Topic: Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy

Ukraine: The World’s Second-Highest Inflation

I estimate the current annual implied inflation rate in Ukraine to be 92%. This is the world’s second-highest inflation rate, far lower than Venezuela’s 480% but slightly higher than Syria’s 75%.

Ukraine's Annual Inflation Rates

I regularly estimate the annual inflation rates for Ukraine. To calculate those inflation rates, I use dynamic purchasing power parity (PPP) theory. I computed the 92% rate by using black-market exchange rate data that the Johns Hopkins-Cato Institute Troubled Currencies Project has collected over the past year.

A recent front-page feature article in the New York Times attests to the severity of Ukraine’s inflation problem. Danny Hakim’s reportage contains many anecdotes that are consistent with my inflation estimates based on PPP. For example, chocolate that used to cost 80 Ukrainian hryvnia per kilogram has dramatically increased to 203 Ukrainian hryvnia per kilogram over the past 17 months – a 154% increase. On an annualized basis, this amounts to an inflation rate of 93% – almost exactly the same number I obtained when applying the scientific PPP methodology.

As evidence of the Alice in Wonderland nature of Ukraine’s current state of affairs, President Petro Poroshenko penned an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal on June 11. The title of his unguarded, gushing piece perfectly reflects the sentiments contained in his article: We’re Making Steady Progress in Ukraine, Despite Putin.

The President failed to even allude to Ukraine’s inflation problem. He is apparently unaware of the harsh realities facing the citizens of his country. He is also apparently unaware that his finance minister, Natalie Jaresko, whom he praises to high heaven, was recently in Washington, D.C., where she used a new Ukrainian law as cover to threaten a sovereign debt default. The reportage on these threats appeared in London’s Financial Times on June 11, the same day the Wall Street Journal published President Poroshenko’s op-ed.

It is time for Ukraine to get real.

ALJs in Limbo

A number of cases have been filed recently against the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), challenging its use of in-house administrative law judges (ALJs).  As I discussed in my earlier post on this topic, the SEC’s use of ALJs has come under close scrutiny lately because of concerns that, in the wake of a provision in Dodd-Frank expanding ALJs’ power, the SEC has elected to use its in-house procedures more frequently and that this use may have increased the SEC’s ability to prevail in enforcement actions.  Of particular concern is the fact that administrative proceedings lack many of the protections for defendants that litigation in federal courts provide, including: the option of having the case decided by a jury; access to the government’s evidence; and the ability to exclude certain evidence traditionally believed to be unreliable (such as hearsay).    

While a number of these cases have been dismissed, Monday finally garnered a win: Charles Hill succeeded in getting a federal court to issue an injunction that prohibits the SEC from continuing its case against him using its in-house ALJ.  Having been charged with insider trading and brought before an SEC ALJ, Hill filed suit against the SEC in federal court claiming the administrative proceeding was unconstitutional on three different grounds.  Although the court disagreed with two of his arguments, it found in his favor on the third – that the ALJs’ appointment violates the appointments clause because ALJs are “inferior officers.”

Iceland: Hayek Got It Right

According to recent reportage in The Economist, “Many economists point to Iceland as a case study of what should be done during an economic crisis: devalue your currency, impose capital controls and avoid excessive austerity.” Not so fast.

Capital controls are for the birds. Nobelist, Friedrich Hayek, got it right in his 1944 classic, The Road to Serfdom:

The extent of the control over all life that economic control confers is nowhere better illustrated than in the field of foreign exchanges. Nothing would at first seem to affect private life less than a state control of the dealings in foreign exchange, and most people will regard its introduction with complete indifference. Yet the experience of most Continental countries has taught thoughtful people to regard this step as the decisive advance on the path to totalitarianism and the suppression of individual liberty. It is, in fact, the complete delivery of the individual to the tyranny of the state, the final suppression of all means of escape—not merely for the rich but for everybody.

Sorry Taxpayers, Paying You Back Is Bad for My Bliss

If I had more time I’d write at greater length about this already infamous New York Times op-ed on student loans – which conspicuously fails to mention that the writer apparently got all of his degrees from pricey Columbia University – but the piece largely condemns itself. What I think is worth contemplating is how far out of mainstream thinking its sentiments are. Alas, maybe not that far.

No doubt most of the public wouldn’t support people not repaying their student loans just because they don’t like them, but the idea that freely chosen debt should be forgiven or curtailed is getting lots of play, from President Obama’s push for programs that would lead to forgiveness for big borrowers, to Senator Elizabeth Warren’s private debt buy-up proposal. And calls for free college are roughly the equivalent of calls for loan forgiveness. No, they aren’t saying that borrowers should renege on commitments they’ve already made, but they are saying that the college cost burden should be dropped even more squarely on the shoulder of taxpayers going forward.

Of course the ultimate problem, beyond the immediate, crushing cost, is that the more you have other people pay for students’ decisions, the more wasteful those decisions will tend to be. And even at current subsidy levels, those decisions are very, very wasteful. But that’s what happens when politicians decide taxpayers should never get in the way of a student’s bliss.

Rick Perry Is Right: Kill the Export-Import Bank and Cut Corporate Taxes

Former Texas governor Rick Perry announced his candidacy for the 2016 GOP presidential nomination earlier today. Many recall his 2012 bid, which came to a rather spectacular end when Gov. Perry, on live television, forgot the name of the third federal agency he promised to eliminate if elected president. However, in a recent WSJ op-ed, Gov. Perry redeemed himself by offering a real candidate for elimination: the Export-Import Bank.

The Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im) provides financing and loan guarantees at below-market rates to foreign purchasers looking to buy products from American exporters. For example, if Emirates Air wants to buy planes from Boeing, Ex-Im can provide a loan guarantee, reducing the interest rate Emirates will pay, and thus incentivizing Emirates to buy from Boeing rather than Airbus.

Ex-Im’s supporters claim that these subsidies create jobs and finance domestic economic growth. But, they fail to consider the ensuing downstream effects, which Bastiat termed “ce qu’on ne voit pas”–that which is unseen. As the Cato scholar Daniel Ikenson makes clear, every dollar Ex-Im provides to subsidize foreign purchasers of U.S.-produced products discriminates against U.S. consumers of the same products. For example, when Emirates receives a subsidy for planes because it is a foreign company, Emirates gets a leg up on Delta.

Venezuela: Not Hyperinflating—Yet

Although Venezuela’s inflation has soared (see: Up, Up, and Away), Venezuela is not experiencing a hyperinflationary episode–yet. Since the publication of Prof. Phillip Cagan’s famous 1956 study The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation, the convention has been to define hyperinflation as when the monthly inflation rate exceeds 50%.

I regularly estimate the monthly inflation rates for Venezuela. To calculate those inflation rates, I use dynamic purchasing power parity (PPP) theory. While Venezuela’s monthly inflation rate has not advanced beyond the 50% per month mark on a sustained basis, it is dangerously close. Indeed, Venezuela’s inflation rate is currently 45% per month (see the accompanying chart).

If inflation moves much higher, the legacy of Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution will be that Venezuela joins the rather select hyperinflation club as the 57th member. Yes, there have only been 56 documented hyperinflations

Venezuela's Monthly Inflation Rates

Ten Things Every Economist Should Know about the Gold Standard

At the risk of sounding like a broken record (well, OK–at the risk of continuing to sound like a broken record), I’d like to say a bit more about economists’ tendency to get their monetary history wrong. In particular, I’d like to take aim at common myths about the gold standard.

If there’s one monetary history topic that tends to get handled especially sloppily by monetary economists, not to mention other sorts, this is it. Sure, the gold standard was hardly perfect, and gold bugs themselves sometimes make silly claims about their favorite former monetary standard. But these things don’t excuse the errors many economists commit in their eagerness to find fault with that “barbarous relic.”

The false claims I have in mind are mostly ones I and others–notably Larry White–have countered before. Still I thought it would be useful to address them again here, because they’re still far from being dead horses, and also so that students wrapping-up the semester will have something convenient to send to their misinformed gold-bashing profs (though I urge them to wait until grades are in before sharing!).

For the sake of those who don’t care to wade through the whole post, here is a “jump to” list of the points covered:

  1. The Gold Standard wasn’t an instance of government price fixing. Not traditionally, anyway.
  2. A gold standard isn’t particularly expensive. In fact, fiat money tends to cost more.
  3. Gold supply “shocks” weren’t particularly shocking.
  4. The deflation that the gold standard permitted wasn’t such a bad thing.
  5. It wasn’t to blame for 19th-century American financial crises.
  6. On the whole, the classical gold standard worked remarkably well (while it lasted).
  7. It didn’t have to be “managed” by central bankers.
  8. In fact, central banking tends to throw a wrench in the works.
  9. “The “Gold Standard” wasn’t to blame for the Great Depression.
  10. It didn’t manage money according to any economists’ theoretical ideal. But neither has any fiat-money-issuing central bank.