Topic: Law and Civil Liberties

TSA: Not Even Good at Getting it Wrong

Bruce Schneier has a very good op-ed on the Transportation Security Administration’s airport security programs in the Los Angeles Times today. The winner line: “That’s the TSA: Not doing the right things. Not even doing right the things it does.”

In fairness, security is hard. By their nature, federal agencies aren’t smart and nimble. I argued that the TSA should be scrapped in a March, 2005 Reason magazine debate.

Justice Dept Backs Up After KPMG Ruling

The New York Times reports that the Justice Dept. is rolling back its bullying tactic of penalizing companies that reimburse their employees’ legal fees during investigations and trials.  This move is mostly show–to make the feds seem reasonable and open to suggestions.  But it is really just a reaction to the department’s defeat in today’s KPMG case (pdf) and a lame attempt to stave off legislation that would be more meaningful and permanent.

Attorney Richard Janis details these issues in this new Cato report.

For still more background, go here, here, and here.

Joe Biden and Limited Government

Barack Obama and Joe Biden both get a perfect 100 from the big-government liberal Americans for Democratic Action, which probably tells you all you need to know. But I remember a dramatic moment back in 1991 when Biden made his commitment to unlimited government clear and dramatic. Clarence Thomas had been nominated for the Supreme Court, and Biden, then chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, was questioning him. Biden bore in on the possibility that Thomas might believe in “natural law,” the idea, as Tony Mauro of USA Today summarized it, that “everyone is born with God-given rights - referred to in the Declaration of Independence as ‘inalienable rights’ to ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’ - apart from what any law or the Constitution grants.” Biden singled out Cato adjunct scholar Richard Epstein and Cato author Stephen Macedo and demanded to know if Thomas agreed with them that the Constitution protects property rights. Waving Epstein’s book Takings in the air like Joe McCarthy with a list of communists, Biden demanded to know, as we very loosely paraphrased it in Cato’s 25-year Annual Report (pdf; page 14), “Are you now or have you ever been a libertarian?” As most judicial nominees do when pursued by a senator roused to defend his power like a mama bear, Thomas assured Senator Biden that he wouldn’t take the Constitution too seriously. Here’s Biden on the warpath:

Was Biden right to worry? Well, as we said in the Annual Report, four years later Thomas joined the Court in declaring, “We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of limited powers.” But ten years later the Court finally considered whether the Constitution protects property rights and said, “Ehh, not so much.” Thomas protested, “Something has gone seriously awry with this Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. Though citizens are safe from the government in their homes, the homes themselves are not.” Biden was right to worry that Thomas’s understanding of individual rights and the Constitution just might put some limits on the power of government.

Drinking Age

Yesterday, over a hundred college presidents called for a reexamination of the current minimum drinking age and suggested it should be lowered. This is great news and could serve as an opportunity to begin an intelligent national dialogue on improving alcohol policies.

Unfortunately, the neoprohibitionists at Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and elsewhere have already sprung into action in an attempt to squelch any reform-minded opinions. MADD National President Laura Dean-Mooney said in a press release that any discussion of the minimum drinking age “must honor the science behind the 21 law which unequivocally shows that the 21 law has reduced drunk driving and underage and binge drinking.”

Of course, MADD’s preferred “science” ignores a very interesting working paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research that shreds the oft-cited correlation between adoption of the Federal Uniform Drinking Age Act (FUDAA), which forced all states to have a minimum drinking age of 21, and a reduction in alcohol-related traffic fatalities.

How could this study’s findings differ so greatly from the research that MADD touts?

The paper, penned by Jeffery A. Miron and Elina Tetelbaum, points out that prior research consistently errs by including states that were unaffected by the law – the 12 states that had adopted a minimum drinking age of 21 long before FUDAA was passed and forced states to do so. Those states – for reasons unrelated to the federal law – experienced a dramatic decrease in alcohol-related traffic fatalities in the 80s and their inclusion in previous studies led many researchers to falsely conclude that the FUDAA was the key factor in the national trend.

That trend, however, began well before the FUDAA was passed in 1984. As the study notes: “[T]he decline began in the year 1969, the year in which several landmark improvements were made in the accident avoidance and crash protection features of passenger cars.” The study also recognizes that medical advances probably deserve a great deal of credit for the reduction.

While drunk driving statistics tend to attract the most attention in discussions of the minimum drinking age, the core purpose of such laws is to prevent minors from accessing alcohol. To this end, these laws have been an abject failure on college campuses. Even high school students seem to have little problem obtaining alcohol. A survey by the University of Michigan reveals that 8th and 10th graders find it easier to get alcohol than cigarettes.

Still, anti-drinking advocates cling to the notion that the minimum drinking age is effective and that state governments are unable to make sound decisions for their residents.

Response to Professor Barron’s Critique of “The Dirty Dozen”

Prior commitments prevented me from participating with Professor David Barron in the Cato / American Constitution Society forum on The Dirty Dozen, which I co-authored with William Mellor.  I’m especially gratified, therefore, to have this second opportunity, which I will use to document seven errors by Professor Barron in his blog postings here and here.  Of course, the best and most complete rebuttal is the book itself, available for the shamefully low price of $17.13 at Amazon.           

Barron #1:  “The crime of the Supreme Court since the 1930s, so says this book, has been its refusal to lock in the laissez faire constitutional philosophy that reigned supreme in the decades leading up to the New Deal.”

Facts:  Laissez faire is never mentioned in the book – not once.  Included among our 12 worst cases are those involving the non-delegation doctrine, campaign finance regulation, gun owners’ rights, civil liberties, civil asset forfeiture, and racial preferences – none of which has anything to do with laissez faire economics.  Yes, we also cover cases relating to property, contract, and other economic liberties; but to suggest that we view the Court’s major crime as not upholding laissez faire is to ignore most of our book. 

Barron #2:  “Number one on The Dirty Dozen’s hit list is Helvering v. Davis … because it upheld Social Security on a broad theory of federal spending and taxing power.”  Moreover, Helvering’s “interpretation of the General Welfare Clause is not inconsistent with original understanding because there was no clear understanding on that point during the Founding.  Madison had one view, Hamilton another.”

Facts:  First, Helvering’s focus on Social Security was incidental to its inclusion.  Helvering is one of The Dirty Dozen because the Court, in favoring Hamilton’s view of the General Welfare Clause, made a mockery of the principle of enumerated powers.  The result: redistributionist schemes – including retirement programs, welfare, hurricane relief, medical care, housing subsidies, farm supports, and grants to the arts – that have no constitutional foundation, even if justified on policy grounds.

Second, we have never argued that a clear and consistent original understanding is required to support a particular constitutional interpretation.  Instead, we note that textualists consult the structure of the Constitution whenever the original understanding is ambiguous.  And we explain (p. 216) that “structure relates, first, to the internal relationship among the various provisions of the Constitution and, second, to the overall design or framework of government that the Constitution establishes.”  No reasonable legal scholar can deny that the Constitution was structured to restrain government and limit its operations to specifically enumerated powers.  By that all-important criterion, Hamilton’s open-ended conception of the General Welfare Clause cannot be defended. 

Barron #3:  The authors “candidly (and admirably) concede that originalism is actually of little help in explaining their hostility to a number of cases on their list.”

Facts:  We make no such concession.  Professor Barron has confused “originalism” (interpreting the Constitution in accordance with the meaning of its words when ratified) with original intent (focusing on the values and objectives of the drafters and ratifiers).  As Justice Scalia has written, “It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.”  We recognize (p. 216) that “applying original intent … begs several questions:  Which drafters or ratifiers are authoritative?  How do we know their intent? … How are differing views among the drafters and ratifiers to be resolved?”  But we heartily endorse originalism.  Judges whose decisions are anchored in the words of the Constitution have an objective basis for their views.  Even when the meaning of the words is unclear, it provides a starting point, which can be supplemented by an examination of constitutional structure, purpose, and history. 

Barron #4:  Wickard v. Filburn is included because the Court “sinned by adopting an expansive view of the commerce power. … Wickard was the key precedent for the decision upholding the constitutionality of the 1964 Civil Rights Act…. The Dirty Dozen never faces up to that obvious problem.”

Facts:  Under Wickard v. Filburn, the commerce power is not merely “expansive”; it is incoherent and all-encompassing.  Article I, section 8, of the Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce, not to restrict activities that are neither interstate nor commercial.  Mr. Filburn’s crops were grown within a single state for consumption by his family and farm animals.  He didn’t buy the crops; he didn’t sell the crops; they didn’t cross state lines; and his activities had no perceptible impact on interstate markets.  Yet Congress, with the Court’s approval, brazenly distended the Commerce Clause – unleashing it from the operative word “commerce” and granting to the federal government regulatory authority over virtually all manner of human conduct.

To be sure, the 1964 Civil Rights Act is where the rubber hits the road.  Our position is straightforward:  The Act has no constitutional pedigree.  It addresses private, not state actions; so it cannot be traced to the Fourteenth Amendment.  It has nothing to do with eliminating state impediments to the free flow of interstate trade; so it cannot be shoehorned into the Commerce Clause.  That said, the 1964 Civil Rights Act was an unambiguously good thing; it helped erase an unconscionable assault on human dignity.  We are glad that it happened.  We applaud its aftermath.  And we recognize that the Civil Rights Act is a settled principle of American law, not to be revisited by the courts despite its constitutional infirmities. 

Even if we are wrong about those infirmities, our position is intellectually honest – unlike the position of those who insist that, because the Civil Rights Act is beneficent, it must necessarily be constitutional.  Some activities offend the Constitution – e.g., torture – even if they yield universally acclaimed benefits – e.g., preventing a nuclear attack.  The remedy in such cases is either to amend the Constitution or acknowledge the disconnect.  In this instance, we choose the latter alternative. 

Barron  #5:  “The authors seem to be arguing in simple, consequentialist terms.  A case is badly decided if it has some bad effect in the real world.” 

Facts:  We asked 74 legal scholars to name the post-1933 cases that had the most destructive effect on law and public policy – either by expanding government powers beyond those that are constitutionally authorized, or imperiling individual liberties that are constitutionally protected.  Further, we stipulated (pp. 5-6) that “worst” cases must have led to anti-liberty outcomes and been based on erroneous legal reasoning.  Accordingly, consequentialism played a role; but we did not presume, as Professor Barron asserts, “a case is badly decided if it has some bad effect.”  Not a single case in our book was selected solely because it had a bad effect.  Unless the rationale for the case was legally defective, we did not include the case among The Dirty Dozen.  “Bad effect” and “badly decided” were two separate and distinct criteria.  Each selected case had to qualify on both grounds.  Indeed, the purpose of our book was to dissect each case and demonstrate not only its bad effect, but also how and why it was badly decided. 

Barron #6:  The authors’ criterion for judicial intervention is based on “libertarianism, which does not even begin to address the problem of private power.”

Facts:  This allegation by Professor Barron reflects a profound misunderstanding about the nature and purpose of the Constitution.  The Constitution is not a criminal or civil code that private citizens must obey.  Rather, the Constitution has two primary objectives: to secure individual rights, and to limit the power of government.  It’s not private people or private power that the Constitution constrains.  Instead, it’s government officials and government power.  The Constitution is first and foremost a code of conduct for the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.  Our “libertarian” theory of judicial intervention doesn’t speak to private power because the Constitution doesn’t speak to private power. 

Barron #7:  “You still need a sorting theory.  When should judges, while engaging, defer and when should they act?”

Fact:  We have a sorting theory, which we document at some length (pp. 215-24).  Members of the Court must have an allegiance to the text of the Constitution.  If the original meaning of the text is unambiguous, textualists adopt that meaning unless it leads to absurd consequences.  If the meaning is blurred, textualists must interpret the words in accordance with an originalist theory of our founding documents – in particular, a respect for federalism, separation of powers, limited government, and individual rights (both enumerated and unenumerated).  Those were the principles that the Framers applied in crafting the Constitution.  By comparison, members of the Court who subscribe to an anchor-less “living Constitution” will be disposed to use their own preferences and ideology as a basis for their decisions – thereby negating the written documents that have sustained a free society for more than two centuries.

 

Juror Becomes Fly in the Ointment

It was supposed to be just another federal drug prosecution.  The federal prosecutors introduced evidence that the man on trial was involved in the black market drug trade.  The defense attorney said the government agents entrapped his client.  And then the twelve citizen-jurors retired to deliberate the outcome of the case.

But then something unusual happened.  The jury sent a note to the trial judge with the following query: Since the Constitution needed to be amended in 1919 to authorize federal criminal prosecutions for manufacturing and smuggling alcohol, a juror wanted to know from the judge where “is the constitutional grant of authority to ban mere possession of cocaine today?” 

That’s a fair question.  It is a point that has been made in Cato’s publications ( go here (pdf) and here (pdf)) and a point that has been made by Justice Clarence Thomas [pdf], among many others.  Federal District Court Judge William Young was startled.  He says he has been on the bench for 30 years and has never faced a situation where a juror was challenging the legitimacy of a criminal law.  Young tried to assure the jury that the federal drug laws are constitutional because the Supreme Court has interpreted the commerce clause quite expansively.  When the jury sent out more notes about a juror that wasn’t going to sign off on an unconstitutional prosecution, Young halted the proceedings to identify the ”problem juror.”  Once discovered, that juror was replaced with an alternate–over the objections of defense counsel.  Shortly thereafter, the new jury returned with guilty verdicts on several cocaine-related charges.

It is an extraordinary thing for a judge to meddle with the jury in the middle of its deliberations.  So, to justify his removal of the “problem juror,” a man named Thomas Eddlem, Judge Young issued a 40-page memorandum of law (pdf).  I happen to know and respect Judge Young.  I invited him to speak here at Cato about the awful federal sentencing guidelines, but his legal memorandum in this case is remarkably thin.  I will briefly respond to his substantive arguments below.

1.  Court precedents say jurors have no right to nullify.  Well, yes, that is undeniable.   But that’s like someone saying in 1950 that court precedents tell us that  ”separate, but equal” is the law of the land–go read Plessy v. Ferguson. The real question is whether those court rulings are truly consistent with the Constitution.  I would also point out that even though many modern court rulings express hostility toward jury nullification, no court has yet dared try to reverse a not guilty verdict or attempt to punish any juror who cast a not guilty vote in a jury room where the result was deadlock (not an untoward outcome, by the way).  Judges do remove jurors from time to time, but there is no punishment.  At least not yet.

2.  Judge Young writes, “The impropriety of nullification emanates from the notion that ours is ‘a government of laws and not of men,’” and he attributes that proposition to our second president, John Adams, who also authored the Massachusetts Constitution.  The quote is accurate, but Young is mixing up legal principles and does not know Adams well enough.  Like so many of America’s early leaders, John Adams was a strong proponent of jury nullification.  Here’s Adams: “It is not only the juror’s right, but his duty, to find the verdict according to his own best understanding, judgment, and conscience, though in direct opposition to the direction of the court.”  C.F. Adams, “The Works of John Adams,” 253-255 (1856)(emphasis added).

3.  Jury nullification undermines the rule of law.  This is simply another variation of objection #2 above.  There is a logical fallacy to this objection.  Jury nullification is assumed to be improper–so it undermines “the law.”  It is like saying a presidential pardon undermines the “rule of law.”  But if the president has the power to pardon, and he does, he can exercise it (though we may or may not like the result in particular cases).  This is the way in which to understand jury nullification.  The framers of the American Constitution considered it to be part and parcel of what a criminal jury trial was all about.  Some state constitutions, such as Indiana, Maryland and Oregon, explicitly provide that juries have the power to judge the law and the facts in criminal cases.  Judges are the ones that have undermined the “rule of law” by pretending those provisions mean the opposite of what they say.

Judge Young expressed alarm about the recent Time magazine article by David Simon and his The Wire colleagues that calls for jury nullification in drug cases.  But that article has revived a debate that we should all welcome.  For much more on this subject, go here, here, here, and here.