Topic: Law and Civil Liberties

Justice Thomas Shows Again that the Federal Emperor Has No Constitutional Clothes

Yesterday’s unanimous Supreme Court opinion in American Trucking Associations v. City of Los Angeles is a run-of-the-mill federal preemption case, not inviting much attention. But the interesting bit isn’t Justice Kagan’s majority opinion. It’s Justice Thomas’s short concurrence. Thomas agrees that federal law trumps conflicting state/local law regarding certain regulations related to the Port of Los Angeles, but seizes on the plain language of the preempting statute to take a shot at the massive expansion of federal authority under a misreading of the Commerce Clause.

Justice Thomas focuses on a section of the relevant statute (the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, or FAAAA–don’t ask why this covers ports) titled “Federal authority over intrastate transportation.” He denies that Congress possesses this authority: the Commerce Clause, part of Article I, section 8, only gives Congress the power to regulate commerce “among the several States.” Thomas can’t believe that Congress could have been granted power to legislate something so local as where trucks park once they leave the port (one of the regulations at issue in American Trucking):

Congress cannot pre-empt a state law merely by promulgating a conflicting statute–the preempting statute must also be constitutional, both on its face and as applied. As relevant here, if Congress lacks authority to enact a law regulating a particular intrastate activity, it follows that Congress also lacks authority to pre-empt state laws regulating that activity

The reason that Justice Thomas nevertheless concurs in the judgment here, however, is that Los Angeles waived any constitutional claims against the FAAAA, instead relying solely on statutory arguments (which correctly lost 9-0).

This isn’t the first time that Thomas upheld a federal law but noted federalism concerns that, as here, the plaintiffs didn’t raise (or didn’t preserve on appeal). In Gonzales v. Carhart, for example, Thomas concurred with a majority decision that sustained the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act against a challenge based on Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey but noted that the issue of whether a federal abortion regulation “constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause is not before the Court. The parties did not raise or brief that issue; it is outside the question presented; and the lower courts did not address it.”

Justice Thomas’s opinions in these sorts of cases illustrate the misuse of the Commerce Clause given the Constitution’s careful enumeration of congressional powers. These brief, pointed concurrences show that our imperial government isn’t clothed in constitutional authority.

And they also have a direct use for legal practitioners. I wasn’t a “real” lawyer for that long before joining Cato, but here’s an easy practice tip: Don’t just assume that the federal government has the power to pass the law you don’t want applied to your client.

The I Told You So Files: NSA Bulk Collection Edition

I will confess, when I contemplated the most paranoid scenarios for how the govenrment might use the Patriot Act’s §215 “business record” authority that still seemed realistic, I did not imagine they would use it to routinely collect all Americans’ phone (and perhaps Internet) records for years at a time. I thought perhaps in a panic they might do something similar for an entire city over the course of a month. Clearly, I was thinking too small. Still, I have just been reminded that when I testified about the reauthorization of this Patriot Act provision back in 2011 before the House Judiciary Committee, I did very specifically plead with members of Congress with access to the details to look into what we now know to be this bulk metadata program:

While both [National Security Letter & §215] powers have been expanded along multiple dimensions since 9/11, the main cause for concern in both cases has been the removal of the requirement that there be some evidence—not “probable cause,” but some evidence—linking the people whose records are sought to terrorism or espionage. Now records need only be “relevant” to an investigation, and in the case of §215 orders the court is required to deem records “relevant” if they pertain to someone connected, however tenuously, to a suspect under investigation. As the Justice Department readily acknowledges, these tools are used in the early phases of an investigation to broadly sweep in large amounts of data, mostly about innocent people, which is then stored indefinitely in classified government databases.

Here, again, we should bear in mind that while the easiest and most obvious response to any intelligence failure is always to grant more power to collect more information, the evidence is very thin that the problem before 9/11 was a lack of raw data. On the contrary, reflexively expanding collection authorities can exacerbate what has been colorfully characterized as the problem of “drinking from a firehose.” This can even lead to a vicious cycle, where it comes to seem that more and more data is needed to close down all the dead end leads generated by indiscriminate data collection. […]

Of special concern here is a “sensitive collection program” involving §215 alluded to by Acting Assistant Attorney General Hinnen last year in his testimony on these authorities. Though the Senate had previously unanimously approved an amendment limiting §215 authority to records pertaining to the activities of terror suspects or their associates, a similar reform appears to have been abandoned last year following claims by the Justice Department that such a change would hamper that secret program. Soon afterward, Sen. Russ Feingold purported to have knowledge of clear misuse of §215 unknown to the general public.

If nothing else, I would urge those with access to the relevant details to take a long, hard look at that. But I would also suggest that we should be highly skeptical of any intelligence program that cannot function within even those very modest limitations. The United States was able to observe the time-tested principle of individualized suspicion in a decades-long conflict with a hostile empire armed with nuclear weapons. We should not assume it is an insuperable handicap against scattered bands of religious fanatics.

I guess they either didn’t, or didn’t think it was a problem.

Censorship in the National Security State

Today the Washington Post says the federal government “should allow” Google and other business firms “to say a little more about their relationship with the government.” It is a telling indication of our “relationship with the government” that we are now pleading for freedom of speech.

Quick story to illustrate this point. Nick Merill is a business person in the telecommunications and web services field and one day federal agents brought him a “national security letter.” Astonished by what the “letter” demanded of him, Merill sought legal advice even though the government threatened him with jail if he told anyone else about his “letter.” I invited Merill to a Cato event on Capitol Hill. Listen to his story and then forward it across the internet so others will have a better idea of what the government is doing.

It seems to me that Edward Snowden has put his liberty on the line to sound the alarm about the national security state. I agree with what security expert, Bruce Schneier, wrote the other day in the New York Times, “I believe that history will hail Snowden as a hero – his whistle-blowing exposed a surveillance state and a secrecy machine run amok. I’m less optimistic of how the present day will treat him, and hope that the debate right now is less about the man and more about the government he exposed.”   

More Cato work here, here, and here.

Using Metadata to Find Paul Revere

What stood out to me in David Brooks’ amateur psychologizing about NSA leaker Edward Snowden on Monday was his claim that Snowden “has not been able to point to any specific abuses.” Brooks’ legal skills are even worse than his psychologizing. He didn’t notice that the document Snowden leaked was a general warrant. It fails to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of probable cause and particularity. That’s an abuse.

I gather that it’s hard to apply the principles of liberty and our nation’s founding charter to the new world of data. In aid of your consideration, I offer you the fun essay: “Using Metadata to Find Paul Revere,” which recounts how metadata (so-called) reveals relationships and, from the perspective of King George, sedition.

The essay concludes:

[I]f a mere scribe such as I—one who knows nearly nothing—can use the very simplest of these methods to pick the name of a traitor like Paul Revere from those of two hundred and fifty four other men, using nothing but a list of memberships and a portable calculating engine, then just think what weapons we might wield in the defense of liberty one or two centuries from now.

The present-day federal surveillance programs revealed in media reports are “the tip of the iceberg,” Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA) said Wednesday after being briefed Tuesday.

Obama Keeps Losing Unanimously at Supreme Court

Faithful readers of this blog will have noticed that the government lost unanimously before the Supreme Court in yesterday’s quirky raisin case (which Ilya Somin points out is the government’s third unanimous property-rights loss in 15 months).  Even more keen Cato followers will have realized that this ruling comes on the heels of three other unanimous government losses this term, which I described in a Bloomberg View op-ed last week.  And my biggest fans (hi Dad!) will have remembered that this continues a seeming pattern – not sure if statistically significant, but does look anomolous – that I chronicled in a Wall Street Journal op-ed a year ago.

As I said last week,

These cases have nothing in common, other than the government’s view that federal power is virtually unlimited: Citizens must subsume their liberty to whatever the experts in a given field determine the best or most useful policy to be.

If the government can’t get even one of the liberal justices to agree with it on any of these unrelated cases, it should realize there’s something seriously wrong with its constitutional vision.

I wonder if I’ll get to write the same op-ed every year at this time.

Raisin-Taking Claim Now Ripe for Consideration on the Merits

As Ilya noted, the Supreme Court yesterday cleared the procedural roadblocks for the Horne family, which grows and processes raisins in California, to challenge the operations of the USDA’s marketing order system as an unlawful taking of their property without compensation. The Hornes say that under the USDA’s California Raisin Marketing Order, the Raisin Administrative Committee demanded that they hand over 47 percent of their raisins to be disposed of in ways that do not compete with sales in the domestic retail raisin market, such as export programs and school lunches. 

47 percent! Back in January that figure reminded me of an earlier scale of government extraction: 

Max Boot, who has written a new book on the history of guerrilla movements, tells how Shamil, firebrand leader of a celebrated 19th-century Muslim insurgency in Chechnya and Dagestan, began to lose the allegiance of “many ordinary villagers who balked at his demands for annual tax payments amounting to 12 percent of their harvest.” Instead, they switched their allegiance instead to the rival Russian czar, whose demands were more modest.

If only Washington were content with the czar’s less-than-12 percent. For more on regulatory takings, check out this testimony from way back in 1995 by Cato’s own Roger Pilon before the House Judiciary Committee.