Topic: Law and Civil Liberties

President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing

Following the protests and riots in Ferguson last year, President Obama created a Task Force on 21st Century Policing to examine policing problems and make recommendations.  The Task Force issued its final report last month.  In this post, I want to highlight the numerous ways in which the report would expand the role of the federal government.

By way of background, policing is supposed to be the near-exclusive province of state and local government under the U.S. Constitution.  The federal government is nevertheless constantly seeking to expand its jurisdiction.  The number of federal crimes and the number of federal law enforcement agents keeps rising.  Members of Congress also like to throw millions and millions of dollars at local police departments.  Of course, having accepted the money, local policymakers are now swamped with myriad federal conditions and mandates.  On top of that, the feds have entwined themselves with local police with the creation of hundreds of permanent joint federal-state police units that operate to enforce narcotics, guns, and immigration offenses.

President Obama’s Task Force is now recommending a host of actions to expand the role of the federal government even further.  Here is an excerpt from the final report (pdf):

The President should support and provide funding for the creation of a National Crime and Justice Task Force to review and evaluate all components of the criminal justice system for the purpose of making recommendations to the country on comprehensive criminal justice reform.

The President should promote programs that take a comprehensive and inclusive look at community-based initiatives that address the core issues of poverty, education, health, and safety.

The Federal Government should develop survey tools and instructions for use of such a model to prevent local departments from incurring the expense and to allow for consistency across jurisdictions.

The Federal Government should create a Law Enforcement Diversity Initiative designed to help communities diversify law enforcement departments to reflect the demographics of the community.

Discretionary federal funding for law enforcement programs could be influenced by that department’s efforts to improve their diversity and cultural and linguistic responsiveness.

State-by-State Data on the Number of Taxpayers King v. Burwell Would Free from Illegal Taxes

A ruling for the challengers in King v. Burwell would have benefits that swamp other effects of the ruling, including:

  • More than 67 million Americans would be freed from illegal taxes in the form of ObamaCare’s employer mandate.
  • More than 11 million Americans would be freed from an illegal tax averaging $1,200 (i.e., ObamaCare’s individual mandate).
  • Affected workers could receive a pay raise of around $900 per year.
  • The ruling could create an estimated 237,000 new jobs.
  • It could add an estimated 1.3 million workers added to the labor force.
  • It could result in more hours and higher incomes for 3.3 million part-time workers.

The number of people who could benefit from a ruling for the challengers is, therefore, more than ten times the number who would lose an illegal subsidy. And, as discussed here, the pool of people who need such subsidies may be as small as one-tenth the number receiving them.

Click here for state-by-state data on the number of employers and taxpayers who would benefit from King v. Burwell.

An Illustrated Guide to Civil Asset Forfeiture

This cheerfully drawn comic from the Daily Signal does an excellent job highlighting the insanity of civil asset forfeiture.  It begins with a quintessentially American premise: a young person setting out on his own, all wordly possessions in hand, to start a new life as an adult.  Far be it from me to spoil the rest:

 

Arresting your property

 

If such stories seem unbelievable (it is a cartoon after all), be sure and check out the recent all-too-real stories of Joseph Rivers and Charles Clarke, for whom this cartoon surely hits too close to home.  Even they are only the tip of the iceberg.

New Mexico has taken the initiative to end this inherently abusive practice once and for all, and there are active reform efforts underway in California, Michigan, Montana, Oklahoma, Maryland, and others. But until every other state and the federal government join in, these incredible tales of legalized theft and policing for profit will continue.

FreedomWorks recently released a handy map accompanying their report on state forfeiture laws. How does your state stack up?  

 

 

Two Years On, the TSA Is Still Not Subject to Law

Two years ago tomorrow, the Transportation Security Administration stopped accepting comments on its proposal to use “Advanced Imaging Technology” for primary screening at airports. The end of the comment period on nude body scanning would ordinarily promise the issuance of a final rule that incorporates knowledge gained by hearing from the public. But this is no ordinary rulemaking. This is an agency that does not follow the law.

It was almost four years ago that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ordered TSA to do a notice-and-comment rulemaking on its nude body scanning policy. Few rules “impose [as] directly and significantly upon so many members of the public,” the court said in ordering the agency to “promptly” publish its policy, take comments, and consider them in formalizing its rules.

What’s Left at the Supreme Court?

After yesterday’s colorful opinion day – involving raisins, motels, and Spiderman – the Supreme Court announced that it would be handing down more rulings on Thursday and Friday, with Monday also currently indicated as a decision day. So what’s left to decide? (Not to be confused with “why are Court decisions moving left? – a remarkably premature assessment given the cases remaining, not to mention coding issues regarding liberal/conservative.)

Of Raisins and Property Rights

Further to Ilya’s overview of today’s Supreme Court decision in Horne v. Dept. of Agriculture, it should be noted that it’s taken Marvin and Laura Horne over a decade to vindicate their rights in the raisins the government sought to take “for their benefit,” under one of the many economically foolish New Deal and later agricultural marketing schemes Congress has seen fit to enact. But in this lengthy process, the Hornes have helped the Court to settle a fundamental principle, namely, that the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause prohibits the government from taking both real and personal property for public use without just compensation.

At the same time, the Court is still confused in its effort to distinguish and adjudicate what have come to be called “physical” and “regulatory” takings. In Horne, the Court held, the government sought to “physically” take 47 percent of the Hornes’ raisins, much as ten years ago, in its infamous Kelo decision, the Court upheld the City of New London, Connecticut’s “physical” taking of Suzette’s Kelo’s little pink house. In other words, the government sought to take title to the Hornes’ property in their raisins.

By contrast, in a regulatory taking, the government, through regulation, takes certain otherwise legitimate uses an owner has in his property. The owner retains the title; but it’s usually a much devalued title. For almost a century, the Court has struggled to fit these regulatory takings under the Takings Clause—ever since Justice Holmes in 1922 wrote that a regulatory restriction that goes “too far” amounts to a taking requiring compensation. The three-part test the Court set forth in 1978 in its Penn Central decision only muddied those waters. In fact, we see that here when Chief Justice Roberts tries to drive home the point that in Horne we have a physical taking. In response to a point made by the dissent he writes that in such cases “‘we do not ask … whether [the taking] deprives the owner of all economically valuable use’ of the item taken”—citing one of the three Penn Central criteria.

Roberts is right: we don’t ask that when title is taken, as here. But in labeling Horne a “physical” taking, and distinguishing it from a taking that “‘deprives the owner of all economically valuable use’ of the item taken,” Roberts opens up a question: Just what does “the item” refer to? Clearly, Roberts means to refer to “the property” in the sense of the whole parcel or the underlying fee. But that is not “the item” that is taken in a regulatory taking. The owner still owns the fee. What is usually taken is certain “economically valuable uses”—but not all such uses. Indeed, in many regulatory cases the owner is entitled to compensation only when all the uses are taken. That was the case in the Court’s 1992 Lucas decision, where the regulatory restrictions left the owner with an effectively worthless title.

The nub of the matter here is really quite simple, and it was stated by James Madison in his famous 1792 essay, Property: “In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.” In other words, it’s not simply the underlying fee that is our property. All the legitimate uses that go with it are our property as well. Thus, a taking occurs and compensation is due not simply when that last use is taken, which is what the Lucas Court effectively held, but when the first use is taken and the title is accordingly devalued. Those uses—those “items”—are our property too. Perhaps the Court will one day give us an integrated theory of property of a kind that Madison understood—before the rise of the modern regulatory state.

Patel: Right Result, Wan Rationale

Making short work of the idea that facial challenges aren’t available under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court ruled today in Los Angeles v. Patel that a city may not require its hotels to turn over their business records without some opportunity for review of the government’s demands. It’s the right result, but the Court was too quiet about its treatment of Fourth Amendment doctrine, and it did not take the opportunity to fully address situations like the case presented, in which the government dragoons private businesses into surveillance on its behalf.

Justice Sotomayor, writing for a 5-4 majority, held: “the provision of the Los Angeles Municipal Code that requires hotel operators to make their registries available to the police on demand is facially unconstitutional because it penalizes them for declining to turn over their records without affording them any opportunity for pre-compliance review.” Justice Scalia led one bloc of dissenters believing it was reasonable to institute this kind of regulation on business owners suspected of no substantive crime because their facilities are sometimes used for crime. Justice Alito dissented as well, arguing that there should be no facial challenge to the statute because constitutional applications of it exist.

Had the stars lined up, the Court might have used the Patel case to address simmering issues around current Fourth Amendment doctrine, as the Cato Institute’s brief for the Court suggested. The Court indeed eschewed the backward “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, which finds that Fourth Amendment interest exists when people reasonably feel that it does. It instead examined whether the government’s scheme was reasonable, which is where the language of the Fourth Amendment focuses courts’ attention. But the Court did not broadcast the inapplicability of “reasonable expectation” doctrine, so most lawyers and lower courts will probably not realize that another in a growing line of cases is applying the Fourth Amendment in a new and better way, by hewing more closely to the text.

Part of the reason the Court didn’t take all the constitutional bait was the unusually narrow challenge the hoteliers brought. They attacked the collection of information by the government, granting for the sake of argument in this case that the government has the power to require them to collect information about their customers for the government’s later use. Had the Court considered the totality of what we called “the warrantless search scheme,” it would have had to assess whether it is reasonable in our constitutional system for private businesses to be dragooned into wholesale, comprehensive surveillance on behalf of the government. That scope might have brought the Court’s conservatives off the sidelines and into defending the degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. (Surely, the government couldn’t have conscripted businesses into mass surveillance of the public at the time of the framing.)

Folks who are paying attention will recognize that the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test continues to recede in importance. We will continue to wait, though, for the case that clearly and articulately applies the right against unreasonable seizures and searches to information as such. While Patel is a technical win, some later case or cases will have to truly address how the Fourth Amendment is to be administered in the modern era.