help his campaign.
Caldwell notes sadly that even the defenders of the practice hardly mentioned liberty. Instead, they mentioned the economic benefits of tourism and the alleged anti-Hispanic bias of the drive to ban a sport popular with Hispanics. The better argument, he thought, would have been liberty: some people want to attend cock-fights, and Americans have been doing so for centuries, so why should “reformers” be able to take a small pleasure away from others? Caldwell deplores the decline of the general presumption of liberty:
It used to be, under the US system, that one could do anything that was not expressly forbidden. Now one is forbidden to do anything one cannot make an explicit case for. The burden of proof has shifted.
This work by Cato Institute is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.