Topic: Law and Civil Liberties

‘Undergrads Required to Lobby for Obama Policy’—-Cont’d

As I noted in this space the other day, GWU law professor John Banzhaf on Monday sent out a press release boasting of having assigned undergrads to lobby for New York City-style soda bans or, alternatively, other ventures in “obesity policy.” Reactions include Katharine Mangu-Ward at Reason (“I’m gonna guess there aren’t a lot of libertarians in his class”), George Leef at Phi Beta Cons, and UCLA law professor Stephen Bainbridge:

I wonder what people would say if I made my students write letters to their congressman supporting Senator Shelby’s Dodd-Frank corrections bills? Actually, I don’t wonder. They’d say I was abusing my power. And they’d be right. Only someone blinded by their own self-righteous arrogance would fail to see the gross impropriety here.

Now Banzhaf has sent out another press release, which aside from tossing an inaccurate brickbat or two at my motivations for writing about him, takes care to specify—as his Monday press release did not—that students in the class are free to propose lobbying for at least some ideas that might count as deregulatory. The two examples he gives are as follows: “students could also ask legislators to reduce limits on the sale of items from food trucks [or] cut back on unnecessary food-related regulations.”

Whether liberty-minded students could actually get course credit for lobbying against food-related positions that Banzhaf favors—as distinct from seeking out some subtopic in the field where their views and his happen to coincide—remains unclear. If they are free to lobby against policies identified with the Obama administration and NYC’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg, then that makes utter nonsense of the headline bannered over the press release Banzhaf sent out on March 4: “Undergrads Required to Lobby for Obama Policy.” So which is it? 

[cross-posted, with some adaptation, from Overlawyered]

Mr. Paul Goes to Washington

C-SPAN footage of Rand Paul's filibusterAs Sen. Rand Paul acknowledged early on in his epic 13-hour speech Wednesday (highlights here), his decision to mount an old-fashioned, talk-till-you-drop filibuster of John Brennan’s confirmation as CIA director didn’t really have much to do with Brennan personally. But neither was it really, at a fundamental level, about the narrow question of whether the president can “drop a Hellfire missile on your cafe experience” as you sit sipping a latte on American soil. If any citizens were realistically worried about that prospect, Attorney General Eric Holder has (somewhat belatedly) answered that question in the negative, prompting Paul to declare victory on that front.

But as Wired’s Spencer Ackerman observes, the spectre of Predators over Starbucks actually served to spotlight the “extraordinary breadth of the legal claims that undergird the boundless, 11-plus-year ‘war on terrorism’ ”—and to frame a much broader and more wide-ranging critique of that “perpetual war,” in which Paul charged that Congress has abdicated its responsibilities to an unaccountable executive branch. In Paul’s view, “we shouldn’t be asking [the president] for drone memos”—documents laying out the legal basis for the CIA’s targeted killing program, which the administration has finally, grudgingly deigned to provide to Congress, though not the American public—”we should be giving him drone memos.” As if to highlight the erosion of statutory checks on the president’s counterterror authority, Sen. Lindsey Graham declared that, after all, the Authorization for the Use of Military Force passed after 9/11 made no exception for actions “in the United States”—even though Congress had specifically rejected a request to include that phrase in the authorization.

The broadly positive reaction to Paul’s filibuster suggests, to me at least, that many Americans now fall outside the bipartisan Washington consensus that there’s little need for serious congressional scrutiny or debate when it comes to the War on Terror, and are relieved to hear that dissatisfaction echoed on the Senate floor. No longer as terrorized or shell-shocked as we were a decade ago, perhaps we’re becoming less willing to accept assertions that the public has no business knowing how and when the president may authorize secret killings in countries where we are not formally at war. If we want to get really radical, we may eventually begin to suggest there are proper constraints—if not constitutional, then at least moral—even on the killing of human beings who had the poor taste to be born in another country. We might question whether Americans are being well served when Congress spends less time debating the reauthorization of the Patriot Act or the FISA Amendments Act than Senator Paul did (literally) standing on principle Wednesday night.

Is it absurd to fear, as some of Paul’s colleagues charged, that the president will begin launching drone strikes on American soil? Probably. But the point is precisely that we live under an administration so unwilling to acknowledge meaningful limits on what they may do in the name of national security that it was an exercise in tooth-pulling just to get a public disavowal of an absurd scenario that the government’s anemic targeted killing “standards,” taken to their logical extreme, would not appear to foreclose. The crucial message we should take from Paul’s marathon oration, then, may be this: If it’s absurd to pose the question that inspired his filibuster, surely it’s far more absurd that we’ve arrived, after a decade of complacency about government secrecy and unfettered executive discretion in the sphere of counterterrorism, at a point where the question would need to be posed.

Banzhaf’s Boast: “Undergrads Required to Lobby for Obama Policy”

I normally resist the temptation to pay attention to George Washington University law professor John Banzhaf, given his reputation as a bit of a publicity chaser, but this Monday press release from him was enough to get me to forsake my usual practice: 

Undergrads Required to Lobby for Obama Policy

At 4 PM today, undergraduate students in a major university will be assigned homework requiring them to lobby their local legislators in favor of a major Obama policy – fighting obesity.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE PRLog (Press Release) - Mar. 4, 2013 - More specifically, some 200 undergrads will be asked to contact legislators in their home cities, counties, or states asking them to adopt legislation similar to that already adopted in New York City – and apparently to be considered in D.C., Cambridge, Mass, New York State, and perhaps elsewhere  – banning restaurants, delis, movie theaters and many other businesses from selling high-sugar drinks in cups or containers larger than 16 ounces.

Because asking the students to lobby on behalf of whatever opinions they themselves actually consider worth lobbying for would just be too old-school. Readers at Overlawyered have met Prof. Banzhaf before in various of his academic and activist capacities: proposing lawsuits against parents of obese children and against doctors who do not adequately warn their patients against obesity, urging that parents who smoke not be allowed to adopt kids, threatening school officials in Massachusetts with lawsuits naming them personally if they allow soft drinks to be sold on school property, promoting suits against individual administrators at his own institution, GWU, and filing a losing complaint against single-sex dorms at crosstown rival Catholic University of America.

Monday’s Banzhaf press release does mention that students will be given other optional topics to lobby about if they don’t pick the NYC-style soda ban. All the other examples given, however, involve alternative ways of extending regulation and taxation in the food and beverage realm. Presumably any student that believes that the government should stay out of this area has had the foresight to drop the course.

Voting Rights in Massachusetts and Mississippi

During last week’s oral argument in Shelby County v. Holder – the challenge to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act – Chief Justice Roberts questioned the Solicitor General concerning the rationality of the VRA’s coverage formula (Section 4(b)) by comparing non-covered Massachusetts with Mississippi, which remains subject to federal preclearance based on registration and voting data from 1964.  As the Chief Justice pointed out (page 32 of the transcript), Massachusetts has the “worst ratio of white voter turnout to African American voter turnout” while Mississippi “has the best.”  Massachusetts likewise “has the greatest disparity in registration between white and African American” while Mississippi is third best in the nation, “where again the African American registration rate is higher than the white registration rate.”

The Chief Justice’s remarks apparently angered the Massachusetts Secretary of State.  According to a Politico story, Secretary William Galvin found it “just disturbing that the chief justice of the United States would spew this kind of misinformation” and that the “2010 numbers don’t support what Roberts is saying.”  Galvin continued: “He’s wrong, and in fact what’s truly disturbing is not just the doctrinaire way he presented by the assertion, but when we went searching for an data that could substantiate what he was saying, the only thing we could find was a census survey pulled from 2010 … which speaks of noncitizen blacks … .  We reached out to academics at many institutions … and they could find no record either, they were puzzled by [Roberts’s] reference.”

But it’s Secretary Galvin who has his facts wrong—a mistake he could have avoided simply by reviewing the lower court decision that the Supreme Court is considering.  In his dissenting opinion, D.C. Circuit Judge Stephen Williams examined the voter registration and voting statistics from the 2004 presidential election – not the 2010 mid-term elections—because it was the last national election before Congress reenacted Section 5 in 2006.  The question the Supreme Court is considering—which seems to be lost on Galvin – is whether Congress acted appropriately in retaining the same coverage formula that has been in place since 1975 despite significant changes in the country.  To answer that question, the Court must of course look at the statistics that were in the 2006 legislative record. And those statistics, which are publicly available and come directly from the Census Bureau, fully vindicate the Chief Justice’s statement.

Google Illuminates the Shadowy World of National Security Letters

In a pretty much unprecedented move, Google today announced that it was expanding its regular “Transparency Report” to include some very general information about government demands for user information using National Security Letters, which can be issued by the head of any of 56 FBI field offices without judicial approval or supervision. Recipients of NSLs are typically forbidden from ever revealing even the existence of the request, and therefore not included in the company’s general tally of government surveillance requests. Instead of disclosing specific numbers of NSL requests, then, Google is publishing a wide range indicating the rough volume of requests they get each year, and how many users are affected. Broad as these ranges are, there’s some interesting points to be gleaned here:

It’s illuminating to compare the minimum number of users affected by NSLs each year to the numbers we find in the government’s official annual reports. In 2011—the last year for which we have a tally—the Justice Department acknowledged issuing 16,511 NSLs seeking information about U.S. persons, with a total of 7,201 Americans’ information thus obtained. That’s actually down from a staggering 14,212 Americans whose information DOJ reported obtaining via NSL the previous year. Remember, this total includes National Security Letters issued not just to all telecommunications providers—including online services like Google, broadband Internet companies, and cell phone carriers—but also “financial institutions,” which are defined broadly to include a vast array of businesses beyond such obvious candidates as banks and credit card companies.

What ought to leap out at you here is the magnitude of Google’s tally relative to that total: They got requests affecting at least 1,000 users in a year when DOJ reports just over 7,000 Americans affected by all NSLs—and it seems impossible that Google could account for anywhere remotely near a seventh of all NSL requests. Google, of course, is not limiting their tally to requests for information about Americans, which may explain part of the gap—but we know that, at least of a few years ago, the substantial majority of NSLs targeted Americans, and the proportion of the total targeting Americans was increasing year after year. As of 2006, for instance, 57 percent of NSL requests were for information about U.S. persons. So even if we reduce Google’s minimum proportionately, that seems awfully high.

There’s a simple enough explanation for this apparent discrepancy: The numbers DOJ reports each year explicitly exclude NSL requests for “basic subscriber information,” meaning the “name, address, and length of service” associated with an account, and only count more expansive requests that also demand more detailed “electronic communications transactional records” that are “parallel to” the “toll billing records” maintained by traditional phone companies. I’ll get back to what that means in a second. But the obvious inference from comparing these numbers, unless Google gets a completely implausibly disproportionate percentage of total NSLs, is that the overwhelming majority of NSLs are just such “basic subscriber information” requests, and that the total number of Americans affected by all NSLs is thus vastly, vastly larger than the official numbers would suggest.

The rationale for not counting such “basic subscriber information” requests—beyond a desire not to terrify Americans by exposing the true magnitude of government surveillance—is presumably that these are so limited in scope that they don’t pose the same kind of civil liberties concerns as more extensive data requests. But this may not really be the case when you think about how we use the Internet in practice: Many people, after all, go online to engage in anonymous speech. In those cases, the contents of a person’s communications may be public (or at least widely shared), and what’s sensitive and private is the identity of the person tied to a particular account. (The first step in the FBI investigation that ultimately brought down CIA chief David Petraeus, recall, was stripping away the digital anonymity of his biographer and lover, Paula Broadwell, by linking a pseudonymous e-mail address to her primary Google account.) Indeed, that seems to be the primary reason one would issue such a “basic subscriber information” request to an entity like Google: To effectively de-anonymize the otherwise unknown user of a particular account. Insofar as the right to both speak and read or recieve information anonymously has long been recognized by the Supreme Court as a component of our basic First Amendment freedoms, even these relatively limited requests may indeed have important implications for our civil liberties. And Google’s numbers, imprecise as they are, very strongly suggest that such requests are issued in far higher numbers than had previously been recognized.

The other interesting tidbit to come from Google today is their expanded FAQ detailing what kinds of information can be obtained under NSLs:

Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) 18 U.S.C. section 2709, the FBI can seek “the name, address, length of service, and local and long distance toll billing records” of a subscriber to a wire or electronic communications service. The FBI can’t use NSLs to obtain anything else from Google, such as Gmail content, search queries, YouTube videos or user IP addresses.

For a long time, the FBI operated on the assumption that NSLs could be used broadly to obtain any “electronic communications transactional records.” But in a 2008 memorandum, the Office of Legal Counsel rejected that interpretation, holding that NSL authority “reaches only those categories of information parallel to subscriber information and toll billing records for ordinary telephone service.” Just what that means, of course, is fairly opaque—but I think most observers had supposed, as I had, that it encompassed user IP addresses. Since these can be crucial to linking a wide array of online activity to a particular user, their exclusion would somewhat limit the potential of NSLs to undermine Internet anonymity. Whether IPs are covered, however, may well depend on the specific service in question—and it is not at all clear whether other providers will disclose IP addresses in response to NSLs.

Of course, what Google does not specify clearly is just what information does fall into the category of “toll billing records.” In all likelihood, however, it covers the equivalent of the kind of information about who is communicating with whom that might be found on a phone bill—such as a list of all the people with whom you exchange e-mails or Gchat instant messages, though again, given differences in how people use the Internet versus traditional phone service, such lists are likely to be substantially more revealing than any phone bill.

Child Abuse

From the Washington Examiner

In June 2011, 11-year-old Skylar Capo saved a baby woodpecker from her family’s cat. “I’ve just always loved animals,” the aspiring veterinarian told her local news station. “I couldn’t stand to watch it be eaten.”

After rescuing the bird, Capo kept it by her side in a small cage for a few days to make sure it wasn’t injured. She even took it along on a family trip to the local Lowe’s hardware store. With the hot sun beating down overhead, Capo decided to carry the cage inside the store so the tiny woodpecker wouldn’t get overheated in her car.

Little did she know, these acts of compassion violated a federal statute against the “possession” or “transport” of a migratory bird – or that a Virginia game warden would be on her family’s doorstep days later demanding payment of a $535 fine.

And today’s Washington Post reports that a seven-year old boy was suspended from school because he carefully created a handgun out of the poptart he was eating and then said “bang, bang” to a schoolmate. A time-out would have been an overreaction. A suspension?

Supreme Court Could Also Strike Down DOMA on Federalism Grounds

One of the more interesting and potentially influential amicus briefs in United States v. Windsor, the case challenging DOMA Section 3, is one filed by a group of federalism scholars, all of whom have some connection to Cato and/or are generally sympathetic to the positions we take at the Center for Constitutional Studies. As Dale Carpenter puts it on the Volokh Conspiracy blog:

Today I’m proud to join three of my co-Conspirators — Jonathan Adler, Randy Barnett, and Ilya Somin — as well as Ernie Young and Lynn Baker in filing an amicus brief in United States v. Windsor arguing that DOMA Section 3 is unconstitutional. While this conclusion is shared by 69% of constitutional law professors around the country, our route to that end is probably not as widely shared.

Our view is that Section 3 fails equal protection review for a reason quite distinct from the standard approaches relying on heightened-scrutiny analysis.  Whatever else may be its constitutional defects, Section 3 is not a constitutional exercise of any enumerated federal power.  It is also not a “necessary and proper” measure to carry into execution any of Congress’s enumerated powers.  Instead, it is an unprecedented expansion of federal authority into a domain traditionally controlled by the states.  The federal government claims a hitherto unknown and sweeping power to determine marital and family status.  While Congress has not (yet?) claimed a statutory authority to bar states from recognizing specific marriages, it has greatly complicated and burdened their police power to do so through the enforcement of DOMA. It may well be that Congress has authority to limit access to specific federal benefits otherwise available to validly married people.  But Section 3, as an across-the-board enactment untethered to any specific power, is not plainly adapted to serve any “legitimate” interest of the federal government.

This may be an appealing argument for those on the Court who take federalism seriously and have a problem with Section 3 but may not be ready to extend the constitutional right to marry to same-sex couples. Coincidentally, the justice most likely to fall into that category is Anthony Kennedy—who will almost certainly be the swing vote in these cases—but the four “conservative” justices could also sign on to something like this even as they vehemently reject the broader constitutional argument in Hollingsworth v. Perry (the Prop 8 case) or in future cases challenging state denials of marriage licenses.  The four “liberal” justices, meanwhile, don’t care about limiting federal power through constitutional structure, but will presumably vote to strike down Section 3 on equal protection grounds.

Indeed, as I wrote in December, “I could see an opinion stating that marriage is an issue that our federal system leaves to the states and the federal government has to respect each state’s definition of it in granting benefits based on that status. That would mean that federal benefits would operate differently in different states, but so be it; gay married couples would have an incentive to live in the growing number of states that recognize their relationships.”

This federalism argument may ultimately be too clever because the federal government certainly does have the power to define the terms in its statutes, which would collapse the issue in Windsor back to whether the restriction on DOMA’s definition of marriage survives equal protection analysis (on which see Cato’s brief). It would also probably be a mere way-station on the road to full marriage equality, becoming increasingly academic as more states allow same-sex marriage. But, as I said, it’s more likely to resonate with certain members of the Court—and could have the potentially more important benefit of strengthening federalism in other areas of policy.

It would also mean the striking down of arguably the most signficiant federal law on federalism grounds in the modern era. We shall see.