Topic: Foreign Policy and National Security

New at Cato Unbound: Ted Galen Carpenter Replies to Gerecht

Today at Cato Unbound Cato’s own Ted Galen Carpenter argues that Reuel Marc Gerecht’s strategy of bombing Iranian nuclear facilities may be harder than advertised and that “thousands of innocent Iranians would perish in U.S. air strikes.” Such an attack might trigger a “massive regional crisis,” Carpenter says. “America’s troubles with the Islamic world do not yet constitute a war of civilizations,” he writes, “but Gerecht’s strategy could well produce that result.” Carpenter argues that the U.S. should try to persuade Iran to give up its nuke program by offering a “grand bargain,” and if that doesn’t work, should pursue a policy of containment and deterrence, that, while “nerve-wracking,” has proved effective against deadlier and more fanatical regimes.

Don’t miss replies to Gerecht on Friday from Edward N. Luttwak and on Monday from Anthony H. Cordesman.

Bring Back the Baggage, Please

This is well past its purchase-by date, but Dafna Linzer had a Washington Post Outlook piece in March on the National Security Council’s “Sesame Street Generation.” Not as sneering as the title implies, the article describes the first generation of NSC officials to come of age in an era of American unipolarity. If the article is any indication, my exceedingly low expectations for my generation may have been a touch too optimistic.

In one particularly breathtaking passage, Meghan O’Sullivan, the president’s point person for Iraq on the NSC, describes her intellectual heritage and how that shapes her approach to policy:

For many of the generals with whom O’Sullivan consults in her current job, the painful experience of Vietnam permeates their thinking on Iraq. Not for O’Sullivan. “We are the first post-Vietnam generation, without the baggage of Vietnam, which doesn’t mean we don’t try to learn some of the lessons from there about counterinsurgency and so forth, but it’s not my first frame of reference and I think that’s a good thing,” said O’Sullivan.

Actually, having a pessimistic view of counterinsurgency would probably be a good thing. The new Army field manual on counterinsurgency is only the latest indication that the sunny optimism of the Bush administration was a mistake, and that counterinsurgency is much, much harder than administration officials thought it was before we went in to Iraq.

After the first Persian Gulf war, President George H.W. Bush famously exclaimed “By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all!” It appears his son, and the Sesame Street Generation at the NSC—the Best and the Brightest, if you will, of Generation X—are doing their level best to bring it back.

Fake IDs Save Lives in Iraq

A fascinating AP report says that Iraqis are using fake IDs in light of the recent growth in sectarian killings.  The major groups in Iraq are not distinguishable by physical traits, but they are by name.  To avoid being killed, people are getting false identification cards:

Surnames refer to tribe and clan, while first names are often chosen to honor historical figures revered by one sect but sometimes despised by the other. 

For about $35, someone with a common Sunni name like Omar could become Abdul-Mahdi, a Shiite name that might provide safe passage through dangerous areas.

This illustrates very well how genuinely complex security can be.  At any time, the relevant authorities in Iraq could have decreed that all people get (as near as possible) forgery-proof biometric ID cards and carry them at all times - a great way to batten down a country, right? 

Doing so would have fed directly into the strategy being used by the enemies of peace and security in Iraq today: setting up fake checkpoints and killing people who arrive there members of the wrong sect. Identity cards had a role in the Rwandan genocide just over 10 years ago, as well.

Those who believe that identity cards are a simple route to good security, well, they suffer what is so rightly known as the fatal conceit. Central planning that deprives people of control over their lives can be deadly–literally–in surprising and unpredictable ways.

Thank goodness for the fake ID outlets in Iraq today, and thank goodness the promoters of ”secure ID“ in the United States didn’t take their message to Iraq.

The tradeoffs involved in identification are discussed in my book, Identity Crisis.

Geneva and Guantanamo

The news wires are saying there has been a major policy development concerning Guantanamo Bay.  The Bush administration is now changing its stance with regard to the Geneva Convention, reports say.

The White House says today’s announcement does not reflect a change in policy.  That is probably right.  That is, the Supreme Court ruling in Hamdan established some new law with respect to the application of Geneva to detainees and the Pentagon is now simply tinkering with some policies to comply with that ruling.

Because Clintonian word games still pervade the capital, however, one must scrutinize these policy announcements very closely.  For example, whatever the Pentagon is saying about Guantanamo today may be limited to the Pentagon and to the men held at Guantanamo Bay.  I say that because in 2002, President Bush issued a directive that pledged humane treatment to all prisoners in U.S. custody.  Attorney General Alberto Gonzales later admitted in 2005 that that directive did not apply to officers of the CIA and other nonmilitary personnel. 

UK National ID in Collapse - U.S. National ID to Follow?

The Sunday Times (U.K.) reports that “Tony Blair’s flagship identity cards scheme is set to fail and may not be introduced for a generation.” The Times cites leaked e-mails reflecting senior officials’ belief that the plan to subject the U.K. population to the regimentation of a national ID system is falling apart. Even a backup, scaled-down national ID card isn’t “remotely feasible,” according to the e-mails cited by the report. Ministers who are pressing ahead with the plan are “ignoring reality.”

Similar e-mails may well be floating around the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, which will be issuing regulations to flesh out the REAL ID Act this summer this fall after November 7th. (No bureaucrat with an ounce of political acumen would drop a $9-billion-dollar unfunded surveillance-mandate before the mid-term election.)

This is not bad news. A national ID system is useful for controlling a law-abiding population, but not useful for securing against law-breakers, particularly committed threats like terrorists - unless it is part of a total surveillance system.

The failure to implement a national ID system in the U.S. would represent little loss to the nation in terms of security, and a substantial gain in terms of preserved freedom and autonomy. All this is discussed in my new book, Identity Crisis: How Identification is Overused and Misunderstood.

Unlike the U.K., where a national ID is apparently a project identified with Tony Blair, the Bush Administration does not have to look for a face-saving alternative. The U.S. national ID was not a Bush Administration project, but something it accepted in a political bargain. The Administration can now (rightly) declare it impossible to implement and inconsistent with American values, then work with Congress to repeal the REAL ID Act.

New at Cato Unbound: What to Do about Iran?

In this month’s Cato Unbound, “What to Do about Iran,” Reuel Marc Gerecht, resident fellow of the American Enterprise Institute and author of The Islamic Paradox, argues in a provocative new essay that diplomatic attempts keep Iran’s clerical regime from getting nuclear weapons will fail, so the U.S. must choose between preemptively bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities or allowing the mullahs to have the bomb. Arguing that the latter option “would empower its worst enemies in Tehran and spiritually invigorate all Muslim radicals who live on American weakness,” Gerecht advises the former: a policy of preemptively bombing Iran’s nuclear sites.

This week and next, a panel of defense strategy and foreign policy experts will challenge Gerecht’s argument, starting with Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, and followed by Edward N. Luttwak, senior fellow of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and author of widely discussed recent article in Commentary, “Three Reasons Not to Bomb Iran — Yet,” and Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and author of Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities.

Is Gerecht right? Are all non-military approaches to the Iranian nuke bound to fail? If so, should the U.S. resign itself to a nuclear Iran and rely on deterrence as it did during the Cold War? Or is deterrence ill-suited to a regime run by religious extremists?

Stay tuned for incisive commentary and criticism by some of America’s leading defense policy thinkers.

Remembering Japanese Internment

Over the 4th of July, I headed out West to a family reunion in a very remote part of the U.S.: Minidoka County, Idaho–an apocalyptically stark stretch of mile-high lava rock and sagebrush in the heart of the Snake River basin, unfolding like a moonscape from the base of the Albion mountain range at the Utah-Idaho border.

I’d grown up on my dad’s stories about his Idaho childhood. One story that intrigued was his very early memory of working my grandfather’s fields alongside Italian and German World War II POWs, who were held in a prisoner-of-war camp near Twin Falls, Idaho. POWs were used to remedy a shortage of farmhands in agricultural areas throughout the U.S.

Not long ago, I asked my dad if any World War II Japanese internment camps had operated in the Minidoka area. He wasn’t aware of any. Imagine my surprise then when I learned of this memorial service, held today, for the Minidoka internment camp–one of the larger Japanese internment camps operated during World War II.

Its no surprise my dad–otherwise an encyclopedia of information about southern Idaho–was caught short on this question. Virtually nothing of substance remains to memorialize the camp today, although a more substantial memorial is planned.

Minidoka residents–fond of calling their region the “Magic Valley“–shouldn’t get off so easily. Just as the government loaned Axis POWs to some local farmers, it loaned Japanese-Americans to others. Some 2,300 “Nisei” camp residents worked area sugar beet farms on “agricultural leave” from the Minidoka camp–hard, backbreaking work at a time when local farming was undertaken without modern tractors or modern irrigtation technology. To be sure, the camp residents weren’t technically forced to work, as this bit of outrageously upbeat 1943 government propaganda notes–but the Japanese internees had little other choice of employment.

This shameful episode–part of the darker history of communities throughout the West and a telling example of the worst that can happen when courts abdicate oversight of the political branches during wartime–deserves substantial local recognition in Minidoka and other host communities. For more about the location of internment camps, see here and here.