Topic: Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy

Hunting Whales: The Problem with Prosecuting SIFIs

Yesterday, Attorney General Loretta Lynch made the unprecedented announcement that five of the world’s largest banks – JP Morgan, Citi, Barclays, RBS, and UBS – would be pleading guilty to criminal charges.  According to the allegations, traders and executives working at the banks’ foreign exchange (FOREX) desks colluded through the use of chat rooms to fix currency prices on a daily basis.   The fines are in the hundreds of millions, with Barclays total penalty (including those levied by US and UK authorities) at $2.4 billion topping the charts and Citigroup’s $925 million following behind.  According to Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell, these guilty pleas “communicate loud and clear that we will hold financial institutions accountable for criminal misconduct.”

But do they?  Can they?  In the world of “too big to fail,” JP MorganChase and Citigroup are whales among whales.  Dodd-Frank, with its “living will” provision, was supposed to end too big to fail by requiring that systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) create a plan for an orderly unwinding in the case of failure.  But this provision contains the seeds of its own destruction.  By designating firms as SIFIs, the government has made the too big to fail designation explicit when it was previously only implicit.

If a SIFI behaves badly, even very very badly (and there is no doubt that, if the allegations are true, the FOREX traders at these banks behaved badly indeed), how much can it be punished?  While corporations can be held criminally liable, you obviously cannot imprison a corporation.  Instead, criminal penalties for companies mean two things: (1) public censure and (2) fines.  The big banks are not very popular these days and it’s unlikely the taint of public censure will cause much additional pain. 

So that leaves the government with fines.  For a fine to be a punishment, it must be large enough to hurt.  These fines are not small.  Even for a bank as large as Citi, $925 million is a chunk of change.   But in imposing these fines, the government must walk a fine line.  If Citi is a SIFI, can the government risk imposing a fine large enough that it risks destabilizing the entire company?  Almost certainly not. 

Complicating the government’s position is the fact that three of the banks – RBS, Barclays, and UBS – are foreign (RBS and Barclays are British, and UBS is Swiss).  These banks have large footprints in the U.S. markets but, even if they were to falter, the government would be hard-pressed to offer a bailout even if it wanted to.  Consider what happened during the financial crisis.  Several large foreign banks were put at risk when AIG failed.  Because the U.S. government could not, for political reasons if for no other, directly bail out these banks (even though their failure would impact U.S. markets), it instead engineered the so-called “back door bailout” by which TARP funds injected into AIG wound up in the hands of foreign banks.  If the Department of Justice were to impose a heavy enough fine on RBS, Barclays, and UBS today that it really hurt those banks, that is, that it put any significant part of their business at risk, it could harm U.S. markets.

Secret price-fixing is bad.  It distorts markets and prevents them from performing one of their most essential functions: price discovery.  But having doubled-down on the too big to fail designation, the government has put itself into an impossible situation when it comes to reining in SIFIs’ bad behavior.

How Much Profit Is There in Thwarting Financial Innovation?

Ben Lawsky is resigning as superintendent of financial services in New York. The New York Times says he plans to open his own firm and lecture at Stanford University. The Post reports that he will consult on digital currencies such as Bitcoin.

The move West suggests that Lawsky may want a piece of the action in Silicon Valley. If he does, it’s worth noting that the action is not in New York.

Lawsky was a leading Bitcoin antagonist. Bitcoin has not particularly flourished in New York, and Lawsky’s work makes it unlikely that New York will be a Bitcoin-friendly jurisdiction.

Ben Lawsky welcomed Bitcoin in August 2013 by sending out subpoenas to everyone in the Bitcoin world. He went on television talking about the “real dangers” of Bitcoin, including use by “narco-terrorists.” (Asked for evidence of Bitcoin misuse, he cited a centralized digital currency called Liberty Reserve, which is not Bitcoin.)

Around the same time, Lawsky precipitously announced a plan for a special “BitLicense.” Shortly after producing it, his office violated New York’s Freedom of Information Law by refusing to release the research and analysis that it claimed to have done to validate the regulation. The NYDFS found that the BitLicense would have no impact on employment in the state, after which investors poured hundreds of millions of dollars into Bitcoin companies outside of New York. (See my comments to the NYDFS for more.)

The Very Model of a Modern Monetary Economist

I’m very well acquainted… with matters mathematical,
I understand equations, both the simple and quadratical,
About binomial theorem I’m teeming with a lot o’ news,
With many cheerful facts about the square of the hypotenuse.
I’m very good at integral and differential calculus;
I know the scientific names of beings animalculous:
In short, in matters vegetable, animal, and mineral,
I am the very model of a modern Major-General
.[1]

One of the chief goals Cato’s Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives is to make people aware of alternatives to conventional monetary systems—that is, systems managed by central bankers wielding considerable, if not unlimited, discretionary authority. The challenge isn’t just one of informing the general public: even professional monetary economists, with relatively few exceptions, are surprisingly ill-informed about such alternatives.

I recently came across a document that perfectly illustrates this last point: a power point presentation by a senior Federal Reserve Bank research economist, given at a conference aimed at school teachers specializing in economics.

I have no desire to single-out the economist in question, who I will therefore refer to simply as “our economist.” On the contrary: I offer his presentation as an example of the all-too common tendency for otherwise competent monetary economists (and our economist is in fact very accomplished) to misread the historical record regarding potential alternatives to central banking and to otherwise give such alternatives short shrift.

Wasting a Crisis: A Book Forum

Wasting a CrisisThis is a story we all know: the Great Depression was caused by market failure, the predictable fall-out from the excesses of the unrestrained, unregulated, Wild West that was the securities markets at the dawn of the 20th century. After all, before the 1930s, there was no Securities and Exchange Commission. The state securities laws, the so-called “blue sky laws,” were also products of the early 20th century, largely implemented between 1911 and 1931. These laws, as well as the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, tamed the wild speculators that had been defrauding the American public by requiring transparency in the markets and promoting thorough disclosure in securities offerings.

But is that story true? Paul Mahoney, Dean of the University of Virginia School of Law, has dug deeply into this narrative in his recent book, Wasting a Crisis: Why Securities Regulation Fails. The results of his research and analysis reveal a mismatch between the received wisdom about the causes of the Depression and the actual data, and a pattern of crisis-narrative-regulation that has persisted through the recent Great Recession and the implementation of Dodd-Frank.

Dean Mahoney recently shared his thoughts on these and related issues at a book forum at the Cato Institute. Joining us was also banking regulation scholar Heidi Schooner of the Columbus School of Law at the Catholic University of America, leading to an interesting discussion of the externalities of bank failures and the application of banking regulation principles to non-bank entities.

Watch the video of the event:

Instead of the Fed

That, some of you may recall, was the name of a November 1, 2013 conference put on by the Mercatus Center. (The full name was actually “Instead of the Fed: Past and Present Alternatives to the Federal Reserve System”). The proceedings of that conference–or most of them, at any rate–are now available in a special issue of the Journal of Financial Stability, edited by yours truly.

Although online access to the articles is by subscription only, individual contributors have temporary, open links to their own articles. Here is mine on “Synthetic Commodity Money.”

[Cross-posted from Alt-M.org]

ALJs and the Home Court Advantage

The SEC has come under fire lately for its use – some might say overuse – of internal administrative proceedings.  The SEC’s use of administrative proceedings and administrative law judges (ALJs) is by no means unique within the federal government.  Thirty-four agencies currently have ALJs.  Nor is the SEC the heaviest user of administrative proceedings or ALJs; the Social Security Administration has that distinction, with more than 1,300 ALJs according to the most recent data available.  The SEC, by comparison, has only five ALJ positions, two of which are recent additions. 

The SEC’s ALJs have been in the spotlight due to a provision in Dodd-Frank that expands their ability to impose fines.  In the past, the SEC could impose monetary sanctions only on individuals and entities registered with the Commission – typically brokers, investment advisors, and similar entities and their employees.  By registering with the SEC, it was reasoned, these individuals and organizations had submitted to the SEC’s jurisdiction.  Others could be brought before the SEC’s tribunals for violating federal securities laws, and the ALJs could make findings of fact (that is, decide which side’s version of the facts was correct) and issue cease and desist orders, but could not impose fines.  Instead, the SEC’s lawyers would have to bring a separate case in federal district court.  Under Dodd-Frank, registered and unregistered persons are treated the same.

Administrative proceedings have their advantages.  Like a federal judge, an ALJ can issue subpoenas, hold hearings, and decide cases.  Because an ALJ’s cases deal with a very narrow area of law – only that related directly to the ALJ’s agency – the ALJ’s knowledge of that area tends to be deeper than that of a federal judge who hears a broad range of civil and criminal cases.  The proceedings before ALJs tend to be somewhat truncated, with fewer procedural requirements than federal district court, allowing the case to be decided more quickly. 

Lessons from the Ayr Bank Failure

One consequence of the financial crisis of 2008-09 has been renewed interest in the merits of contingent convertible debt as a mechanism for equity bail-ins at moments of acute financial distress. Should it fail, a financial institution’s contingent bonds are automatically converted into equity shares. History suggests that convertible debt can help to preserve financial stability by limiting the spillover effects of individual financial institution failures.

A particularly revealing historical illustration of this advantage of contingent debt comes from the Scottish free banking era. From 1716 to 1845, the Scottish financial system functioned with no official central bank or lender of last resort, no public (or private) monopoly on currency issuance, no legal reserve or capital requirements, and no formal limits on bank size, at a time when Scotland’s was a classic emerging economy with large speculative capital flows, a fixed exchange rate, and substantial external debt. Despite this, Scotland’s banking sector survived many major shocks, including two severe balance of payments crises arising from political disturbances during the Seven Years’ War.

The stability of the Scottish banking system depended in part on the use it made of voluntary contingent liability arrangements. Until the practice was prohibited in 1765, some Scottish banks included an “optional clause” on their larger-denomination notes. The clause allowed the banks’ directors to convert the notes into short-term, interest-bearing bonds. Although the clause was seldom invoked, it was successfully employed as a means for preventing large-scale exchange rate speculators from draining the Scottish banks’ specie reserves and remitting them to London during war-related balance of payments crises–that is, as a private and voluntary alternative to government-imposed capital controls.

Contingent debt also helped to make Scottish bank failures less costly and disruptive. If an unlimited liability Scottish bank failed, its shorter-term creditors were again sometimes converted into bondholders, while its shareholders were liable for its debts to the full extent of their personal wealth. Although the Scottish system lacked a lender of last resort, the unlimited liability of shareholders in bankrupt Scottish banks served as a substitute, with sequestration of shareholders’ personal estates serving to “bail them in” beyond their subscribed capital. The issuance of tradeable bonds to short-term creditors, secured by mortgages to shareholders’ estates, served in turn to limit bank counter-parties’ exposure to losses, keeping credit flowing despite adverse shocks.

A particularly fascinating illustration of how such devices worked came with the spectacular collapse in June 1772 of the large Scottish banking firm of Douglas, Heron & Co., better known as the Ayr (or Air) Bank, after the parish where its head office was located. The Ayr collapsed when the failure of a London bond dealer in Scottish bonds caused its creditors to panic. The creditors doubted that the bank could could meet liabilities that, thanks to its reckless lending, had ballooned to almost £1.3 million. The disruption of Scottish credit ended quickly, however, when the Ayr’s partners resorted to a £500,000 bond issue, secured by £3,000,000 in mortgages upon their often vast personal estates—including several dukedoms. By this means the Ayr Bank managed to satisfy creditors, at 5% interest, as the Ayr’s assets, together with those of its partners, were gradually liquidated. In modern parlance, the Ayr Bank had been transformed into a “bad bank,” whose sole function was to gradually work off its assets and repay creditors while the immense landed wealth of its proprietors’ personal estates provided a financial backstop. Creditors were thus temporarily satisfied with fully secured, negotiable bonds, which were eventually redeemed in full, with interest.

We are unlikely today to witness a return to unlimited liability for financial institution shareholders. The extensive and effective use of contingent liability contracts during the Scottish free banking episode nevertheless offers important evidence concerning private market devices for limiting the disruptive consequences of financial-market crises. When compared to the contemporary practice of public socialization of loss through financial bail-outs, such private market alternatives appear to deserve serious consideration. Most importantly, perhaps, by encouraging closer monitoring of financial institutions by contingently liable creditors and equity holders, these private alternatives appear, in the Scottish case at least, not only to have made crises less severe, but also to have made them far less common.

This post is based on Tyler Goodspeed’s doctoral dissertation, a revised version of which is under consideration at Harvard University Press under the title Legislating Instability: Adam Smith, Free Banking, and the Financial Crisis of 1772.

[Cross-posted from Alt-M.org]