Topic: Law and Civil Liberties

The 4th Amendment Is Another Victim of the Drug War

Over at the Washington Post, Radley Balko details a recent Fourth Circuit ruling overturning an award for a father whose son was shot and killed in a military-style SWAT raid after marijuana residue was found in an outside garbage bag. A jury awarded the father $250,000 after it was shown that the police failed to comply with their obligation to knock and announce their presence before barging in and that they lied about several aspects of the raid.

Without repeating the entirety of Balko’s excellent analysis, a particularly troubling aspect of the ruling is the nonchalant way in which the Fourth Circuit judges, even in dissent, treat the militarized raid over marijuana residue and dispense with any suggestion that such escalated violence is constitutionally questionable:

Let’s first start by noting one very important issue that is not in dispute—whether the massive amount of force the police brought to bear in this case was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. As far as the federal courts are concerned, it was. As Judge Pamela Harris points out in her dissent, “The point here, to be clear, is not to take issue with the Officers’ decision to execute a search warrant based on marijuana traces by way of a military-style nighttime raid.”

Harris is correct. The courts long ago decided that dangerous, punishing SWAT-style raids to search for pot—even when there is no evidence of distribution—are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. A lawsuit arguing otherwise will be promptly tossed.

Balko then points out that such behavior is precisely what the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent:

Steep Drop in Colorado Marijuana Arrests

A new report from the Drug Policy Alliance details a steep decline in the number of marijuana arrests in Colorado and remarks on the beneficial effects.

The key points:

  • Since 2010, marijuana possession charges are down by more than 90%, marijuana cultivation charges are down by 96%, and marijuana distribution charges are down by 99%.
  • The number of marijuana possession charges in Colorado courts has decreased by more than 25,000 since 2010—from 30,428 in 2010 to just 1,922 in 2014.
  • According to raw data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System, drug-related incidents are down 23% since 2010, based on a 53% drop in marijuana-related incidents.
  • In 2010 the top five Colorado counties for marijuana possession cases were El Paso, Jefferson, Adams, Larimer, and Boulder.  Marijuana possession cases in those counties all dropped by at least 83% from 2010 to 2014.
  • Marijuana distribution charges for young men of color did not increase, to the relief of racial justice advocates wary of a “net-widening” effect following legalization. The black rate for distribution incidents dropped from 87 per 100,000 in 2012 to 25 per 100,000 in 2014.
  • Racial disparities for still-illegal and mostly petty charges persist for black people when compared to white people, primarily because of the specific increase of charges for public use combined with the disproportionate rates of police contact in communities of color. The marijuana arrest rate for black people in 2014 was 2.4 times higher than the arrest rates for white people, just as it was in 2010.
  • The report also reveals a decline in synthetic marijuana arrests, presumably because people are less likely to use synthetic marijuana when marijuana itself is no longer criminalized.

According to Art Way, Colorado state director of the Drug Policy Alliance:

It’s heartening to see that tens of thousands of otherwise law-abiding Coloradans have been spared the travesty of getting handcuffed or being charged for small amounts of marijuana. By focusing on public health rather than criminalization, Colorado is better positioned to address the potential harms of marijuana use, while diminishing many of the worst aspects of the war on drugs.

Young v. UPS : Bias Plaintiffs Win at the Supreme Court

As I’ve had occasion to note in this space, pundits regularly complain that the current Supreme Court is somehow throttling job-bias lawsuits out of some concern for employers’ rights. However, the Court’s recent rulings on employment discrimination law in fact tend toward the cautious and centrist, and the caseload of discrimination claims filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) remains near its all-time highs. (Thus the New York Times complained in 2013 that a Court decision four years previously had made it hopeless to file age-bias claims, omitting to mention that lawyers filed more such cases after the decision than before.)

Today’s decision in Young v. United Parcel Service, on the scope of pregnancy discrimination and accommodation law, will be hailed reflexively in some quarters on a which-side-are-you-on basis, since the pregnant employee won. Few non-lawyers are likely to stick around for its dry details, in which Justice Stephen Breyer laid out a balancing test mushy enough in its liberalism to win over Chief Justice Roberts and even Justice Alito. (Readers interested in such matters as McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting and the selection of similarly situated co-worker “comparators” should follow up at the specialty employment-law blogs.) The practical impact of the case is also somewhat limited by Congress’s having further liberalized pregnancy accommodation law in plaintiffs’ favor after the events being sued over. 

Chicago Police Department Needs Reform

It’s been a rough month for the Chicago Police Department (CPD). 

First came the revelations from Spencer Ackerman and The Guardian about a CPD warehouse at Homan Square that was, according to detainees, defense attorneys, and civil rights advocates, operating as a “black site” where detainees were held for hours and aggressively interrogated without ever being officially entered into the system or given access to their attorneys. While the police and others dispute this characterization, one complaint seems to be that the abuses at Homan Square could be found at any police facility in Chicago.  Not exactly a resounding defense of CPD practices.  Last week the commander of the Homan Square facility, Nicholas Roti, resigned.

This week, the ACLU of Illinois released a troubling report about the use of Stop-and-Frisk in Chicago.  Stop-and-Frisk is the controversial practice, made infamous by the NYPD which has been ordered to halt it, of stopping large numbers of (especially African American and Hispanic) men on the street without probable cause and frisking them for contraband.  The ACLU report concludes that the CPD’s use of this practice is even broader and more Constitutionally-suspect than the NYPD program.

Kudos to the New Mexico Legislature for Abolishing Civil Asset Forfeiture

Good news from out west.  A New Mexico bill, HB 560, to restrict civil asset forfeiture has cleared the legislature - receiving unanimous support in the State House and State Senate - and awaits the signature of Governor Susana Martinez to become law.

Among other things, the New Mexico bill requires a criminal conviction for forfeiture actions, bolsters the “innocent owner” defense by requiring that the owner know that his/her property was being used illegally, requires that all forfeiture proceeds be deposited into the general fund rather than into the seizing agencies, and limits the ability of state and local law enforcement agencies to circumvent state law by utilizing the federal equitable sharing program.

As noted numerous times by Cato and other civil liberties advocates like the Institute for Justice and the ACLU, civil asset forfeiture is a conceptually unjust practice that has no place in a society that cherishes due process and private property.  

That many state legislatures across the country are now undertaking efforts to rein in this government abuse is something worth cheering about.

Yes, Ted Cruz Is Eligible to Be President

As Ted Cruz announces his White House candidacy, let me forestall a new round of birtherism prompted by the discovery that the Texas senator was actually born in a different oil patch: Calgary, Alberta, Canada. I looked at the whole “natural-born citizen” requirement a couple of years ago and concluded that Cruz’s eligibility for the presidency is an easy legal call. Here’s the heart of the matter:

So the one remaining question is whether Ted Cruz was a citizen at birth. That’s an easy one. The Nationality Act of 1940 outlines which children become “nationals and citizens of the United States at birth.” In addition to those who are born in the United States or born outside the country to parents who were both citizens … citizenship goes to babies born to one American parent who has spent a certain number of years here.

That single-parent requirement has been amended several times, but under the law in effect between 1952 and 1986 — Cruz was born in 1970 — someone must have a citizen parent who resided in the United States for at least 10 years, including five after the age of 14, in order to be considered a natural-born citizen. Cruz’s mother, Eleanor Darragh, was born in Delaware, lived most of her life in the United States, and gave birth to little Rafael Edward Cruz in her 30s.

In an amusing footnote, when this mild controversy first arose, Cruz quickly renounced any claim to Canadian citizenship. This prompted my good friend and sometime co-author Josh Blackman to present me with a filled-out renunciation application after I naturalized as a U.S. citizen last June. I have not signed or submitted this document, however, because there’s really no need – and who knows when a second passport might come in handy? (The State Department allows dual citizenship even though the naturalization oath requires a new citizen to “renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen.”) Rest assured that if I’m ever required to give up my Canadian citizenship to get a security clearance or for some other official reason, I will do so, much as I owe to the country where I grew up after my family left the Soviet Union.

King v. Burwell Doesn’t Present a ‘Coercion’ Question

I have a post over at National Review Online’s Bench Memos blog that explains why, contrary to Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concerns, the King v. Burwell challengers’ interpretation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (a.k.a., PPACA, ACA, and ObamaCare) doesn’t coerce states. At least, not under the Court’s current tests for determining whether Congress is coercing states.

If you happen to be a busy Supreme Court justice, here’s a spoiler:

1. The ACA’s exchange provisions don’t penalize states. They let states make tradeoffs between taxes, jobs, and insurance coverage.

2. Roughly half of states appear to consider those costs tolerable. Prior to 2014, eight states voluntarily imposed this supposedly coercive penalty on themselves.

3. This “deal” is comparable to what the Court allowed in NFIB v. Sebelius. In NFIB, the Court allowed states collectively to turn down Medicaid subsidies for as many as 16 million poor people. The exchange provisions permit states to do the same for 16 million higher-income residents.

I have no objection to the Court lowering the bar for demonstrating that cooperative federalism programs coerce states. But the Court will have to lower the bar quite a bit to find the ACA’s exchange provisions coercive.

If you aren’t a busy Supreme Court justice, or even if you are, read the whole thing.